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Executive Director, Institute for Democracy and Mediation (IDM)
In April 2018, IDM launched its benchmark study on religious 
tolerance in Albania. The study found that an overwhelming 
majority of Albanians welcome religious diversity, accept 
interreligious differences and reject the notion of supremacy of 
a given religion above others. This religious tolerance is a core 
value of Albanian society that, according to even Pope Francis, 
should not be taken for granted.
Indeed, continuous efforts are made to preserve the good 
interreligious relations in the country. A prime example is 
the work done by the Interreligious Council of Albania, which 
has made tireless efforts to promote interfaith dialogue both 
at home and abroad. Its unique experiences, challenges and 
lessons learned may find cross-border applicability. Individual 
input derived from the experience elsewhere, could play a 
similar role for neighbouring countries or contribute to interfaith 
dialogue at a global level. 
This opportunity to learn from each other’s experiences and 
discuss how religion can play a positive role in our societies, was 
one of the main catalysts to organising this regional conference. 
It offers a unique opportunity to discuss among religious leaders, 
politicians, academia and civil society leaders of the region, 
how we can enhance societal and policy mechanisms to better 
respond to future challenges with regards to religion in society. 
To foster the debate, IDM and its regional partners have drafted 
this conference volume, which explores the role of religion in 
Western Balkan societies. Given the uniqueness of our project, 
the first of its kind in the region, our call for evidence-based 
analysis garnered a high level of interest from researchers and 
practitioners from the region and beyond. Their findings are 
complimented by contextual research carried out by partner 
organisations in individual countries. Combined, this research 
enhances response mechanisms for policymakers and the society 
to face challenges, explore opportunities, and foster stakeholder 
capacities. While this study marks an important development, 
we believe the role of religion in our societies deserves further 
efforts of this kind. 
It is important to note that this event would not have been 
possible without the generous support of the Netherlands 
Foreign Ministry and its efforts to furthering reconciliation and 
Europeanization of the societal relations in Western Balkans. I 
would also like to take the opportunity to thank the President of 
the Republic of Albania, HE Ilir Meta, for his continuous support 
to initiatives that foster cooperation and understanding, in the 
country and in the wider region. 
Foreword by Guusje Korthals Altes
The Ambassador of the Netherlands to Albania
For the Netherlands, freedom of religion is a fundamental 
freedom and an important part of our foreign policy on human 
rights. The focus of this policy is at international cooperation, 
promoting the universality of individual human rights and 
strengthening the resilience of society.
The Netherlands is firmly committed to promote and protect the 
freedom of religion and belief, and does not distinguish between 
religious groups when doing so. Enjoying fundamental rights 
and freedoms is an essential part of an open and free society. 
A society that understands and embraces differences, that 
tolerates and respects without judging or discriminating. It is up 
to every individual to have a theistic or non-theistic belief, to 
change one’s religion or choose not to believe. 
Religious harmony and peaceful coexistence is an asset 
of Albania and its people. A characteristic to cherish and 
strengthen. Albania is an important example of a country where 
people of different faiths have the ability to coexist peacefully 
and with mutual respect for one another. An inspiring example to 
countries around the globe. 
Religion has long been an essential element in the societies 
of the Western Balkan region. It has achieved a prominent role 
in almost all aspects of society in the post-communist era. 
Differences in religious diversity and interreligious dialogue can 
be observed in the region’s multi-ethnic societies. The Western 
Balkans have a recent history of conflict in which religion played 
an important role. For ongoing reconciliation processes in the 
region, for the strengthening of democracy and for building 
resilient societies, the interfaith dialogue is essential.
It is for that reason that we are pleased to see so many of the 
religious and other leaders from the region gather in Tirana for 
the regional Conference “Role of Religion in the Western Balkan 
societies”. We look forward to an active and open discussion.
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Country snapshot Albania
By Leonie Vrugtman
Albania has a long history of peaceful religious coexistence and tolerance. Over the centuries, 
Albanians embraced and assimilated a variety of monotheist religions under the influence 
of a series of occupying powers; be it Rome, Byzantium or the Ottoman Empire. Aware of 
this longstanding religious diversity, leaders of the National Renaissance movement in 
the nineteenth century sought to emphasise an overarching national identity by removing 
religion from the identity of Albanians. From 1912, when Albania gained independence 
from the Ottoman Empire, state institutions have embraced secularism. Enver Hoxha, the 
communist dictator who ruled the country from 1944–1985, supressed religion through 
legislation. Organised religion was banned though a 1967 constitutional reform, which 
prohibited religious literature, initiated the further destruction or repurposing of places 
of worship and leading to the arrest or execution of religious leaders.1  
Following the collapse of communism in 1991, religious institutions in the country were 
in an abominable state. Foreign religious foundations, eager to train a new generation 
of clerics and finance the (re)construction of religious sites, came to the rescue. Some 
of these had a conservative outlook, which was at odds with the mainstream moderate 
religious traditions in the country, or they were connected with foreign governments that 
aimed to advance their influence in the region. During the 1990s, these groups were able 
to operate in Albania without any restrictions due to weak state institutions, lax borders 
and high crime rates.2 In the early 2000s, the Albanian government and the Albanian 
Muslim Community (KMSH) took measures to tackle the issue of foreign-backed religious 
groups. A national action plan against terrorism was adopted in 2002 leading to sweeping 
enforcement measures.3 Also, to facilitate the re-establishment of religious communities, 
the government promised compensation for religious buildings, land and other property 
that was confiscated by the communist regime. The Agency for the Treatment of Property 
(ATP) was established to manage restitution claims; however, most remain unresolved.4
Religious composition of the country
Today, most Albanians lead a secular life. According to a 2018 IDM study on religious 
tolerance, Albanians have limited knowledge of religion and rarely condition their 
everyday lives according to religious norms. Instead, the study argues, ‘Albanians welcome 
1 B. Tönnes, ‘Religious persecution in Albania’, Religion in Communist Lands, 1982, 10(3), pp. 
242–255. doi:10.1080/09637498208431032
2 S. Woehrel, ‘Islamic terrorism in the Balkans’, Congressional Research Service, 26 July 2005, p. 
7
3 Ibid.
4 US Department of State, ‘International Religious Freedom Report for 2016 – Albania’, 15 August 
2017, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/religiousfreedom/index.htm?year=2016&dlid=268782 
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the religious diversity that is present in the country and strongly reject the idea of the 
supremacy of a given religion, irrelevant of the size of the religious community’.5 Religious 
coexistence and tolerance are considered a fundamental value, which is also embedded 
in the country’s constitution. There is no official religion, the state is neutral on questions 
of belief, and freedom of religion is guaranteed.6 The state recognises the equality and 
independence of religious groups and prohibits discrimination based on religion. The four 
largest religious communities (Sunni Muslim, Roman Catholic, Orthodox and Bektashi)7 
also receive financial support from the state, which is mainly used to cover administrative 
expenses and the salaries of educational staff.89
According to the latest official census in 2011,10 Sunni Muslims constitute 56.7% of the 
population; Roman Catholics 10%, Eastern Orthodox adherents 6.8%; members of the 
Bektashi Order (a sect of Shia Sufism) 2.1%; and the Protestant Evangelical community 
0.14%.11 Approximately 2.5% of Albanians identify as atheist, and there are a small number 
of Jehovah’s Witnesses, followers of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints 
(Mormons), in addition to around 40 or 50 Jews living in Albania.12
Interreligious issues
Unlike its neighbours, Albania has not been subject to major interreligious conflict. 
Nonetheless, in the last three decades, some isolated cases of tension have been recorded. 
In early 2000s, the Bektashi community outside Tirana was the target of vandalism, 
intimidation and threats of violence, which, according to Bektashi leaders, was the result 
of the division created by foreign-influenced, intolerant interpretations of religion.13 In 
5 Institute of Democracy and Meditation, ‘Religious tolerance in Albania’, 25 April 2018, p. 5, 
available at: http://idmalbania.org/religious-tolerance-albania/ 
6 Constitution of the Republic of Albania, 28 November 1998, Art. 10, translated into English by 
OSCE, available at: https://www.osce.org/albania/41888?download=true
7 The Evangelical community does not yet receive financial support, despite being recognised 
as a religious community.
8 See the recognition agreements between the state and religious communities via Albanian 
State Committee on Cults, available at: http://www.kshk.gov.al/legjislacioni-per-fene-pas-
vitit-1990/
9 Council of Minister Decision 245, ‘Agreement on the allocation of funds from the state budget 
to religious communities’, 9 May 2018, available at: www.qbz.gov.al/     
10 Representatives of all religious communities have stated that the 2011 census presents 
an inaccurate picture of the religious demographics of the country, not least because the 
question was optional. The census is available in Albanian and English at: http://www.instat.
gov.al/media/3058/main_results__population_and_housing_census_2011.pdf
11 At the time of the 2011 census, the Albanian Evangelical Community (VUSH) was not yet an 
official religious community and has grown significantly since. According to unpublished 
research conducted by VUSH, the Evangelical Community consisted of approximately 68,000 
people in 2014, or 2.2% of the population. See the report ‘Raport kërkimor për Ungjillorët në 
Shqipëri 2003 – 2014’ by Reverend Akil Pano.
12 World Jewish Congress, Albania (Report), http://www.worldjewishcongress.org/en/about/
communities/AL 
13 US Department of State, ‘International Religious Freedom Report for 2003 – Albania’, 18 
December 2003, https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/2003/24328.htm 
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2005, media reports targeted Jehovah’s Witnesses for being involved in a series of juvenile 
suicides, although it remains unclear what the involvement of the religious community 
was, if any.14 A year later, Shkodra’s municipal decision to place a statue of Mother Teresa in 
the city centre was opposed by a small group of local Muslims. A local Catholic church was 
vandalised after the installation of the statue. Tensions were lifted with the announcement 
that the Albanian Muslim Community recognised Mother Teresa as a national rather than 
religious symbol.15 In recent years, the majority of complaints regarding religious tolerance 
have concerned schools banning female students that wear a headscarf. 16 Most public 
educational institutions do not allow students or staff to wear religious symbols, which has 
led to several female students being prevented from attending high school or university 
classes. As a result, many parents and students instead choose private educational 
institutions, where headscarf are allowed.
In response to current and future challenges, religious communities, in concert with state 
institutions, have made efforts to enhance interfaith cooperation. A good illustration of 
this is the increased visibility of the Interreligious Council, which was established in 2007 
to promote dialogue and interfaith harmony in the country through joint projects and 
activities.17 Over the past few years, the Interreligious Council has met more frequently 
and has been more broadly engaged, for example by issuing statements on the political 
situation in Albania and on the EU accession process.18
14 US Department of State, ‘International Religious Freedom Report for 2005 – Albania’, 8 
November 2005, https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/2005/51536.htm 
15 US Department of State, ‘International Religious Freedom Report for 2006 – Albania’, 15 
September 2006, https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/2006/71364.htm 
16 See, US Department of State, International Religious Freedom Reports for 2003, 2009, 2010 
and 2015, at: https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/2003/24328.htm; https://www.state.gov/j/
drl/rls/irf/2009/127295.htm; https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/2010_5/168289.htm; http://
www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/religiousfreedom/index.htm?year=2015&dlid=256157 
17 Interreligious Council of Albania, ‘History of the Interreligious Council of Albania’, http://
knfsh.al/en/historiku-i-knfsh-se/ 
18 Interreligious Council of Albania, ‘Press Releases’, http://knfsh.al/en/category/deklarata/
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Country snapshot Bosnia and Herzegovina
By Lejla Hodžić
Since it emerged as an independent state in the 12th century, Bosnia and Herzegovina has 
been home to a great variety of religious groups: members of the Bosnian Church, which 
largely disintegrated after the Ottoman conquest; Catholics; Eastern Orthodox Christians; 
Muslims, Sephardic Jews (following their expulsion from Spain and Portugal in the late 15th 
century), and Protestants who settled after the Austro-Hungarian occupation in the 19th 
century.19 Being at the crossroads of different confessions and ethnic migrations, defined 
Bosnia and Herzegovina as a multireligious and multi-ethnic country. During the socialist 
regime in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as one of the republics of the Socialist Federative 
Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), religion was propagated as retrograde leading to the 
exclusion of religious communities from socio-political matters, and atheism was endorsed, 
but not violently imposed, by the political regime.20 Despite being officially excluded from 
the state-building process under the socialist regime, religion was and continues to be 
a pillar of ethnic identity and ethnic differentiation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This has 
had a substantial impact on the creation of a strong relationship between political affairs 
and religion, which intensified in the years preceding its proclamation of independence in 
1992.21 Moreover, religion was a decisive element in victimisation during the armed conflict 
that ensued, since it was the key element of ethnic identity. Despite this context, in post-
conflict Bosnia and Herzegovina religious doctrines are often used to support national 
political ideologies and legitimise new political establishments,22 which have largely been 
characterised as ethno-nationalist.23 Consequently, this has instigated a religious revival 
particularly among younger generations,24 and has strengthened the relationship between 
politics and religion in present-day Bosnia and Herzegovina.25
Religious composition 
According to its legal framework on religious communities, Bosnia and Herzegovina is 
a secular state where none of the dominant religions or religious communities can be 
19 A. Alibašić and N. Begović, ‘Reframing the Relations between State and Religion in Post–War 
Bosnia: Learning to be Free!’, Journal of the Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, vol. 19:1, 3 
January 2017, p. 20.
20 D. Abazovic, ‘Rethinking Ethnicity, Religion, and Politics: The Case of Bosnia and Herzegovina’, 
European Yearbook of Minority Issues, vol. 7:1, 2010, p. 321
21 Bosnia and Herzegovina declared its independence from Socialist Federative Republic of 
Yugoslavia (SFRY) after a positive referendum vote on 3 Mach 1992.
22 D. Abazovic, ‘Rethinking Ethnicity, Religion, and Politics’, p. 323.
23 Ibid. p. 323
24 US Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, “Bosnia and 
Herzegovina: International Religious Freedom Report for 2006’.
25 D. Abazovic, ‘Rethinking Ethnicity, Religion, and Politics’, p. 323.
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given official status.26 The state may not interfere in the internal organisation and affairs 
of the religious communities, while the representatives of the communities may not 
formally participate in political affairs.27 Taking into consideration the religious diversity 
of Bosnian society, the law allows the state to provide equal financial support for the 
cultural, heritage, educational, social and charitable services of all religious communities, 
provided that these services are supplied in a non-discriminatory manner.28 Freedom of 
religion and freedom from discrimination on the basis of religion are constitutionally 
protected categories,29 which may be limited in accordance with the law and international 
standards for the purpose of protecting public security, health or morality, or the rights 
and freedoms of others.30
The religious demography of Bosnia and Herzegovina makes it one of the most diverse 
countries in the region and on the continent as a whole. According to the 2013 census, 
Muslims constitute 50.7% of the population, Orthodox Christians 30.7%, Catholics 15.2%, 
while the remaining 3.4% belong to religious minorities (Jews and Protestants primarily) 
or consider themselves as having no religious belief.31 Due to a strong correlation between 
ethnicity and religion, the three dominant religious groups broadly correspond to the 
three dominant ethnic groups – Bosniaks are predominantly Sunni Muslims, Serbs are 
predominantly Serbian Orthodox, whereas Croats are mainly Roman Catholics.32 This 
strong correlation is demonstrated in the census results, where the ethnic composition 
correlates almost directly with the religious composition of Bosnian society, with Bosniaks 
constituting 50.1%, Serbs 30.8% and Croats 15.4%.33 Indeed, changes in the territorial 
distribution of religious groups after the wars of the 1990s also correspond to equivalent 
changes in ethnic composition. 
There have been no comprehensive surveys on religious observance recently, but according 
to the US Department of State’s International Religious Freedom Report in 2006, the rate 
of religious observance varied among different religious and age groups, with higher 
observance recorded among Catholic Croats, and the younger generations of all three 
dominant religious groups.34 This is some evidence of the religious revival in post-conflict 
26 Bosnia and Herzegovina Official Gazette, Law on Freedom of the Religion and the Legal 
Position of the Churches and Religious Communities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, No. 5/04, Art. 
14(1), http://www.mpr.gov.ba/biblioteka/zakoni/bs/ZAKON%20o%20slobodi%20vjere.pdf 
27 Ibid. Arts. 14(3) and 14(4).
28 Ibid. Art. 14(4). Emphasis is placed on prohibition of discrimination based on religion.
29 Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Art. II(3)(g) and Art. III(4), available at https://www.
wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/ba/ba020en.pdf 
30 Bosnia and Herzegovina Official Gazette, Law on Freedom of the Religion and the Legal 
Position of the Churches and Religious Communities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, No. 5/04, Art. 
14(7).
31 BiH Agency of Statistics, Final results – Census 2013: Religion, via http://www.statistika.
ba/?show=8#link3 
32 US Department of State, 2016 International Religious Freedom Report – Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, 15 August 2017, p. 2.
33 BiH Agency of Statistics, Final results – Census 2013: Nationality, via http://www.statistika.
ba/?show=8#link1 
34 US Department of State, 2006 International Religious Freedom Report – Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, 1 September 2006, available via https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/2006/71372.
htm. 
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Bosnia and Herzegovina, which was partly triggered by the role played by religion during 
the conflict itself.
Interreligious issues
Given that religion had played a major role in defining ethnic and cultural groups in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, it became the key element in the victimisation of ethnic groups during 
the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina 1992–1995.35 Indeed, despite the conflict being 
characterised as ‘ethnic’, religious identity played a defining role in what we understand 
as ‘ethnic cleansing’ during the war. For instance, Bosnian Muslims used the designation 
‘Muslims’ to express nationhood in the former Yugoslavia’s legal framework, which meant 
that the term became primarily a cultural and ethnic one, instead of religious.36 For these 
reasons, the policy of ethnic cleansing was directed at ‘Muslims’ (or Bosniaks today), 
regardless of their actual religious observance. Moreover, the destruction of mosques and 
other Muslim buildings during the conflict, has been considered as evidence of the intent 
to destroy Bosnian Muslims as an ethnic group.37 
This historical background has defined interreligious issues and obstacles towards 
reconciliation in post-conflict Bosnia and Herzegovina. Crucial interreligious issues 
nowadays include the lack of constructive dialogue between groups, religious segregation 
in education and discrimination of religious communities – primarily returnees. Besides 
from the creation of the Inter-Religious Council (IRC) in 1997 to promote the shared 
values of all of Bosnia’s religions, religious leaders have not been sufficiently involved 
in the peacebuilding processes, especially at the grassroots level.38 The absence or 
underutilisation of interfaith dialogue at the local level has been detrimental for 
members of religious minorities returning after the conflict. Most returnees have reported 
selective enforcement of their rights by authorities, while religious leaders have reported 
discrimination by local law enforcement agencies in their investigation of acts of violence, 
vandalism and threats, and in providing protection to victims.39 Religious segregation in 
primary and secondary education is another important obstacle in achieving an inclusive 
education system. Religious education is provided in schools, but it usually involves 
classes on the religion of the majority religious group within the community, compounding 
discrimination towards pupils belonging to minority faiths.40
35 M. Oddie, ‘The relationship of religion and ethnic nationalism in Bosnia and Herzegovina’, 
Occasional Papers on Religion in Eastern Europe, Vol. 32:1, February 2012, pp. 34–42.
36 M. Sells, ‘Crosses of Blood: Sacred Space, Religion and Violence in Bosnia and Herzegovina,’ 
Sociology of Religion, vol. 64:3, 2003, pp. 309–331.
37 Morgan, Op. Cit. p. 40.
38 J. N. Clark, ‘Religion and Reconciliation in Bosnia & Herzegovina: Are Religious Actors Doing 
Enough?’ Europe-Asia Studies, 62:4, 5 May 2010, pp. 677–678.
39 US Department of State, 2016 International Religious Freedom Report – Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, 15 August 2017, p. 7.
40 OSCE, Institute on Religion and Public Policy, Religious Freedom in Bosnia, 7 October 2008, 
https://www.osce.org/odihr/34244?download=true 
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Country snapshot Kosovo
By Leonie Vrugtman and Diori Angjeli
Located in the centre of the Balkan Peninsula, Kosovo is of great historical and political 
importance for the entire region.41 As with most Balkan countries, the dominant religion of 
Kosovo has fluctuated over time, in accordance with its cultural and political contact with 
its neighbours. Christianity first reached the area during the Roman period, and Eastern 
Orthodoxy eventually became the state religion in the ninth century, amid competition 
in the Balkans between the Bulgarian and Byzantine empires. Later, under the Serbian 
Kingdom, the church split with Greece and the Serbian Orthodox Church was established 
in Kosovo. When the Ottoman Empire took over, Islam became the official religion and 
gradually supplanted Christianity as the largest faith by the seventeenth century.42 
Kosovo experienced major demographic changes between the collapse of Yugoslavia 
in the early 1990s and its declaration of independence in 2008. During the Kosovo War 
(1998–1999), a large number of ethnic Albanians were forced to flee or were expelled from 
the area. In a subsequent resurgence of civil unrest a considerable proportion of ethnic 
Serbs were also displaced.43 Today, Kosovo has a population of approximately 1,830,700 
people.44 According to the 2011 official census, 95.6% of the population is Muslim, 2.2% 
is Roman Catholic, and 1.4% is Serbian Orthodox.45 However, this census was boycotted 
by ethnic Serbs, resulting in the underrepresentation of this ethnicity and of Orthodox 
Christians.46 The Serbian Orthodox Church, the representative of the Orthodox community 
in Kosovo, claims that the actual Serbian Orthodox community in Kosovo is composed of 
120,000, or 6.3% of the general population.47 Other religious communities, including the 
Tarikat (a branch of Sufi Islam) and Protestant populations, also contest the census data. 
The Protestant community claims 20,000 followers throughout the country, or 1.1% of the 
population.48 Judaism is listed as one of the five traditional religions of Kosovo, but there 
41 T. Judah, Kosovo: What Everyone Needs to Know (Oxford, 2008).
42 G. Duijzings, Religion and the Politics of Identity in Kosovo (London, 2000), p. 14. 
43 Minority Rights Group International, World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples: 
Minorities and indigenous peoples, March 2018, https://minorityrights.org/country/kosovo/. 
44 World Bank, Population, total – 2017, via https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.
TOTL?locations=XK&view=chart 
45 Kosovo Agency of Statistics, ‘The final results of Population, Households and Housing Census 
Released’, 26 September 2012, http://ask.rks-gov.net/en/kosovo-agency-of-statistics/add-
news/the-final-results-of-population-households-and-housing-census-released 
46 Kosovo Agency of Statistics, Kosovo Population and Housing Census 2011 - Final Results: 
Quality Report, via https://unstats.un.org/unsd/censuskb20/KnowledgebaseArticle10700.aspx 




are currently only 56 Jewish people living in Kosovo.49
Religious communities and the State
Kosovo is a secular state and its constitution guarantees the freedom of belief, conscience 
and religion.50 Expressions of faith are only limited ‘to ensure public order and safety, to 
protect public health and morals, human rights and fundamental freedoms of others’.51 
In 2017, under this provision, the former imam of the grand mosque, Shefqet Krasniqi, 
was arrested on grounds of encouraging terrorism and religious extremism but was later 
cleared of all charges.52 While Kosovo is multi-confessional, the government does not 
have a designated ministry or department responsible for religious affairs and current 
legislation prevents religious communities from registering as legal entities. This has 
the effect that the concerns of religious communities often remain unaddressed; that 
religious communities receive no financial support from the state; and that they are not 
able to conduct administrative activities such as buying or renting properties.53 As a result, 
religious communities seek funding from elsewhere, including foreign governments and 
non-governmental organisations, whose support often comes with caveats. In recent years, 
concerns have been raised over Turkey’s religious influence in Kosovo,54 and the further 
spread of conservative Islam through activities funded by Gulf countries.55
Religious tension
Although religion was not the primary driving force behind the war, it was an inseparable 
part of how the conflict parties identified each other. Since most Albanians are Muslim 
and most Serbs are Orthodox Christian, political leaders in the region emphasised 
49 L. Luxner, ‘With US help, Muslim-majority Kosovo plans its first synagogue and Jewish 
museum’, Times of Israel, 22 December 2018, https://www.timesofisrael.com/with-us-help-
muslim-majority-kosovo-plans-its-first-synagogue-and-jewish-museum/. 
50 Republic of Kosovo Official Gazeta, Law No. 02/L-31 on Religious Freedom in Kosovo, 24 August 
2006, Preamble, available at: http://www.gazetazyrtare.com/e-gov/index.php?option=com_
content&task=view&id=64&Itemid=28&lang=en. 
51 Ibid. Art. 1.3.
52 ‘Kosovo court clears Grande Mosque imam of inciting terrorism’, Reuters, 23 March 2018, 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-kosovo-terrorism-verdict/kosovo-court-clears-grande-
mosque-imam-of-inciting-terrorism-idUSKBN1GZ14P 
53 J. Mehmeti, ‘Faith and Politics in Kosovo: The Status of Religious Communities in a Secular 
Country’, in A. Elbasani and O. Roy (eds.), The Revival of Islam in the Balkans. (London, 2015) 
pp. 62–80; and Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2018: Kosovo, https://freedomhouse.
org/report/freedom-world/2018/kosovo
54 M. Edwards and M. Colborne, ‘Turkey's gift of a mosque sparks fears of “neo-Ottomanism” in 
Kosovo’, Guardian, 2 January 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2019/jan/02/turkey-
is-kosovo-controversy-over-balkan-states-new-central-mosque  
55 C. Gall, ‘How Kosovo Was Turned Into Fertile Ground for ISIS’, New York Times, 21 May 2016, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/22/world/europe/how-the-saudis-turned-kosovo-into-
fertile-ground-for-isis.html 
16 ROLE OF RELIGION  
IN THE WESTERN BALKANS’ SOCIETIES
religious differences even if it had little or nothing to do with faith itself.56 This had a 
significant effect on how ethnic groups perceived each other and fuelled tensions between 
communities of different faiths. Following the withdrawal of Serb and Yugoslav forces, 
some Kosovo Albanians engaged in acts of retaliation such as destroying churches and 
other Orthodox sites between 1999 and 200457. In the last ten years, such incidents have 
declined, but the country remains vulnerable to incidents of religious – or ethnically – 
motivated violence, hate speech and vandalism, especially between Sunni Muslims and 
Orthodox Christians. The government has stepped up its efforts to respond to ethnical or 
religiously motivated violence and vandalism, including protecting religious and cultural 
sites. Despite this protection, theft and vandalism continues and there have been some 
instances of attacks being planned on Serbian Orthodox.58 In 2016 for example, four ethnic 
Albanians with firearms, suspected to have links to the Islamic State, were arrested in front 
of the Visoki Decani Monastery.59 
Cases of religiously motivated incidents impact other denominations as well. Islamic sites, 
including mosques, have been vandalised by ethnic Serbs during and after the war – most 
notably the Ibar River Mosque in North Mitrovica, which was never rebuilt.60 In some cases, 
rival Muslims groups have launched attacks on each other’s religious leaders.61 In the past, 
the Protestant and Jewish communities have raised concerns over Kosovo’s freedom of 
religion provisions, especially over discrepancies in their ability to obtain construction 
permits for places of worship or their properties becoming subject to vandalism.62 
Both the Muslim community of Kosovo and the Serbian Orthodox Church have also accused 
the government of discrimination towards their communities, albeit for different reasons. 
The Muslim community has complained that, due to rules prohibiting religious dress in 
public schools, female Muslim students wearing headscarves had been sent home and 
thereby denied access to education.63 The Orthodox community claims it has received 
no financial support to rebuild destroyed religious sites. Meanwhile, the government has 
56 G. Duijzings, Religion and the Politics of Identity in Kosovo (2000); and L. Dunn, ‘The Roles 
of Religion in Conflicts in the Former Yugoslavia’, Occasional Papers on Religion in Eastern 
Europe, vol. 16 no. 1, January 2015, available at: https://digitalcommons.georgefox.edu/ree/
vol16/iss1/3/ 
57 Amnesty International. (2006). Kosovo (Serbia): The UN in Kosovo - a Legacy of Impunity. 
Retrieved via: https://www.amnesty.org/ 
58 US Department of State, 2016 International Religious Freedom Report - Kosovo, 15 August 
2017, https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/269074.pdf 
59 K. Rexhepi and E. Qafmolla, ‘Kosovo Gunmen Arrested Near Serb Monastery’, 1 February 2016, 
https://balkaninsight.com/2016/02/01/terror-incidents-distress-kosovo-mosques-and-
monasteries-02-01-2016/ 
60 US Department of State, 2016 International Religious Freedom Report - Kosovo, 15 August 
2017, https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/269074.pdf
61 US Department of State, 2011 International Religious Freedom Report - Kosovo, 30 July 2012, 
https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/193037.pdf 
62 US Department of State, 2017 International Religious Freedom Report - Kosovo, 30 May 2018, 
p. 1, https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/281166.pdf; and US Department of State, 
2015 International Religious Freedom Report – Kosovo, 10 August 2016, https://www.state.gov/
documents/organization/256417.pdf
63 Bashkia Islame e Kosove, Deklaratë për Opinion, 24 October 2013, https://bislame.net/
prsdntj/
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expanded its Interfaith Kosovo programme to promote religious tolerance by organising 
conferences and workshops on the topic,64 with state officials and religious representatives 
also attending the consecration of the Catholic St. Theresa Cathedral in Pristina.65
64 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kosovo's interfaith initiative echoes around the globe, June 2015, 
https://frantic.s3-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/kua-peacemakers/2015/06/Kosovos-interfaith-
initiative.pdf
65 P. Çollaku, Pristina Inaugurates Cathedral for Mother Teresa, 7 September 2010, https://
balkaninsight.com/2010/09/07/pristina-inaugurates-cathedral-for-mother-teresa/
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Country snapshot Montenegro
By Belgrade Open School
The history of religion in Montenegro is similar to the rest the region. Christianity was 
present in the cluster of territories which comprise modern Montenegro from around the 
4th century, with authority fluctuating between Rome and Constantinople, before Eastern 
Orthodoxy became established in the late 9th century.  In June 1920 the Orthodox Church in 
Montenegro officially united with that of the new Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenians 
to form the Serbian Orthodox Church.66 The Serbian Orthodox Church was in the rank of 
the Patriarchate, and it was subsequently accepted by other Eastern Orthodox Churches 
in 1922. In 1993 the Montenegrin Orthodox Church was founded, and was registered as an 
NGO in 2001. Its leadership claims that Montenegrin churches were illegitimately annexed 
by the Serbian Orthodox Church in 1920 and that it is the sole legal representative of 
the Orthodox Church in Montenegro. However, the decision to unify was accepted by 
all of the bishops from Montenegro, and the metropolitan Gavrilo Dožić was among the 
most prominent candidates for the first patriarch of the united Serbian Church, a role 
which he eventually took on (1938–1950). As such, the Montenegrin Orthodox Church is 
not recognised by any other official Eastern Orthodox Churches. Islam was introduced 
into the area with the Ottoman conquest in the late 15th century, whose influence in the 
region lasted until the Balkan wars of 1912/13 when the Kingdom of Montenegro gained 
independence and united with the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenians in 1918. The 
Islamic Community claims that significant part of the Muslim population was deported 
after the country gained independence from Ottoman rule.67
Religious composition
According to the 2011 census, about 72% of the population declare themselves to be Orthodox 
Christian. The Orthodox population in Montenegro is divided between two Orthodox 
communities – the Serbian Orthodox Church (SOC) and the Montenegrin Orthodox Church 
(MOC). Their mutual relations are complicated, and they have worsened since Montenegro 
became an independent state in 2006. Local media outlets have estimated that about 
70% of the Orthodox population are adherents of the SOC, with around 30% in the MOC. 
However, these estimates should be taken with caution since there have been no official 
studies conducted. About 3.5% of the population identify as Roman Catholic, and reside 
mostly in the coastal area. 
The second largest religion in Montenegro is Islam, forming around 16% of the total 
population and are represented by the Islamic Community of Montenegro (ICM). The 
66 Đ. Slijepčević, Istorija Srpske pravoslavne crkve: Od početka XIX veka do kraja Drugog svetskog 
rata, Vol. 2, (BIGZ: Beograd, 2002), pp. 369–376.
67 Islamic Community of Montenegro, ‘Historical development and organisation’, https://www.
monteislam.com/islamska-zajednica-u-crnoj-gori 
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majority of Montenegrin Muslims live in the northeastern part of the country in Rožaje, 
Plav and Gusinje, which neighbour the Serbian predominantly Muslim municipalities of 
Sjenica, Novi Pazar, and Tutin. A further 1.24% identified as atheists and 2.61% who did not 
want to declare. The rest of the population (about 4.5%) are members of other smaller 
religions such as Jehovah’s Witnesses, Judaism, and various branches of Protestantism and 
Buddhism.68
Interfaith relations
According to Article 14 of the Constitution of Montenegro, ‘Religious communities are 
separated from the State. Religious communities are equal and free to worship and do 
other religious tasks/works’.69 The government has agreements with the Islamic and Jewish 
Communities and the Holy See further defining the legal status of the respective groups 
and regulating their relationship with the state. There are no similar agreements with the 
SOC, MOC, or the other recognised religious groups. 
By law, religion may not be taught in public primary or secondary schools. The SOC operates 
one secondary school in the historical capital of Cetinje, and the Islamic Community 
operates one private madrassa at the secondary school level in the capital Podgorica – 
both follow the state curriculum in non-religious matters.
There are 21 recognised religious groups in the country and all applied for official 
registration except the SOC.70 The interior minister from May until November 2016, Goran 
Danilovic (a member of the opposition party Demos), wrote a letter to the SOC supporting 
the SOC’s assertion that it was not required to register because it had legal status before 
1977 and was therefore not a new religious group.71 As a result, the SOC has experienced 
regular difficulties with the issuing of residency permits,72 and visas for its clergy. There 
is an ongoing dispute between the SOC and MOC, particularly over the ownership of 750 
Orthodox sites.73 Police have prohibited members of the MOC from performing the liturgy in 
churches on several occasions because of the security concerns, while numerous members 
of the SOC were already in churches performing liturgies. Police have continued to provide 
68 Montenegro Statistical Office, ‘Census of Population, Households and Dwellings in 
Montenegro 2011 – Population of Montenegro by sex, type of settlement, ethnicity, religion 
and mother tongue per municipalities’, pp. 14–15, via https://www.monstat.org/userfiles/file/
popis2011/saopstenje/saopstenje(1).pdf 




70 US Department of State, 2017 International Religious Freedom Report – Montenegro, May 2018, 
http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/religiousfreedom/index.htm?year=2017&dlid=280940 
71 US Department of State, 2016 International Religious Freedom Report – Montenegro, August 
2017, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/religiousfreedom/index.htm?year=2016&dlid=268848 
72 See International Religious Freedom Reports prior to 2015, via https://me.usembassy.gov/our-
relationship/official-reports/ 
73 US Department of State, 2017 International Religious Freedom Report – Montenegro, May 2018, 
p. 7, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/religiousfreedom/index.htm?year=2017&dlid=280940
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protection around churches for events conducted by both groups.74 In recent years there 
have also been tensions among the Islamic Community, with a dispute arising between the 
head of the ICM, Reis Rifat Fejzic, and one of the two leaders of the Islamic Community in 
Serbia, former Mufti Muamer Zukorlic, over who represents the Islamic community in the 
Sandzak region (a historical term for a former Ottoman region now divided by the border 
between northeast Montenegro and southwest Serbia).75 
Religious groups have continued to complain that the laws regulating their legal status are 
outdated and inadequate because they were created based on the demographic conditions 
of the former Yugoslavia. The government has been working on a new law regulating the 
legal status of religious communities since 2015.76 After three years of preparation, a 
draft version was completed. However, during an international academic conference on 
‘Freedom of Religion or Belief in Montenegro’ held in Montenegro on 3–4 May 2019, the new 
draft law was heavily criticised.77
74 Ibid. p.5
75 US Department of State, 2015 International Religious Freedom Report – Montenegro, 
October 2016,  p. 6, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/religiousfreedom/index.
htm?year=2015&dlid=256223 
76 US Department of State, 2017 International Religious Freedom Report – Montenegro, May 2018, 
p. 6, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/religiousfreedom/index.htm?year=2017&dlid=280940




Country snapshot North Macedonia
By Mariglen Demri
Many religious beliefs and cultures have existed on the territory of the Republic of North 
Macedonia (RNM). Orthodox Christianity has been present in the geographical area of the 
modern RNM since the first century AD and is the largest religious denomination of North 
Macedonia. According to the most recent census, conducted in in 2002, 64.8% of citizens 
identify as Orthodox Christians.78. Indeed, it has been inscribed into cultural memory that 
the region of ‘Macedonia’ is cited in the Bible – its roughly 25 mentions are a source of 
particular pride amongst Orthodox believers.79 As such, the followers of the RNM Orthodox 
Church consider themselves to be the successors of the first Christians on the Balkan 
Peninsula. 
However, North Macedonia is also characterised by its religious diversity, having been 
under the religious and cultural influence of the Bulgarian, Serbian and Ottoman empires, 
as well as experiencing a major influx of Sephardic Jews from Iberia in the fifteenth 
century. Positive interfaith relations have generally been preserved in the modern era 
although at times they have experienced moments of tension. According to the 2002 
census, the religious distribution of RNM is as follows: 64.8% are Orthodox Christians, 
33.3% are Muslims, 0.35% Catholics, and 0.03% Protestants. A more recent study by Brima 
and WIN–Gallup80, found that only 1% of citizens identified as atheists, while 88% declared 
themselves as members of one of the religious communities. Similar to other countries 
in the Balkan region, members of the largest ethnic groups in North Macedonia tend to 
belong to distinct religious communities. According to research conducted by Abdul Gafffar 
Mughal using data from the State Statistical Office, over 90% of ethnic Albanians in North 
Macedonia identify as Muslim.81 On the other hand, more than 90% of ethnic Macedonian 
identify as Orthodox.82   
78 Republic of North Macedonia State Statistical Office, Census of Population, available at: 
http://www.stat.gov.mk/publikacii/knigaX.pdf
79 T. Tordsson, ‘How Do Religion And National Attitudes Coexist In Contemporary Macedonia?’. 
Unpublished Master’s Thesis 2013, Humanistic Faculty, University of Bergen, Bergen, 
Norway. Available at: http://bora.uib.no/bitstream/handle/1956/6940/106778789.
pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y Accessed 12.05.2019 
80 WIN-Gallup International, Global Index of Religiosity and Atheism – 2012, accessed at: 07. 
05. 2019, available in: https://sidmennt.is/wp-content/uploads/Gallup-International-um-
tr%C3%BA-og-tr%C3%BAleysi-2012.pdf
81 A. Gafffar Mughal, ‘Muslim Population of the Republic of Macedonia: A Demographic and 
Socio-economic Profile’, Balkan Social Science Review, Vol. 5, June 2015, p. 90, js.ugd.edu.mk/
index.php/BSSR/article/download/1021/1032/ 
82 Ruzhica Cacanoska, “The Process of De-Secularization in Macedonian Society”, (2003) 
Available on: https://newbalkanpolitics.org.mk/item/The-Process-of-De-Secularization-in-
Macedonian-Society#.XN6rKY4zaM8 Accessed on: 15. 05. 2019
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Politics and religion
Given this historical context and the particular geography of North Macedonia, religion is 
often interwoven with daily politics. More often than not religious representatives openly 
communicate political positions on issues that fall out of the scope of their capacity as 
religious communities. The ethnophyletism83 – the conflation of national and religious 
identities – of the Orthodox Church enables it to claim certain responsibilities regarding 
ethno-national issues. For example, during negotiations in the Macedonia naming dispute 
with Greece (and the law on the use of languages, where Albanian was supposed to become 
an official language of state), some bishops of the Macedonian Orthodox Church (MOC) 
joined public protests claiming that the MOC is strictly against changing the name and the 
constitution of the country.84 
Considering that the theory and practice of politics in the region is often framed in ethnic 
terms, such ethno-political conflicts have a major effect on the religious cohesion of North 
Macedonian society, such as in the armed conflict between the government and Albanian 
separatists in 2001.85 The principle basis for the conflict was inter-ethnic disagreement, 
but inevitably involved a religious element too. The inter-ethnic conflict in this case grew 
into an interreligious conflict between the two main religious communities. During the 
armed conflict, objects of religious and cultural-historical significance from both sides 
were demolished or destroyed.86 
Even after the Ohrid Agreement ended the conflict, tensions have persisted. According 
to the US State Department’s 2016 Religious Freedom Report the reconstruction of the 
mosque in Prilep called ‘Charshi Mosque’ was facing obstructions by the government.87 
Also, in 2011 a government decision to build a museum in the shape of church inside Kale 
Fortress in Skopje led to a violent confrontation between young members of the two main 
ethnic communities, Albanians and Macedonians.88 Albanians were angry for building the 
so called church-museum on location which they claimed should have been a mosque. 
Macedonians, however, felt the need to defend the ‘church’.  All Albanian ethnic political 
parties were against this project, calling it a provocation.89
83 See G. Papathomas, Course of Canon Law — Appendix VI — canonical glossary. (Paris, 1995).
84 (Video) The Bishop Petar: MOC is against change of the Constitution and the name of country. 
[(Видео) Владиката Петар: МПЦ е против промена на Уставот и името на државата], 
MakFax, 27 February 2018. Available on: https://makfax.com.mk/daily-news/... accessed on: 12 
May 2019
85 The 2001 insurgency in the Republic of Macedonia was an armed conflict which began when the 
ethnic Albanian National Liberation Army (NLA) militant group attacked the security forces of the 
Republic of Macedonia at the beginning of February 2001, and ended with the Ohrid Agreement.
86 V. Petroska-Beska and M. Najcevska, ‘Macedonia: Understanding History, Preventing Future 
Conflict’, Special Report 115, United States Institute Of Peace, February 2004, http://unpan1.
un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/UNTC/UNPAN017851.pdf
87 US Department of State, 2016 International Religious Freedom Report - Macedonia, 15 August, 
2017, p. 6, https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/269084.pdf
88 European Commission. Working Paper, ‘The Former Yugoslav Republic Of Macedonia 2011 
Progress Report’, 12 October 2011, Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-
enlargement/sites/near/files/pdf/key_documents/2011/package/mk_rapport_2011_en.pdf 
89 S. Marusic, ‘Eight Injured in Clashes over “Church” Construction in Macedonia’, Balkan 
Insight, 13 February 2011, Available on: https://balkaninsight.com/2011/02/13/albanians-
macedonians-clash-over-museum-church/ 
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State interference in religious freedom
The Macedonian Orthodox Church (formerly the Archbishopric of Ohrid), which after the 
Second World War had been reinstated an autonomous diocese of the Serbian Orthodox 
Church, declared its independence in 1967. Its autocephality is still disputed by the Serbian 
Orthodox Church. Besides internal administrative church motives, ecclesiastical inner 
circles do not reject the possibility that movement for autocephaly has been led by ethno-
political and ethnophyletist elements in the Orthodox Church, in general.90 
In 2002, one of the bishops of the Macedonian Orthodox Church broke off and joined the 
Serbian Orthodox Church canon. Bishop Jovan, also known as Zoran Vranishkovski, and 
his followers then tried to register the Orthodox Ohrid Archdiocese (OOA) as a religious 
community but was rejected by the state commission, which recognises the MOC.91 In 2017, 
the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg ruled that the blocking of registration 
was in breach of Article 11 of the convention, and awarded the OOA 4500 euros in damages.92 
Vranishkovski has been charged and served criminal sentences, but the Church is still not 
officially registered.93 
Similar circumstances exist within the Islamic community in Macedonia, although with a 
lesser intensity. Namely, the law on religious communities from 2007 disputes the legal 
status of the Bektashi Community which registered in 2000 in the Republic of North 
Macedonia, as well as its right to the property of the Arabati Baba teke (Sufi religious 
building). With the inability to register itself as a legal entity, and the subsequent denied 
right to acquire property, the teqe has become the property of the Islamic Religious 
Community (IRC) of the RNM. Representatives of the Bektashi community consider this to 
be an instance of the state favouring the IRC at the expense of a smaller community.94 In 
2018, the European Court of Human Rights passed a verdict requiring the state to pay the 
Bektashi community in North Macedonia compensation for the damages caused by the 
obstacles imposed by national courts that made it impossible for the Bektashi community 
to retain its status as religious community.95
90 G. Gjorgjevski, ‘Macedonian Orthodox Church in the Context of Balkan and European 
Orthodoxy’, Occasional Papers on Religion in Eastern Europe, Vol. 37, Iss. 4 , Article 2, 2002, 
http://digitalcommons.georgefox.edu/ree/vol37/iss4/2 
91 Критика и противаргументи за нерегистрирање на ПОА, available at: https://www.dw.com/
mk/критика-и-противаргументи-за-нерегистрирање-на-поа/a-4549834
92 Orthodox Ohrid Archdiocese (Greek-Orthodox Ohrid Archdiocese Of The Peć Patriarchy) vs. 
The Former Yugoslav Republic Of Macedonia, App no. 3532/07 (ECHR, 9 April 2018)
93 Helsinki Committee for Human Rights of the Republic of Macedonia, ‘Annual Report on 
the situation in the area of human rights in the Republic of Macedonia for 2014’, available 
in: http://www.mhc.org.mk/system/uploads/redactor_assets/documents/1110/Godishen_
Izvestaj__English_.pdf
94 US Department of State, 2017 International Religious Freedom Report - Macedonia, 30 May 
2018, p. 6-8, https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/281176.pdf
95 Bektashi Community and Others v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, App. nos. 
48044/10, 75722/12, and 25176/13 (ECHR, 12 April 2018).
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Country snapshot Serbia
By Belgrade Open School
The Christian faith has been present in the territory comprising modern Serbia since the 
Roman period. After the initial spread of Christianity to the area in the 2nd century, religious 
authority fluctuated between Rome and Constantinople, before Eastern Orthodoxy became 
established in the late 9th century. Under the medieval Nemanjic dynasty, the Serbian 
Orthodox Church achieved autocephalous status in 1219, and was elevated to a patriarchate 
in 1346. Islam was introduced in Serbia with the Ottoman presence in the Balkans from the 
14th century onwards. Varying degrees of tolerance between the Orthodox and Muslim 
populations of foreign and Slavic descent followed. Between 1804 and 1815, a series of 
Serbian uprisings against Ottoman rule culminated in Serbia gaining autonomy under the 
rule of Serbian hereditable princes in 1830, and eventually in complete independence in 
1878. However, in southern parts of Serbia, a minority population of Slavic Muslims and 
Albanian Muslims remains. 
During the communist regime after 1945 when Serbia was a part of the Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia, religion was tolerated but discouraged, whilst the property of 
religious organisations was mostly nationalised. The impact of socialist political ideology 
on religion in Serbia can be seen in the fact that data on religious affiliation was ignored 
for ideological and political reasons in the censuses of 1961, 1971 and 1981.96 Moreover, 
recent data has shown a decline in the proportion of people identifying as atheist since 
then by a factor of 10, the underlying reason for which could be the changed political and 
ideological atmosphere of Serbian society.97
The substantial overlap between religious affiliation and ethnic identity played a major role 
in the wars that followed the dissolution of Yugoslavia in 1991, and continues somewhat to 
this day. This reflects the role of religion in creating an atmosphere of mutual intolerance 
among the different nations in the Balkans, with rises in nationalism being reinforced 
by a rise in expressions of religious identity. This increase in the importance of religious 
identity in Serbia was also demonstrated by the establishment of the Ministry of Religion 
of Serbia in 1991, which lasted until 2012. 
Church-state relations
The Republic of Serbia is a secular state according to Article 11 of its Constitution. 
Churches and religious communities are separated from the state and no religion may be 
established as a state or mandatory religion. The 2006 state law which regulates churches 
96 A special study written on the basis of the 2011 Census, the Etnomozaik, is available 
only in Serbian; Republic of Serbia, 'Census of population, households and dwellings in 




and religious communities grants special treatment to the seven religious groups which 
the government defines as ‘traditional’. These are the Serbian Orthodox Church, the Roman 
Catholic Church, the Slovak Evangelical Church, the Reformed Christian Church, Evangelical 
Christian Church, the Islamic Community, and the Jewish community.98 The law grants 
these seven traditional religious communities tax exemptions, the right to have their faith 
taught in public schools, and the right to provide chaplain services to military personnel.99 
Besides the seven traditional religions, there are another twenty religious communities 
and churches on the state register. 
Religious composition of country
All statistical data on Serbian religious demography is based on the 2011 census, and does 
not include data for Kosovo,100 which declared independence in 2008. The data for two 
municipalities bordering Kosovo is incomplete since a number of Albanian citizens in 
those areas refused to participate in the census. The majority of the Serbian population 
identified as Christian (91.22%), belonging to the major denominations – Eastern Orthodoxy, 
Roman Catholicism and various branches of Protestantism. Of the different Christian 
denominations, the vast majority belong to the Serbian Orthodox Church (84.59%), while 
4.97% identified as Catholics. The majority of Roman Catholics live in the northern part of 
Serbia – Vojvodina.101 
The third biggest religion in Serbia is Islam, according to the 2011 census Muslims 
represent 3.10% of the population. They are organised in two different communities – the 
Islamic Community of Serbia and the Islamic Community in Serbia. The first has its seat 
in Belgrade and consists of three mufti units, while the second is located in city of Novi 
Pazar, a Muslim majority area and is under the riyasat (executive body) of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. The traditional Protestant communities constitute around 1%, mostly of the 
Slovak and Hungarian national minorities. More than 90% of Serbia’s 36,000 Jews were 
killed during the Holocaust, and as a result the Jewish community now has less than 1000 
members.
Interfaith relations 
According to independent reports, religious violence has declined in last years, although 
it is sometimes hard to determine if a violent act has been motivated by religion or ethnic 
identity. Interfaith relations are generally good in Serbia, but tensions persist between the 
Serbian Orthodox Church and other unrecognised Orthodox Churches – the Montenegrin 
and Macedonian – as well as divisions between the two Islamic communities. 
98 US Department of State, 2017 International Religious Freedom Report – Serbia, p. 3, http://
www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/religiousfreedom/index.htm?year=2017&dlid=280956 
99 Ibid. p. 3
100 This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 
1244/1999 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.
101 Republic of Serbia, 'Census of population, households and dwellings in 2011. Ethno-
confessional and linguistic mosaic of Serbia’, http://pod2.stat.gov.rs/ObjavljenePublikacije/
Popis2011/Etnomozaik.pdf 
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Religious identity continues to overlap with and reinforce feelings of national or ethnic 
identity.102 A major outbreak of religious violence took place in 2004 when mosques in 
the centres of Belgrade and Nis were damaged soon after a series of attacks in Kosovo 
in which more than 36 Serbian Orthodox churches and monasteries103 were destroyed in 
rioting by Kosovan Albanians.104 
Kosovo 
The situation in Kosovo remains very complex105, as tensions between the majority Albanian 
and minority Serbian populations have not abated 20 years after the war of 1998–99.106 
While Kosovo declared independence in 2008, it is still not recognised as a member state 
of the United Nations and it is not officially recognised by approximately half of its member 
states – despite the EU’s several resolutions that encourage its members to recognise 
Kosovo’s independence. What makes the situation especially difficult, is that a significant 
number of Serbian Orthodox Church properties are located in Kosovan territory.
102 Ibid. 
103 Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in 
Kosovo, https://unmik.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/s-2004-348.pdf 
104 Human Rights Watch, ‘Failure to Protect: Anti-Minority Violence in Kosovo, March 2004’, 
https://www.hrw.org/report/2004/07/25/failure-protect/anti-minority-violence-kosovo-
march-2004 
105 On current state of relations, "Serbia-Kosovo relations: Confrontation or normalisation?", 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2019/635512/EPRS_BRI(2019)635512_
EN.pdf
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Introduction
Religion has long been an essential element in the societies of the Western Balkan region, 
primarily because religious affiliation was key to cultural characterisation and ethnic 
differentiation,107 but religion has achieved a prominent role in almost all aspects of 
society in the post-communist era. According to scholars, religion has not only witnessed 
a revival in these societies considering the increased number of religious activities, but 
the process of ‘de-secularisation’ of the public has been present as well.108 Also, religion 
played a crucial role in the armed conflicts in the former Yugoslavia during the 1990s,109 
which came to define contemporary interreligious relations across the whole region. These 
are only some of the dimensions of the role of religion in Western Balkan society which 
this cross-country report attempts to analyse. 
The goal of this survey report is to gather information and opinions on the role of religion 
in contemporary Western Balkan countries with regard to different societal issues such 
as politics, the economy, social cohesion, interreligious coexistence, tolerance, and 
democracy. In addition, the aim is to get an insight into multi-religious context and identify 
the role of religious institutions and leaders, their activities and practices. Finally, this 
survey report identifies areas for improvement, and the ways in which religion could be 
more beneficial to each society. While the analysis focuses on each country separately, this 
survey is part of an effort to better understand the role of religion in the entire region of 
the Western Balkans. 
107 Oddie, Morgan, 'The relationship of religion and ethnic nationalism in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina', Religion in Eastern Europe, XXXII, February 2012, p. 34.
108 Abazović, Dino, 'Rethinking Ethnicity, Religion, and Politics: The Case of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina', Eur.Y.B. Minority Issues 7:317, 2007, p. 318..
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Survey report Albania
By Leonie Vrugtman and Dior Angjeli
Survey sample
In April and May 2019, more than one hundred surveys were distributed amongst influential 
figures in Albania. The survey aimed to gather their views on the role of religion in Albania 
and the Western Balkans. In total, 33 respondents provided quantitative and qualitative 
answers to questions, including politicians and government employees (N = 3), religious 
leaders (N = 4), academia (N = 6), civil society leaders (N = 7), journalists and opinion-
makers (N = 6) and young leaders (N = 5). One respondent did not state his occupation. 
Of the respondents, 25 were male (78.1%) and seven (21.9%) were female. The average age 
of the respondents was 41.6 years, with the youngest respondent being 28 years old and 
the oldest 54. In terms of education, one respondent was educated to a bachelor’s degree 
level, 18 respondents finished an MA, eight have obtained a PhD and four have completed 
post-doctoral study as well. One respondent did not state his education.
The role of religion in Albania
The daily life of most Albanians is largely secular. The majority of Albanians identify as 
belonging to a religious community, but when asked about religion people often refer 
to their family’s religious affiliation instead of their own choice of faith.110 According to 
a study on religious tolerance in Albania (IDM, 2018), the majority of Albanians do not 
consider themselves as actively practising a religion (62.7%). Instead, most only practise 
the most important rituals of their religion (42.3%) or do not take part in any of the 
rituals (26.8%). Religion, for most people, is something personal and their everyday life 
is not really influenced by faith (71%). 54.1% of Albanians agree or strongly agree with 
the statement: ‘Although I am a religious person, I refuse to let religious considerations 
influence my everyday activities’; and 65.7% agreed or strongly agreed with the statement: 
‘Although I believe in my religion, I think there are many more important things in life’.111 
110 UNDP Albania ‘Being LGBTI in Eastern Europe: Albania country report’, 2017, available at: 
https://www.undp.org/content/dam/albania/docs/ALBANIA%20FINAL%20REPORT%20
18.10.2017.pdf
111 Institute of Democracy and Meditation, ‘Religious tolerance in Albania’, 25 April 2018, available 
at: http://idmalbania.org/religious-tolerance-albania/
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Very inﬂuentialHas no inﬂuence
Inﬂuence on political issues
Inﬂuence on societal issues
In the current survey, carried out only amongst influential figures in Albania, answers were 
largely in agreement with those findings. Respondents were asked to comment on the 
statement: ‘In your opinion, how important is religion for most of the people in Albania?’ 
On a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 marks complete irrelevance and 7 marks significant influence, 
the mean was 4.1. This suggests that, according to Albania’s influential figures, religion is 
of moderate importance to most Albanians. Only three respondents thought of religion as 
very important in people’s lives, of which two are influential members of one of Albania’s 
religious communities and one is a youth leader.
Although religion in general may not be perceived as of great importance in people’s 
lives, it may still influence people’s perceptions of societal or political issues. According 
to respondents, religion has moderate influence on their attitudes about societal issues 
such as poverty, justice, equality, crime and social cohesion in Albania. The respondents 
answered with an average assessment of 4.16 on a scale from 1 (no influence at all) to 
7 (significant influence). While journalists and opinion makers valued the influence on 
societal matters as quite low to moderate, two of the influential members of religious 
communities answered that religion has a significant influence on people’s perceptions 
regarding societal issues. When asked the same question about political matters such 
as democratic participation, voter behaviour or political parties, respondents felt that 
religion had less of an influence (average assessment was 3.26). Only one member of the 
religious community and a youth leader perceived that religion had a strong or significant 
influence on people’s opinions on political matters (a 6 or 7). 
Religious leaders
Since 2007, the leaders of the largest religious communities of Albania have formed an 
Interreligious Council that promotes dialogue and inter-faith harmony through joint 
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projects and activities. Over the past few years, the council has become more visible and 
has been increasingly engaged with societal and political developments in Albania. The 
council has received international recognition for its work and was awarded the awarded 
Sérgio Vieira de Mello Prize in 2018.112 This sentiment of religious harmony is not only 
embraced at the highest level. According to the 2018 study on religious tolerance carried 
out by IDM, 74.4% of the respondents perceived that religious clerics at the local level also 
embrace values of religious tolerance.113 In the current survey, the prominent members of 
Albanian society were asked about the sphere of influence of religious leaders and other 
clerics. Respondents believe that religious leaders have a considerable influence on their 
own community of believers. On a scale from 1 (no influence) to 7 (significant influence), 
respondents gave an average rate of 4.87. This influence sphere creates an opportunity for 
promoting values of religious tolerance within the community of believers.
Despite their perceived influence on their own community of believers, the respondents 
do not feel that religious leaders have a strong influence on public opinion in Albania 
in general. Aside from the representatives of the religious communities responding to 
the survey, the remainder of the elite were sceptical as to the extent to which religious 
leaders influence public opinion. With an average answer of 3.43 on a scale from 1 (no 
influence) to 7 (significant influence), the responses depict that religious leaders have yet 
to substantially breach discussions pertaining to the public realm.
























112 ‘The Interreligious Council of Albania receives human rights award’, Tirana Times, 8 November 
2018, available at: http://www.tiranatimes.com/?p=139119
113 Institute of Democracy and Meditation, ‘Religious tolerance in Albania’, 25 April 2018, available 
at: http://idmalbania.org/religious-tolerance-albania/
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The influence of religion on developments in Albania
Respondents were asked whether they felt that religion, as predominantly interpreted and 
presented in the public discourse, has positively or negatively influenced developments 
in Albania. Overall, the influential figures in Albania viewed religion as a positive influence 
on the developments in the country, rather than a negative one. Respondents saw religion 
especially as having a positive influence on the tolerance and peaceful coexistence in 
the country (83.9% or N = 26), the highest frequency out of all the questions. On other 
developments, such as social cohesion, inter-ethnic relations and democracy, religion was 
also seen as having a more positive than a negative influence. For social cohesion, 58.1% of 
respondents answered that religion had a positive influence. For inter-ethnic relations and 
democracy this was 51.6% and 48.4% respectively. Mostly neutral responses were recorded 
concerning religion’s effect on economic well-being (71% answered neutral) and political 
developments (58.1% answered neutral), which means that respondents tend to perceive 
that in Albania, religion does not really have an influence on these developments. Good 
neighbourly relations among Western Balkan countries was most-often reported as being 
influenced negatively by religion. Six respondents believed that religion has a negative 
influence on relations between Western Balkan Countries. 
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Religious tolerance
In 2014, Pope Francis made the first of his foreign visits to Albania in order to highlight the 
interreligious harmony in the country. Pope Francis hailed Albania because of ‘the peaceful 
coexistence and collaboration that exists among followers of different religions’.114 Indeed, 
according to the 2018 study on religious tolerance, the vast majority of Albanians believe 
that religious tolerance is a fundamental value in Albania (93%).115 The reason for this is, 
according to 76.3% of the respondents, that Albanians in general are not very religious. 
What is more important to Albanians is to lead a moral life (69.5% strongly agrees or 
agrees) and to be a good person no matter what religion you profess (72.5% strongly agree 
or agree).
The findings of the current survey agree with some of the major findings of the 2018 study. 
The respondents were asked to rate the interreligious relations in Albania on a scale from 
1 (religious hatred) to 7 (religious harmony). The average answer from the respondents was 
a 6, meaning that the respondents perceive that in Albania, there is religious harmony. 
38.7% of the respondents rated interreligious relations with a 7 and another 38.7% gave 
a 6. Only one respondent rated the interreligious relations in Albania with less than an 
average score: a 3 on a scale from 1 to 7. Interreligious relations in the Western Balkans, on 
the other hand, were rated as being much less positive. On the same scale from 1 to 7, the 
respondents rated interreligious relations in the Western Balkans with an average score of 
3.74. Only one respondent perceived that in the Western Balkans, interreligious relations 
can be described as harmonious.






















114 N. Squires, ‘Pope Francis hails Albania as model of religious harmony in attack on religious 
extremism’, Telegraph, 21 September 2014, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/
europe/albania/11111600/Pope-Francis-says-Albania-is-a-model-of-religious-harmony-
during-first-visit-to-Muslim-majority-nation.html
115 Institute of Democracy and Meditation, 2018, Op. Cit.
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Following the respondents’ assessment on the current state of interreligious relations 
in Albania and in the Western Balkans, they were asked to give their opinion on future 
developments of interreligious relations. On a scale from 1 (will seriously worsen) to 7 
(will significantly improve), respondents rated that over the next five years, interreligious 
relations in Albania will remain the same (average of 4.5). 


































Respondents did not think that Albania’s deeply rooted values of religious harmony will 
be affected in the next five years. A civil society leader notes that: 
‘the establishment of Centre for Interfaith Cooperation, the continuous work of the Interreligious Council of Albania and the opening of the Balkan Institute for Religious Studies and Democracy will have a positive impact on interreligious relations over the next five years’. 
A high-level cleric also foresees a significant improvement of interreligious relations, 
especially because the religious communities have such a good relationship with each 
other. Another cleric does not share this view. He expects that the ‘growing awareness of 
the specific teachings of different religions […] naturally increases the distance between 
believers of different religions’. One journalist thinks that it is the ‘apparent religious 
radicalism’ and ‘foreign agendas of the religious communities’ that may cause a slight 
worsening of interreligious relations in Albania. 
In the Western Balkan region, respondents did not predict significant changes in regards to 
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the interreligious relations. On a scale form 1 (will seriously worsen) to 7 (will significantly 
improve), the average assessment was 3.76, meaning that interreligious relations will remain 
difficult (see also Figure 4). According to one respondent, the EU accession process could 
be the cause of stronger divisions between Western Balkan countries, if it is ‘differentiated 
between the Western Balkan states’. One religious leader noted that, compared to Albania, 
the situation in the Western Balkans will remain challenging due to the perception of 
ethnic divisions when speaking about religion. Another high-level cleric points out that 
‘religious communities have shown readiness to strengthen the relationships between 
different religious groups’, and therefore expects that interreligious relations will improve 
over the next five years.










The ignorance and lack of education 
concerning religious matters  
The inﬂuence 
of foreign actors
Wrong interpretations of religion 
and the rise of extremist movements
The abuse of religion 
for political purposes3
Threats and opportunities for religious tolerance in Albania
When asked their opinion on the biggest threats to interreligious relations in Albania, 
the respondents named a wide variety of possible threats. Most often mentioned was 
the abuse of religion for political gain. Respondents expressed their concerns regarding 
mixing religious arguments with political discourse, and with politics interfering in what 
one respondent calls ‘the religious domain’. These answers indicate that the respondents 
think it is important that politics and the state should not interfere with religious affairs 
and vice-versa, as is also stated in the Albanian Constitution. 
Another often-cited threat to religious harmony is the misinterpretation of religion, the 
rise of religious extremism [not specifically in Albania] and the stereotypes that are built 
around religious conservatism. In the 2018 study on religious extremism in Albania, it was 
noted that over 30% of Albanians associate women wearing a veil or men having an Islamic 
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beard with ‘religious fundamentalism and extremism’.116 According to the respondents to 
this survey, it is important that (violent) religious extremism is not confused with religious 
conservativism. Similarly, respondents think that hate speech among different religious 
groups, especially when based on stereotypes, can be a potential threat to interreligious 
relations.
The third most-cited threat to religious harmony in Albania, according to the respondents, 
is the foreign influence that exists in religious communities in Albania. Some respondents 
cite the institutions economic dependency on foreign funding, while others are particularly 
concerned with the more conservative teachings that come along with young, foreign-trained 
religious clerics. The remainder of the most prevalent concerns concerned the ignorance 
on general or alternate religious cultures, the lack of integrity and professionalism on 
the part of religious leaders and the absence of interreligious dialogue and cooperation 
between the main religious institutions. 
Despite seeing threats to interreligious relations in Albania, the respondents also noted 
that religion can have a positive influence on society. Specifically, the vast majority of the 
respondents said that religion can help improve political developments, democracy, inter-
ethnic relations, social cohesion, and peaceful coexistence. Social cohesion was believed 
to be the most prone (N = 27) to positive influence by religion. Respondents highlighted 
religion’s important role as a preserver of a society’s morals and existing social values. By 
preaching good morals, emphasising what unites people, and encouraging believers to 
lead a moral life, religious institutions and representatives can unite people in communal 
activities. This, respondents say, can ‘strengthen the communal sense’ and ‘express the 
message of religious tolerance’, despite the potential differences in religions.  
Besides teaching good morals, the respondents also highlighted that religious institutions 
and representatives can preach democratic values and practices, which would increase 
active citizenship. One civil society leader argued that religious institutions should 
become more active ‘in protecting the rights of the vulnerable groups by using institutional 
mechanisms’. A legal expert also sees an opportunity for religious leaders to speak up when 
there are social issues or misrule, but urges ‘religious institutions to distance themselves 
from political ideologies’. Lastly, another civil society leader suggested that, in order to 
improve the state of tolerance and peaceful coexistence in Albania, religious institutions 
and representatives should lead by example, ‘by staying neutral, tolerant and away from 
extremist ideologies’. 
116 G. Vurmo, ‘Violent Extremism in Albania’, November 2018, The Institute for Democracy 










Survey report Bosnia and Herzegovina
By Lejla Hodžić
Survey sample
In assessing the role of religion in Bosnia and Herzegovina and analysing the multi-
confessional context of the country, the report relies on the findings from an opinion survey 
and a range of secondary sources. The survey, administered during April 2019, aimed at 
gathering the opinions of influential figures in political, cultural and economic sphere in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina on the role of religion. It is based on a questionnaire which was 
distributed to over 50 influential figures, of which 30 provided quantitative and qualitative 
answers to questions addressing religion’s impact on society. 
Religion and society
According to research conducted by Silvestri and Mayall (2015), in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
people tend to identify with their religion rather than with their state.117 One of the most 
comprehensive surveys on the role of religion in Bosnia and Herzegovina, conducted by 
university professors from Mostar, which analysed the importance of religion in transitional 
societies, found that Bosnia and Herzegovina is a traditional society in which religion 
and religious communities play a significant role, especially because religious affiliation 
overlaps with ethnic belonging.118 Religion plays an important role in everyday life of 66.8% 
of Bosnians and Herzegovinians, while 17.3% are ambivalent towards the role of religion.119 
It is noteworthy that the importance of religion in everyday life increases among younger 
generations, whereas it decreases among more educated societal groups.120 
According to our survey – which was conducted among influential individuals involved in 
political, cultural and economic spheres in Bosnia and Herzegovina – showed that religion 
is important to a certain extent. On the scale of 0 to 7 which measures importance of religion 
in the society, where 0 marks complete irrelevance and 7 marks significant influence, the 
average answer was 5.63, where 11 respondents considered religion very important and 
13 respondents considered religion had moderate importance. The respondents who 
considered religion as very important were primarily university professors, journalists, 
and those involved in NGOs. 
117 Silvestri, Sara and James Mayall, “The Role of Religion in Conflict and Peacebuilding” The 
British Academy, September 2015, p. 65.
118 S. Kukić, and M. Čutura, ‘Religija i njezina uloga u tranzicijskom informacijskom društvu’ (2012) 
Informatol. 45: 1, p. 16
119 Ibid., p. 18.
120 Ibid.
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When it comes to the influence of religious arguments on attitudes towards societal issues 
such as poverty, justice, equality, crime and social cohesion in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
respondents showed mixed opinions. According to respondents, religion has a moderate 
to strong influence on attitudes to societal issues in Bosnia and Herzegovina with the 
average answer of 4.76 (on a 1 to 7 scale) given by respondents. Eight respondents said 
they believe religious arguments have moderate influence, while seven respondents said 
religious arguments have very strong influence on these societal issues.
Respondents also believe that religious leaders in Bosnia and Herzegovina are influential 
within their own community of believers. Ten consider them to be very influential, whereas 
eight respondents consider them somewhat influential, and six respondents consider 
them influential. Two respondents refused to provide an answer on this question. Overall, 
the majority of respondents believe they have a strong influence within their community 
with an average answer of 5.78. Respondents also believe that religious leaders and their 
representatives in Bosnia and Herzegovina have medium to strong influence on public 
opinion in general, with an average answer of 5.2.
The relationship between religion and politics became stronger in all countries of 
southeastern Europe after the fall of communism as religion recovered the influence it had 
before.121 In Bosnia and Herzegovina, religion and politics are considered as interdependent, 
but the state has not achieved much in creating an inclusive political community for all 
religious groups, and especially for minorities.122 The opinion survey conducted for this 
report demonstrated that ten respondents believe religion has a significant impact on 
political questions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and only one respondent believes it has no 
impact on politics. Overall, respondents believe religion has strong influence on political 
questions since the average answer was 5.24.
In the opinion survey from 2010–2011 on the relationship of religion and politics in 
contemporary Bosnia and Herzegovina, the large majority of citizens (74.5%) said that 
the role of religion in politics should not be stronger.123 Interestingly, of the 19.4% who 
believe that religion should have a stronger role in politics the majority are from younger 
generations.124 Comparing this to the results of a survey conducted at the end of the 1990s 
which showed that this generational group had the lowest affiliation towards religious 
values, the change in the impact of religion is evident. It is indicative of a radical shift 
in the system of values supported by the younger generation, which is explained by the 
strengthening of the role of religious communities and institutions in the society.125
Previous data indicates that religion plays an important role in society, family and politics 
and that religious leaders are influential figures in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but these 
findings do not substantiate religion’s influence on concrete societal developments. As 
part of the survey conducted for this report, respondents were asked to give their opinion 
on whether religion, as dominantly interpreted and presented in the public discourse, 
positively or negatively influenced the development of political processes, democracy, 
inter-ethnic relations, social cohesion, economic well-being, tolerance and peaceful 
121 Ognjenović and Jozelić, p. 311.
122 Ibid.
123 Kukić and Čutura, p. 20
124 Ibid. 
125 Ibid, p. 20.
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coexistence, and good neighbourly relations among Western Balkan countries. Figure 
7 shows the opinions of respondents on the way religion influences different societal 
matters. The majority of respondents believe that religion has a negative impact on most 
spheres in society, or its impact was neutral. The most negative influence of religion is 
visible in the sphere of political processes and inter-ethnic relations, while tolerance and 
peaceful coexistence and good neighbourly relations were also negatively affected by 
religion, according to the respondents’ opinion. A small number of respondents believe 
religion positively influences these spheres. Moreover, many respondents believe religion 
has no influence on economic well-being, democracy and social cohesion.

















13.3      10    73.3                  
10   46.67    43.3 0
16.67           6.67   73.3     
13.3   46.67     40 0
 73.33       20       6.67
23.3   20   56.67 0






Respondents, therefore, consider that religion and religious leaders have failed to positively 
contribute to areas where religious communities are usually the driving force of change 
e.g. social cohesion. Efforts of religious leaders to enhance social cohesion and inclusion 
at the local level have been seldom, whereas international religious organisations have 
provided substantial humanitarian assistance during and after the armed conflict.126 In 
addition, many international denominational organisations, especially those from North 
126 Silvestri and Mayall, p. 68
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America, have contributed to reconciliation through interfaith dialogue and training on 
conflict resolution.127
Religious diversity – threats and opportunities
The peaceful coexistence of different confessional groups in Bosnia and Herzegovina has 
been disrupted by the 1992–1995 armed conflict, and insufficient interfaith dialogue in the 
post-conflict period has sustained the rift between different religious groups. Transition 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina has been described as situation of ‘negative peace’ (simply 
the absence of war), indicating a failed reconciliation among different ethno-religious 
groups.128 Even though religion was not the underlying cause of conflict, the religious 
context sustains the conflicting positions of and furthers divisions between the three 
ethno-religious groups.129 Since the end of the conflict, there have been no substantial 
efforts of religious leaders to promote universal values and principles, which would 
promote coexistence as well as a unified attitude towards some societal matters. While 
religious leaders have engaged in interfaith dialogue more substantially through the 
Inter-Religious Council (IRC), formed in 1997,130 this and similar initiatives tend to focus 
on religious leaders themselves, students of theology, youth and women’s groups within 
religious communities, while disregarding other segments of society.131
The fact that little has been done regarding improvement of interreligious relations in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina is supported by the answers given by influential figures in the 
political, cultural and economic spheres. The results of the survey show that, generally, 
respondents perceive interreligious relations in Bosnia and Herzegovina as somewhere 
between outright religious hatred and religious harmony, but closer to religious hatred. 
Only one respondent thought there is religious harmony in the country, two respondents 
thought there is religious hatred in the country, whereas nine respondents thought the 
interreligious relations were closer to religious hatred than to harmony.  On the scale 
of 1 to 7 where 1 marks religious hatred and 7 marks religious harmony, respondents’ 
average answer was 3.67 indicating their perception is that interreligious relations in 
Bosnia are slightly closer to religious hatred, which is depicted in Figure 8 below. However, 
respondents believe that interreligious relations in Bosnia and Herzegovina are slightly 
better than those in other countries of the Western Balkans. On the scale of 1 to 7, on 
average respondents believe interreligious relations in the Western Balkans are 3.5, which 
is lower than their perception on the same issue in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
127 Ibid.
128 Alicino, p. 1.
129 Religion was an underlying factor, but the political and economic situation in Yugoslavia 
worsened over time causing conflicts over power-sharing among the representatives of 
different nations in Yugoslavia.
130 J. Natalya-Clark,’Religion and Reconciliation in Bosnia & Herzegovina: Are Religious Actors 
Doing Enough?’,,Europe-Asia Studies, 62:4, 2010, pp. 677-678
131 H. Fazlić. ‘Perspectives on Building Trust among Communities in Bosnia and Herzegovina: The 
Challenges and the Role of Faith Communities’, (2015) Journal of Ecumenical Studies, 50:2, p. 
340.
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When asked about the future of interreligious relations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the 
majority of respondents (13) believe they will stay the same. None of the respondents 
believe that they will seriously worsen, or significantly improve. Based on their answers, 
three respondents believe that the relations will improve depending on political stability 
and the economic situation. The reasons that the respondents gave when explaining why 
interreligious relations will stagnate in the future were varied. Four respondents believe 
that interreligious relations will not improve because interfaith dialogue is non-existent 
and there is no willingness among religious leaders to establish the dialogue. Another 
four respondents recognised the detrimental effect of the relationship between politics 
and religion, where religious communities continue political relations which have been 
negative. A journalist who believes there will be no improvement in interreligious relations 
said that: ‘There is no will of leaders of religious communities and groups to interact with 
other religious leaders and communities in accordance with the basic moral principles of 
sacred texts, but that they interact on the basis of political preconceptions and attitudes.’
Other reasons cited by the respondents include failed post-conflict reconciliation and the 
slow pace of development of an interfaith dialogue, as well as lack of tolerance among 
the religious groups. Those respondents who believe there will be some, but limited 
improvement of interreligious relations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, gave particular 
importance to the Inter-Religious Council and its activities, as well as to cooperation 
amongst religious communities. Nevertheless, these respondents also noted that there 
has been symbolic and formal cooperation between religious communities, but no 
constructive efforts to build on the interfaith cooperation. Others believe the driving force 
the improvement of interreligious relations will come from the international community, 
and the European Union in particular. One of the respondents, a university professor, said 
that:
‘since religious and ethnic identity in Bosnia and Herzegovina coincide, and political goals are conflicting, religious leaders must support the interests of their community, although Islam, Orthodoxy and Catholicism overcome the borders of a state. Religious leaders and religious teachers 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina can raise their own religious leaders in the ethnic 
and religious plural state of Bosnia and Herzegovina. I see such readiness 
with the bishops, imams, priests and teachers in state schools.’ 
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The respondents expressed similar opinions on the improvement of interreligious relations 
in the Western Balkans. The majority of respondents (13) believe that interreligious 
relations in the Western Balkans will remain the same, three respondents did not express 
their opinion on the issue, while only one respondent believes there will be significant 
improvement. A director of an NGO said that he believes:
‘that there will be some improvement because political elites of the Western Balkan countries, taught by previous conflict experiences, have realised that it is impossible to establish a functional democracy in a state with impaired interreligious relations.’
On the scale of 0 to 7 where 0 marks the deterioration of interreligious relations and 7 
significant improvement, the respondents’ average answer was 4.14.
According to respondents’ opinions, the biggest threats to interreligious relations in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina are related to the political situation, which is shown in Figure 9. Political 
instability, the behaviour of politicians, the relationship of politics and religion, or the 
abuse of religion for political purposes were named the biggest threats. The absence of 
interfaith dialogue, the rise of nationalism and insufficient education and knowledge were 
named as the three next biggest threats. History and lack of reconciliation, as well as false 
interpretations of religion and the development of extremist movements were named 
as additional threats to interreligious relations in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Respondents 
often cited lack of knowledge and understanding of religion as one of the threats to 
interreligious relations in the country, indicating insufficient education in this regard. For 
example, an assistant university professor said the three biggest threats are: 
‘lack of the curriculum for the subjects of history and religion which would affirmatively speak about value of diversity, common cultural and historical heritage, affirmatively about the other and differences (not the fear of the Turks); lack of projects on interreligious dialogue; and non-
engagement of religious leaders in passing interreligious reconciliation and 
mutual understanding on to ordinary citizens in all communities/counties 
throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina.’
According to the Stuebner (2009), there is no comprehensive effort to enrich school 
curricula with the study of religious culture or history, and the politicisation of education 
systems in Bosnia and Herzegovina is sustaining the lack of cooperation among religious 
groups on this issue.132
132 R. Stuebner, 'The Current Status of Religious Coexistence and Education in BiH.' USIP, 
November 2009.
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In the survey, respondents were given the opportunity to explain the ways religion can 
improve certain aspects of society such as politics, democracy, social cohesion and others. 
Overall, respondents consider that religion can attain a more positive role in all of these 
aspects if religious leaders engage more actively in the promotion of universal and ethical 
values and strengthening interfaith dialogue at the level of local communities. On the 
question of how religion can improve political processes in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the 
majority of respondents mentioned a total separation of religion from the state, promotion 
of universal or ethical values among people and condemnation of bad/detrimental 
political practices. Other suggestions for improving political processes included educating 
believers on political pluralism, interfaith dialogue and reconciliation, and stimulating 
active voting among citizens.
Respondents believe that religious leaders should promote more democratic principles and 
universal values, as well as coexistence and respect of religious groups in order to improve 
the processes related to democracy in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Respondents also believe 
that religious leaders need to take a more active role in teaching and promoting tolerance, 
since the majority of respondents considered this to be the key for the improvement of 
inter-ethnic relations in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Religion can improve social cohesion, through the promotion of universal or ethical 
principles and social equality, while promoting entrepreneurship and social justice would 
be beneficial for economic well-being in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Considering that the majority of respondents thought that religion negatively influenced 
tolerance and peaceful coexistence, this is the area where religious leaders should 
assume a more active role. Generally, respondents think that tolerance and coexistence 
are insufficiently promoted by the religious leaders. A significant number of respondents 
consider that the Inter-Religious Council should have a more prominent role, especially in 
establishing interfaith dialogue.
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Without doubt, religion can trigger positive developments in Bosnian and Herzegovinian 
society, especially in those areas where it is important to reconcile the needs of different 
groups within society. In addition, respondents felt strongly that religious leaders should 
promote and teach universal values, as well as condemn negative practices in politics, 
economics, human rights, and other spheres of society. However, a significant number of 
respondents said that religion cannot improve these spheres at all, especially in terms 
of political processes, economic well-being, good neighbourly relations in the Western 
Balkans, and democracy.
The promotion of interethnic tolerance and coexistence was mentioned most frequently 
as a way to improve good neighbourly relations through religion. Religious leaders in the 
region should meet more often, organise visits and events together, and promote peace 
in the entire region. Notably, respondents believe that good neighbourly relations should 
be primarily ensured within the borders of respective states, in order to ensure good 
neighbourly relations across the region. Finally, promotion of peace among the youth is the 
key in creation of good neighbourly relations in the region, according to the respondents. 
One of the respondents said that religion can improve good neighbourly relations in the 
Western Balkans through: 
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During April and May 2019, approximately 120 surveys were distributed to high-level 
individuals involved in political, economic and cultural spheres in Kosovo. A total of 19 
respondents completed the survey. The respondents include influential individuals from 
civil society (N=7), government and the political elite (N=5), religious communities (N=5), 
and academia (N=1). One respondent did not state his occupation. As regards the gender 
of survey respondents, 15 were male (79%) and four female (21%). Of the respondents, 
half of them have MA degrees (N = 9), six have BA degrees, and the remaining hold PhD 
or postdoctoral degrees. The average age of the respondents is 31 years old, with the 
youngest 27 and the oldest 58 years old. It is important to highlight that this report suffers 
from two major limitations. First, is the low number of respondents compared to other 
countries, and second, that all respondents are ethnic Albanians. Both of these limitations 
were caused by low responsiveness to the surveys we distributed.
The role of religion in Kosovo
In Kosovo, there is a strong sense of secularity in the political and intellectual sphere. 
In former Yugoslavia, Dr. Bashkim Iseni argues, integration and modernisation policies 
implemented in some Muslim-populated areas gave birth to an atheistic political and 
intellectual elite, as well as to a radical marginalisation of the Muslim clergy.133 Islam was 
reduced to the private sphere: reserved only for worship practices, annual religious feasts 
and traditional ceremonies for weddings and deaths. According to a 2016 study on the 
impact of religion on ethnic identity in the state-building period of Kosovo, the quest for 
the country’s independence was not religiously motivated134. Most Kosovars envisioned a 
secular state, particularly because of the absence of a unitary religion. It was only after 
the Kosovo War and the subsequent NATO intervention in 1999 that religion became more 
important due to a combination of circumstances such as a weak economy, political 
instability, and societal disorientation.135 As a result, religion became more visible in all 
public spheres, from personal lives to the society at large. Especially since the introduction 
of mass media and increased access to the internet, public debates about religion, have 
133 B. Iseni, National Identity, Islam and Politics in the Balkans (Stuttgart: Akademie der Diozese, 
2009).
134 A. D. Peci, What happened to Kosovo Albanians: The impact of religion on the ethnic identity 
in the state building-period (Prishtina: KIPRED, 2016).
135 Ibid.
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increased over the years.136
In the current survey, respondents were asked how important religion is for most people 
in Kosovo. Respondents were asked to rate on a scale of 1 (not important at all) to 7 (very 
important), the importance of religion today for most of people. The average answer was 
5.3, where five respondents considered religion very important and nine other respondents 
considered religion to have a moderate to strong importance (see Figure 10). There is a mix 
of opinions and no common trend among individuals with similar occupations. Some of the 
respondents from a specific occupation think religion is important while their colleagues 
are more sceptical. For example, a respondent working in government has rated religion 
as not important (2), while another respondent working in government has rated religion 
as very important (7).  
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When asked about the influence of religion on the attitudes of the majority of people on 
societal issues such as poverty, justice, equality, crime and social cohesion in Kosovo, 
respondents had diverse reactions. According to them, religion has a moderate influence 
on attitudes regarding societal issues in Kosovo with an average answer of 4.57 on a scale 
from 1 to 7 (see Figure 11).
Figure 11: Religion’s influence on societal and political matters
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136 J. Mehmeti, ‘Faith and Politics in Kosovo: The Status of Religious Communities in a Secular 
Country. The Revival of Islam in the Balkans’, 2015, pp. 68–69
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Although the respondents perceive that religion may have some influence on societal 
issues in the country, they appear to be more sceptical over the influence of religion 
on political matters. According to the majority of respondents (N = 13), the influence of 
religion on the attitudes of people in Kosovo towards political matters such as democratic 
participation, voter behaviour, and political parties in Kosovo is very modest. On a scale 
of 1 (not important at all) to 7 (very important), the average answer was 3.7. Only six of 
respondents believe religion has a moderate influence on political matters (see Figure 11).
Religious leaders
The respondents believe the religious leaders in Kosovo are influential among their 
respective community of believers. Eleven respondents believed religious leaders are 
either influential or very influential. Six of the respondents believe they have a moderate 
influence, while only two respondents believe they have modest influence. On a scale from 
1 (no influence) to 7 (very influential) the average answer of respondents is 5.47 (see Figure 
12). In terms of the influence of religious leaders on wider public opinion in Kosovo, the 
majority of respondents (N = 12) believe religious leaders have a moderate influence. On 
a scale from 1 (no influence) to 7 (very influential) the average answer is 4.38 (see Figure 
12). Only three of respondents believe religious leaders are influential or very influential 
on public opinion. Three others believe they have little or very little influence on public 
opinion in Kosovo. Based on these findings, religious leaders are perceived to be influential 
within their own community of believers, but have only a moderate influence on society 
as a whole.
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The role of religion on developments in Kosovo
As part of the survey conducted for this report, respondents were asked to give their 
opinions on whether religion, as dominantly interpreted and presented in the public 
discourse, positively or negatively influenced political developments, democracy, 
interethnic relations, social cohesion, economic well-being, tolerance and peaceful 
coexistence, and good neighbourly relations among the Western Balkans countries. The 
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following figure (see Figure 13) shows their responses on all these spheres. Overall, the 
majority of respondents believe that religion had either a positive or neutral impact on all 
the spheres.
According to the respondents, religion had a particularly positive influence on tolerance 
and peaceful coexistence, social cohesion, and interethnic relations. Respondents gave the 
‘positive influence’ answer most often in the sphere of tolerance and peaceful coexistence, 
with the vast majority of respondents (N = 14) believing that religion has positively influenced 
tolerance and peaceful coexistence in Kosovo. Only five respondents believe religion has 
negatively influenced Kosovo’s tolerance and peaceful coexistence. For both social cohesion 
and interethnic relations, 12 respondents felt religion had a positive influence. More mixed 
responses were given with regards to political developments, democracy, and good neighbourly 
relations among Western Balkan countries. In terms of Kosovo’s political developments, 
five respondents believe religion has positively influenced political developments, and five 
others believe religion has negatively influenced them. As regards the role of religion on good 
neighbourly relations among Western Balkan countries, seven respondents believe religion 
has played a positive role in this aspect, while five believe religion has played a negative role. 
In terms of the role of religion on Kosovo’s democracy, eight of respondents believe religion 
has positively influenced Kosovo’s democracy, and seven believe it has negatively influenced 
it. Lastly, almost half of the survey respondents believe religion has played a neutral role in the 
economic well-being of Kosovo. Five respondents believe religion had a positive role and three 
others believe it had a negative role.
Figure 13: Religion’s influence on spheres of society
Does not knowNegative inﬂuenceNeutral inﬂuencePositive inﬂuence
Democracy 8 4 7
Interethnic
relations 12 5 2
Social cohesion 12 2 4
Tolerance and
peaceful coexistence 14 5
Good neighbourly
relations among WB 7 6 5
Political
developments 5 8 5 1
Economic
well-being 5 10 3 1
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Religious diversity in Kosovo
Data from the 2011 official census shows that 95.6% of the population in Kosovo identifies 
as Muslim, 2.2% as Roman Catholic, and 1.4% as Serbian Orthodox.137 However, this census 
was boycotted by ethnic Serbs, resulting in the underrepresentation of this ethnicity and 
of Orthodox Christians in general.138 Other religious communities include the Protestant 
community, which claims 20,000 followers (1.1% of the population), and the Jewish 
community (with only 56).139 Although the overwhelming majority of its citizens are Muslim, 
Kosovo has a diversity of religions. Therefore, in a religiously diverse country, interreligious 
relations are of great importance to the progress of society. 
Hence, respondents were asked to rate today’s interreligious relations on a 7-point scale 
from 1 (religious hatred) to 7 (religious harmony). With an average answer of 5.57, the 
results show that respondents tend to believe the interreligious relations in Kosovo are in 
harmony (see Figure 14). 
























Eight respondents believe there is religious harmony in the country, six believe interreligious 
relations are closer to religious harmony. Three responders believe the interreligious 
relations are neither harmony nor hatred, and only two believe the interreligious relations 
in Kosovo are closer to religious hatred.
137 Kosovo Agency of Statistics, ‘The final results of Population, Households and Housing Census 
Released’, 26 September 2012, http://ask.rks-gov.net/en/kosovo-agency-of-statistics/add-
news/the-final-results-of-population-households-and-housing-census-released
138 Kosovo Agency of Statistics, Kosovo Population and Housing Census 2011 - Final Results: 
Quality Report, via https://unstats.un.org/unsd/censuskb20/KnowledgebaseArticle10700.aspx 
139 L. Luxner, ‘With US help, Muslim-majority Kosovo plans its first synagogue and Jewish 
museum’, Times of Israel, 22 December 2018, https://www.timesofisrael.com/with-us-help-
muslim-majority-kosovo-plans-its-first-synagogue-and-jewish-museum/ 
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On the contrary, respondents believe that interreligious relations in the Western Balkan 
are slightly worse compared to interreligious relations within Kosovo. Respondents were 
asked to rate on a 7-point scale from 1 (religious hatred) to 7 (religious harmony) and 
they characterise today’s interreligious relations in the Western Balkans as moderately 
harmonious (average answer is 4.1).
Interreligious relations development in the next five years
When asked about the future of interreligious relations in the next five years in Kosovo, 
half of the respondents believe these relations will improve. Only two respondents 
believe they will worsen. The respondents were asked to rate on a seven-point scale from 
1 (will seriously deteriorate) to 7 (will significantly improve) and the average answer was 
4.6. The most frequent argument supporting the idea that the relations will improve, is 
that Kosovo’s interreligious tolerance is deeply rooted and interfaith coexistence has 
occurred in Kosovo for centuries. A member of the civil society sector also added that, ‘my 
nationality is more important than my religion, thus, my religious faith will never have an 
impact on my decisions, but the good sides of religion, such as charity will be conducive 
to my behaviour.’ Sceptical voices in the other hand put an emphasis on radicalisation, 
the low level of accountability among religious institutions and uncontrolled activities of 
religious NGOs. Some of the respondents believe that the future of interreligious relations 
in Kosovo will depend on the political and economic processes taking place in the region.

































In their responses concerning the future of the Western Balkans’ interreligious relations 
the ‘will remain the same’ option was the most selected one (N = 7). Six respondents 
believed interreligious relations in the Western Balkans will improve, while four others 
believe they will deteriorate. The average answer was 4.23, which is lower than for Kosovo. 
The optimistic arguments were the impact of international community and civic awareness 
over their religion. Negative expectations consisted in the interplay of religion and politics 
and the radical interpretation of religion. Just as in the case of Kosovo, respondents 
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believed that interreligious relations in the Western Balkans will reflect the future political 
and economic conditions of the region.
Threats and opportunities for interreligious relations in Kosovo
Respondents were asked to list the top three threats to interreligious relations in Kosovo. 
They offered a variety of answers (see Figure 16), but the most dominant threats that 
they saw to interreligious relations were religious propaganda, the country’s struggling 
economy and the lack of opportunities hindering youth prospects. Religious extremism 
imported from outside, and the interplay of religion and politics were also listed as threats 
to interreligious relations in Kosovo. As regards to imported religious extremism, this is 
an issue that countries all over the world are facing today. However, what is particularly 
pressing about the situation in Kosovo is that the religious communities are not formally 
recognised as legal entities and do not receive any funding from the state to conduct 
their activities, train clergy or to maintain or (re)build property. Consequently, religious 
communities seek funding from elsewhere, for example from foreign governments or 
religiously oriented NGOs.140  
As regards to this threat, the respondents listed Arab countries, Serbia, and Turkey as 
potential exporters of religious extremism to Kosovo. Islamophobia as well as unequal 
treatment of religions were listed as threats by some of the respondents. 








Unequal treatment of religions
Islamophobia
Discrimination / prejudices
Interplay of religion and politics
Imported religious extremism
Struggling economy and 
lack of opportunities for youth
Religious propaganda
140 M. Edwards and M. Colborne, ‘Turkey's gift of a mosque sparks fears of “neo-Ottomanism” in 
Kosovo’, Guardian,2 January 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2019/jan/02/turkey-is-
kosovo-controversy-over-balkan-states-new-central-mosque. See also C. Gall, ‘How Kosovo 
Was Turned Into Fertile Ground for ISIS’, New York Times, 21 May 2016, https://www.nytimes.
com/2016/05/22/world/europe/how-the-saudis-turned-kosovo-into-fertile-ground-for-isis.html 
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Although it is surprising to see that a Muslim-majority country suffers from Islamophobia, 
this finding is confirmed by other literature on the topic. Despite widespread religious 
freedom, studies have shown there is a stigmatisation of conservative religious believers, 
especially of the Islamic community. One study argues that practising believers are 
sometimes prejudiced and stereotyped based on their outlook (for example because of 
Islamic dress).141 Respondents of our survey pointed to the media and government as 
generators of Islamophobia. Some of the respondents emphasised the role of religious 
leaders in dealing with threats to interreligious relations in Kosovo. A respondent from 
one religious community argued the ‘inadequate inclusion of religious leaders in dealing 
with the negative phenomena, especially with those who have to do with extremism and 
radicalism may be a potential threat to the interreligious relations in Kosovo.’ In terms of 
the unequal treatment of religions, this threat was listed four times, and it corresponds 
with the discontent of both the Muslim Association of Kosovo and the Serbian Orthodox 
Church, which have accused the government of discrimination towards their communities, 
albeit for different reasons.142
After expressing their opinion on the biggest threats for interreligious relations, respondents 
also listed what they saw as opportunities for a positive role of religion in society. Overall, 
respondents were optimistic about the role of religion and believe that it can have a 
positive impact on interethnic relations, social cohesion, peaceful coexistence and good 
neighbourly relations among Western Balkan countries. However, respondents note that 
this can only be achieved if religious leaders engage more actively in the promotion of 
moral values (such as mutual respect, harmony, friendship, solidarity and tolerance) and 
work on strengthening interreligious cooperation and dialogue. 
Another respect in which respondents believe religion can have a positive impact is 
democracy. The most frequent response was that religion can help by promoting democratic 
values such as dialogue, sympathy, justice, democracy, and human rights. Additional ways 
in which religion can improve democracy include encouraging citizens to take part in 
public hearings and decision-making. One respondent argued: 
‘religions preach peace and tolerance, which are per se very compatible with the values  of democracy, and if they are correctly explained, they can play an important role in the successful implementation of democratic values.’ 
The only two aspects where responses were neutral or argued that religion can have a 
limited role were political developments and economic well-being. Nevertheless, some 
respondents believe that religion can also improve the political development in Kosovo 
by increasing the public presence of adequate religious leaders and by preventing the 
interplay between religion and politics. One of the respondents said that religion can help 
improve the political developments by ‘encouraging their audiences to take part massively 
in elections.’ With regards to economic well-being, a few optimistic respondents argued 
that religion can have an impact on this aspect by encouraging people to work, refuse 
corruption and nepotism, as well as by doing charity and helping those in need.
141 B. G. Kamberi ‘The practice of religion and respect of religious freedom in Kosovo’, Studime 
Sociale, 2017, pp. 35–36.
142 The Muslim community has complained about the rules prohibiting religious dress in public 
schools, while the Orthodox community claims it has received no financial support to rebuild 
destroyed religious sites. See also: Islamic Association of Kosovo, Press declaration, 24 












During March and April 2019, a survey was conducted as part of the regional project that 
deals with the role of religion in Western Balkan countries. The survey was conducted as 
part of a research project and was conducted among members of the cultural and political 
elite of society. Its purpose is to give a sketch of the religious beliefs of different societies. 
The survey itself was developed as the result of the mutual cooperation among four 
partner institutions in the Balkans.
After the selection of respondents, around 60 surveys were sent to the candidates. As a 
result, we received 25 surveys with the data. The respondents included politicians and 
government employees (N=3), religious leaders (N=3), academics (N=5), civil society leaders 
(N=6), journalists and opinion-makers (N=4) and young leaders (N=4). Of the respondents, 
19 were male (76%) and six (24%) were female. The average age of the respondents was 
39 years, with the youngest respondent being 24 years old and the oldest 58 years old. 
With regard to respondents’ education, seven respondents have a bachelor’s degree, 13 
respondents hold an MA, while five of them have obtained a PhD degree or above. 
The role of religion in Montenegro
In the first part of the survey, respondents were asked to estimate the importance of 
religion for most people living in Montenegro on a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 marks complete 
irrelevance and 7 marks significant influence, the average mark was 4.56. 
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Respondents were then asked to grade the influence of religion on societal issues, such 
as poverty, justice, equality, crime, social cohesion etc. The respondents answered with an 
average assessment of 4.4 on a scale from 1 (no influence at all) to 7 (significant influence). 
This is only a small drop from the average grade in the first question. 
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But when asked about the influence of political issues in Montenegro, such as democratic 
participation, voter behaviour, political parties and others, respondents distributed 
differently along the same scale as in the previous question and gave the average grade 
of 4.04.
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Religious leaders
The next segment of the survey dealt with the influence of religious leaders in their 
religious communities in Montenegro on the one hand and their influence on wider public 
opinion on the other hand. As in the previous questions, respondents were asked to rate 
this on a 1–7 scale, where 1 stands for ‘no influence at all’ and 7 marks ‘very influential’. 
When it came to the influence within their respective communities, the average was 4.72. 
With regard to the influence of religious leaders on broader public opinion, the average 
was a bit lower at 4.56. The difference between the two is not as large as in some other 
countries in the Western Balkans. Based on these survey results, it seems that religious 
leaders in Montenegro are influential to some extent in their respective communities but 
in public opinion also. 
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The influence of religion on developments in Montenegro
Respondents were asked whether they perceived that religion, as dominantly interpreted 
and presented in the public discourse, has positively or negatively influenced developments 
in Montenegro. The specific kinds of developments influenced by religion they were asked 
about are political developments, democracy, interethnic relations, social cohesion, 
economic well-being, tolerance and peaceful coexistence and development of good 
neighbourly relations among countries in the Western Balkans. 
Concerning the political developments, people mostly see religion as a negative influence 
(N=10), a smaller number did not see an effect of religion (N=7) and only five saw a 
positive influence (two of were religious leaders), while three respondents marked that 
they do not know. The answers related to the development of democracy show similar 
results. Out of 25 respondents, ten of them did not see the influence on this, while five 
saw positive and six saw negative consequences for the development of democracy. The 
section regarding interethnic relations showed us that respondents (N=5) tend to believe 
that religion does not affect the development of those relations; 44% of respondents saw 
religion as having a negative influence on the development of interethnic relations; with 
an additional 28% of respondents who claimed that religion has a positive impact. When 
asked about the influence of religion on social cohesion respondents seem to be almost 
equally divided on positive influence (N=8), neutral influence (N=7) and negative influence 
(N=9). It is interesting to note that religious leaders all saw the positive impact of religion 
on social cohesion, while the four out of six members of civil organizations see it the 
other way around. The attitude of the respondents is pretty much the same as in other 
Western Balkan countries when it comes to economic well-being. The largest part of the 
respondents saw no active influence on the economic state of the people (N=16), while five 
respondents saw the negative impact and only two the positive one. Among those two are 
one young leader and one religious leader. 
Figure 20: The influence of religion on politics and society in Montenegro
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The next section of this question dealt with the development of tolerance and peaceful 
coexistence. When asked about the influence of religion on the development of 
tolerance and peaceful coexistence in Montenegrin society, respondents depicted that as 
predominantly negative (N=12). However, there were eight who believed that religion helps 
with the development of tolerance and peaceful coexistence, while four respondents said 
that religion does not influence this development and one respondent who answered 
‘Don’t know’. The last part of the question dealt with the religion’s influence on the 
development of good neighbourly relations among Western Balkan countries. It seems that 
a small majority of the respondents recognised the negative (N=9) influence of religion on 
relations between Western Balkan countries, with an additional six respondents who did 
not recognise the influence of the religion in this matter at all. Eight of the respondents 
claimed that religion positively influenced this development. 
Religious tolerance
The next part of our questionnaire dealt with the issues of religious tolerance and 
interreligious relations in Montenegro and in Western Balkans. Participants of the survey 
tried to assess the state of today’s interreligious relations. They were first asked to give 
their answer on a 1–7 scale, where 1 represents religious hatred and 7 represents religious 
harmony. Based on these two questions we can see that the respondents see interreligious 
relations in Montenegro in a worse condition than they are in the Western Balkans as a 
whole. The average mark of the state of interreligious relations in Montenegro was 3.92 
according to our respondents. When it comes to the present state of the interreligious 
relations in the Western Balkans the results seem to point to slightly better relations with 
an average score of 4.32. 
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The respondents were then asked to estimate the future development of interreligious 
relations over the next five years in Montenegro and in the Western Balkans and to further 
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explain their selection. Once again they had to choose from the scale 1–7, where 1 indicated 
‘will significantly deteriorate’, 7 indicated ‘will significantly improve’ and 4 indicated ‘it will 
remain the same’. 
Our respondents doubt that any significant change will happen over the period of the 
next five years. The majority of respondents tended to think that relations will stay exactly 
the same. In the case of Montenegro, nine respondents do not see any kind of change in 
those relations, while in the case of the Western Balkans 11 respondents feel that relations 
between different religious organisations and communities will not change to a large 
extent. The respondents seem to be a bit more optimistic when it comes to interreligious 
relations in the Western Balkans compared to Montenegro. Eight respondents (32%) 
believe that mutual relations in Montenegro will further, but not drastically deteriorate, 
while nine respondents believe that those relations are going to improve to some extent 
in the Western Balkan countries. Some of the stated reasons for the unsatisfactory state 
of their relations is connected with the new draft law on freedom of religion and the 
problems between Serbian Orthodox Church and Montenegrin Orthodox Church on the 
one hand, but also an increasing level of problems between the Serbian Orthodox Church 
in Montenegro and members of the Albanian minority lately.
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Threats and opportunities for religious tolerance in Montenegro
The final part of the conducted survey explored the possible threats for the further 
development of religious tolerance but also explored possible opportunities for the 
development of religious tolerance in Montenegro. The last question dealt with the 
possible areas of influence for religion in Montenegro. Our respondents were asked to 
list the three potential threats to religious tolerance. Most of the respondents’ mentioned 
politics in some form to be the biggest threat to the religious picture of Montenegro. For 
example, one of the members of academia claims that the ‘new draft law could be very 
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problematic in terms of the property of religious communities, it could create problems 
and tension in the region and not only in the religious picture of Montenegro’. Some 
respondents also noted that authorities tend to influence religious affairs and that some 
politicians capitalise on the religious feeling of Montenegrins in order to recruit potential 
voters. One representative of an NGO saw other factors including: ‘Religious leaders and 
communities lack openness and readiness to have an honest dialogue with members of 
other communities’. One religious leader, besides political influence, saw education as one 
of the problems for better understanding between the distinctive religious communities 
in Montenegro: ‘It would be good to include some kind of formal religious education 
in primary and secondary schools in order to raise the level of knowledge about one’s 
own religion, but also about the religion of others. It seems to me that it is the easiest 
way for people to make a distinction between their religion and ethnic identity’. One of 
the religious leaders also pointed out the way media reports shape public opinion: ‘For 
them [media], the essence is not about the story itself, but rather in the bringing as many 
readers or viewers to read or watch them. With that kind of approach, all good initiatives 
and good examples of mutual respect and life in multi-ethnic parts of the country will 
stay less visible than incidents’. Although the situation regarding religious tolerance and 
interreligious relations in Montenegro is not without difficulties, respondents recognise 
the existing potential for things to change. However, there are many limiting factors which 
tend to change slowly and gradually, and stop the positive development of them. 










Wrong religious interpretations 
or extremism
New Law on Freedom of Religion 
Lack of interreligious dialogue
Lack of Education
Inﬂuence of politics
Despite that, one academic said: ‘There is plenty of room for the upgrade of capacities 
for democracy by applying twin toleration in mutual relation between state and religious 
organisations’. Another member of academia sees the unused potential in religious 
communities when it comes to tackling different social issues from poverty to other 
inequalities in Montenegrin society. Interreligious initiatives focused on this could lead to 
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Survey report North Macedonia
By Viktorija Borovska
Survey sample
One of the activities of the project ‘Role of Religion in Western Balkan Societies’ was an 
elite survey that enabled us to gain an insight into views and perceptions on issues related 
to religiosity, the role and influence of religion, threats and opportunities of religious 
diversity and suggestions on how religion can contribute to the different social aspects 
of the various countries of the region. The survey in the Republic of North Macedonia 
(RNM) was conducted in the period April–May 2019 with a targeted sample comprising 39 
representatives from 7 categories: government and political elite (6 respondents), civil 
society leaders (5 respondents), journalists and opinion-makers (5 respondents), cultural 
elite (7 respondents), religious communities (6 respondents), academia (5 respondents), 
and young leaders (5 respondents). The respondents gave qualitative and quantitative 
answers to the questions.
The gender structure of the sample comprised 22 males (or 56.4%) and 17 females (43.6%). 
The average age of the respondents was 38.5 (the youngest 26 years and the oldest 68 
years old). In terms of education 14 respondents hold BA degrees, 12 respondents hold MA 
degrees and 13 hold a PhD degree.
Religion in North Macedonia – context
North Macedonia is multi-ethnic and multi-confessional country. According to the 
2002 census, the religious map of North Macedonia is as following: 64.8% are Orthodox 
Christians, 33.3% are Muslims, 0.35% Catholics, 0.03% Protestants.143 However, the current 
demographic map is expected to be different bearing in mind the fact that the last census 
was in 2002, while the next has been announced for 2021. According to a Brima/WIN-Gallup 
international survey, Balkan countries, with the exception of Bulgaria and Albania, remain 
in the group of the most religious countries in Europe, and Macedonia, with 88% of people 
being religious,144 is the regional leader in terms of religiosity. 
Regarding interreligious tolerance, the survey conducted by IPIS-Skopje in 2017 shows that 
citizens who belong to the two largest religions in Macedonia are religious and to a lesser 
or greater extent practise their faiths, and a relatively high percentage of them have no 
143 Census of Population, Households and Dwellings in the Republic of Macedonia 2002, available 
at http://www.stat.gov.mk/Publikacii/knigaX.pdf 




problem communicating with members of other religions, that is to say, there seems to 
be a high degree of interreligious tolerance in the country.145 The interreligious tolerance 
and peaceful coexistence of different ethnic and religious groups in North Macedonia was 
recognised by Pope Francis when he made his first foreign visit to North Macedonia.146 
However, multi-religious character of the RNM was always intertwined with the multi-
ethnic composition of the country. This has always been indicator of the mutual tolerance 
and an indicator of possible fragility and sensitivity when facing political crisis or tensions 
in the country.147  
The role of religion in North Macedonia
On the question, ‘how important is religion today for most of the people in your country’, 
the results show that the opinion of the majority of the respondents is that religion is 
rather important for the citizens of RNM. Only 10.3% (cumulative from answers rating 1 
to 3) of the respondents think that religion is to some extent not important, but 74.4% 
(cumulative from answers 5 to 7) of the respondents consider that in North Macedonia 
religion is important or very important to the people. 
On the scale of 1 to 7 measuring the importance of religion in society, where 1 marks 
complete irrelevance and 7 marks significant influence, the mean was 5.21, which again 
shows that the opinion of the respondents is that religion is of great importance today for 
most of the people in North Macedonia.
Figure 24: Importance of religion in North Macedonia (in %)
Very importantNot important at all
1 3 4 5 6 7
The opinions were quite divided when it came to the question of the extent of religion’s 
influence on attitudes regarding societal issues such as poverty and justice. About 41% 
(cumulative from answers rating 1 to 3) of the respondents said that religion has no or little 
145 Institute for Political Research – Skopje, Macedonia as multiconefessional society-perceptions 
of the influence between religion and the state, 2017, Available at: https://www.kas.de/c/
document_library/get_file?uuid=93e2a101-c2d7-7896-2cfe-213ba7e4c804&groupId=281657
146 ‘Pope in North Macedonia: respect for human dignity, diversity for a future of peace and 
prosperity’, 2019, available at: https://www.vaticannews.va/en/pope/news/2019-05/pope-
francis-north-macedonia-apostolic-visit-authoritie-welcome.html
147 Institute for Political Research – Skopje, Macedonia as multiconefessional society-perceptions 
of the influence between religion and the state, 2017, Available at: https://www.kas.de/c/
document_library/get_file?uuid=93e2a101-c2d7-7896-2cfe-213ba7e4c804&groupId=281657
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importance regarding the societal issues, but for 43.6% (cumulative from answers 5 to 7) 
religion has significant impact on societal issues. Or according to the respondents, religion 
has a moderate influence on attitudes about the societal issues for the citizens of North 
Macedonia, with a mean answer of 4 (on a scale from 1 to 7). 
The results are similar regarding the extent of religion’s influence on political matters. 
35.9% (cumulative from answers 1 to 3) of the respondents believe that religion does not 
have significant influence, and 41% (cumulative from answers 5 to 7) think that the religion’s 
influence on political matters is quite significant. Or according to respondents, religion has 
moderate influence on political matters for the citizens of North Macedonia, with a mean 
answer of 4.18 (on a scale from 1 to 7). 
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Religious leaders
According to the survey results, the influence of religious leaders among the respective 
communities is almost equally distributed between the two extremes of the scale. For 
46.2%, this influence is significant (cumulative from answers 5 to 7), while for 35.9% it is 
insignificant (cumulative from answers 1 to 3). The mean answer was 4.36, which can be 
assessed as a medium influence of religious leaders on their respective communities. 
Figure 26: The influence of religious leaders in North Macedonia (in %)
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Although the majority of respondents think that the influence of religious leaders among 
their respective communities is generally moderate to more significant, the majority of 
respondents (41%) also think that the influence of religious leaders on public opinion in 
general is less significant. Cumulative results from those who think that their influence on 
public opinion is significant is 33.3%. The mean answer was 3.84 (on a scale from 1 to 7), 
which shows that the influence of religious leaders is slightly lower than medium. 
The influence of religion on developments in North Macedonia
One set of questions from this survey was about the opinion of the respondents whether 
religion, as dominantly interpreted and presented in the public discourse, positively or 
negatively influences the development of political processes, democracy, interethnic 
relations, social cohesion, economic well-being, tolerance and peaceful co-existence, 
and good neighbourly relations among Western Balkan countries. Regarding this set of 
questions, we have an interesting insight when we compare the answers by religious 
representatives to representatives from other categories.
Regarding the influence of religion on political development, the majority of the 
respondents answered that religion has a negative influence, 61.5%. But out of those who 
think that religion has a negative influence on political development, only 4.2% (or one 
respondent) is a religious representative. 
The answers to the question about the positive or negative influence of religion on 
democracy display the same divergence between religious representatives and the others, 
but the general results (56.4%) show that religion, as dominantly interpreted and presented 
in public discourse, has a negative influence on democracy. However, none of the religious 
representatives think that that is the case, in fact 66.7% of them think that religion has 
a positive influence on democracy and 33.3% think that it has a neutral influence. But 
none of the respondents from the other elite categories think that religion has a positive 
influence on democracy. 
It is also interesting that none of the respondents from this survey think that religion has 
a neutral influence on the interethnic relations. Most think that religion has a negative 
influence (74.4%), while almost all (5 out of 6) of the religious representatives think that 
religion has a positive influence on interethnic relations.
Regarding the question about the influence of religion on social cohesion, answers are 
similar. Although the percentage of answers that cited religion as a negative influence on 
social cohesion was lower than in previous questions.
On the question about the influence of religion on economic well-being, the dominant 
answer is that it has a neutral influence, with 53.8% of responses. Regarding the influence 
of religion on economic well-being, answers from all categories of respondents are 
distributed fairly equally.
Again, most of the answers to the question about the influence of religion on tolerance 
and peaceful coexistence are that it is negative, with 53.8% of respondents sharing this 
opinion. The answers of the religious representatives to this question are again different 
from the others. They think that religion in fact has a positive influence on tolerance and 
peaceful coexistence, but the majority of respondents from the other categories think 
differently, that religion has a negative influence.
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About the influence of religion on the good neighbourly relations among Western Balkan 
countries, the majority of the respondents think that religion has a negative influence 
(51.3%). Again, the answers of the religious representatives differ markedly from the other 
respondents. None of the religious representatives think that religion has a negative 
influence on good neighbourly relations.
Figure 27: The influence of religion on politics and society in North Macedonia
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From the results of the respondents regarding the influence of religion on different 
societal issues: development of  political processes, democracy, interethnic relations, 
social cohesion, economic well-being, tolerance and peaceful co-existence, and good 
neighbourly relations among the Western Balkans countries; one can conclude either that 
religion and religious leaders have failed to positively contribute to society, or perhaps that 
their positive influence is not obvious or visible to citizens outside religious institutions.  
Interreligious relations
Regarding the question about interreligious relations in Republic of North Macedonia on a 
scale between religious hatred (1) and religious harmony (7), the majority of respondents 
think that interreligious relations are somewhere in between, but slightly inclining towards 
interreligious intolerance (41%), but none of the respondents think that the RNM is in a 
state of religious. The average grade for this question is 3.82, which confirms what has 
previously been stated.
Respondents had a slightly different opinion when it came to interreligious relations in the 
broader region. Respondents predominantly thought that religious hatred or intolerance 
is generally present in Western Balkan region. The mean of this question (from the scale 
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of 1 to 7) was 3.05, which is lower than a medium grade, and therefore is closer to the 
assessment that it is slightly inclining toward religious hatred.
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About the opinion on how the interreligious relations will develop in our country, the 
majority of the respondents think that they will remain the same (51.3%). 
The explanations of the respondents to this question were that they do not expect 
changes because the period of five years is too short for any major changes, and there are 
no indications that religious leaders will change their behaviour or rhetoric. Here again 
respondents complain that there is no sufficient contact between different religions, that 
prejudice and ignorance of religions are persistent, that there are only formal contacts 
between religious communities and that religious leaders do not promote interreligious 
relations. A few of the respondents think that interreligious relations will worsen due to 
an ethnic and religious gap which will increase because religious communities will still 
be under the influence of politics and that polarisation between the people in North 
Macedonia after five years. However, there are few more optimistic expectations regarding 
this and hopes that the new generation of religious leaders will be far more willing to 
cooperate and ready for coexistence than the previous ones, and that there is also an 
expectation for a substantial manifestation of mutual respect and help between different 
religions.
Respondents’ opinions on how they expect interreligious relations to develop in Western 
Balkan countries in the next five years are less optimistic than expectations for North 
Macedonia. 38.5% (cumulative % from answers 1 to 3) think that they will worsen, 
and 38.5% that they will remain the same. Only about 10% of respondents think that 
interreligious relations in the region will improve. This more pessimistic views on the 
matter are explained on the grounds that there are still existent and active political issues 
among Balkan countries, and fear that that the different religions in the Balkan countries 
divide people more than they unite them. Namely, political elites would not give up their 
tendency to abuse the religious communities for political purposes. 
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Figure 29: How interreligious relations are expected to develop in the next five years in 
































Regarding the respondents’ opinion about the top three threats to interreligious relations 
in the Republic of North Macedonia today, we can summarise the answers in these 
categories:
• Interference of religion with politics in terms of interference of religion in politics 
and politics in religion; 
• Poverty;
• Ethno-religiosity;
• Hate speech, interreligious intolerance, bad religious leaders, using religion to 
spread interreligious and interethnic intolerance and violence, interreligious 
polarisation, threatening rhetoric of religious leaders;
• Being uninformed about their own and other religions; and
• Media propaganda and social media influence.
And finally, respondents of this survey were asked to give ideas about how religion can 
improve certain aspects of the society such as politics, democracy, social cohesion, 
tolerance and peaceful coexistence, interethnic relations, economic well-being and good 
neighbourly relations. For each of these aspects, a certain percentage of respondents think 
that religion cannot help in any way. But here are the categories that can be distinguished 
from their answers. 
Regarding the question of how religion can help improve political developments in the 
country, the summarised answers of this open-ended question can be divided in these 
categories: 
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• Religion should not interfere at all in politics, nor give opinion on the issues, and 
should stay away from political parties;
• By promoting tolerance and neutrality towards political parties;
• By showing proactivity in addressing issues of general interest and public interest; 
and
• Religious leaders should calm the rhetoric, and should educate their members 
about faith’s truth, promoting human and ethical values.
Opinions about whether and how religion can help improve the state of democracy in the 
country, the summarised answers can be divided in these categories: 
• By promoting human and ethical values, tolerance, acceptance of diversity;
• By supporting democratic processes and promoting democracy as a value;
• With real secularisation, separation of the state from religion; and
• To separate religion from politics and political parties.
The question as to how religion can help improve the interethnic relations in the country, 
the summarised answers are as follows: 
• By building bridges of trust;
• With direct participation in resolving interethnic conflicts;
• Preaching human values, tolerance, respect, understanding;
• By not getting involved in daily political activities; and
• By intensifying interreligious dialogues and promoting values that bring different 
groups closer.
Opinions on how religion can improve the social cohesion in the country are summarised 
in these categories:
• With the joint celebration of the main religious holidays;
• Promoting acceptance, discussion and dialogues between different religions;
• Through mutual introduction of different religions and interreligious forums; and
• By helping the disadvantaged and poor with humanitarian aid.
Although the general opinion of the respondents regarding the influence of religion on 
economic well-being showed that religion has a neutral influence, they also gave opinion 
on how religion can improve the economic well-being in the country:
• By fostering ethics in the economy and encouraging ethics in ecology;
• Promotion of labour as a source of happiness, peace and well-being;
• Taxation, regulation and transparency of economic transactions for religious 
services; and 
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• Religious leaders to try not to enjoy material goods (e.g. expensive cars) and 
dispatch them in favour of the poor.
Respondents were asked to give their opinions on how religion can improve the state of 
tolerance and peaceful coexistence in the country, and their answers were summarised in 
these categories:
• By promoting human values that are common to all religions, and by encouraging 
believers to practice tolerance toward other religions and ethnic communities;
• By rejecting prejudice towards different religions; 
• Spreading messages of coexistence; 
• By intensifying interreligious dialogues; and
• By teaching tolerance.
The summarised answers to the last question on how religion can improve the good 
neighbourly relations among WB countries are as follows:  
• To promote tolerance and peace, acceptance of others;
• To show respect instead of directing hate speech to other countries or groups;
• To develop real cooperation and encounters between religious leaders/religious 
groups; and
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During March and April 2019, a survey was conducted as part of a regional project which 
deals with the role of religion in the Western Balkan countries. The survey was conducted 
as the research part of the project and it was conducted among members of cultural and 
political elite members of society. Its purpose is to give a sketch of the religious topography 
of different societies in the Western Balkans.
The respondents were carefully selected and around 80 surveys were sent to the selected 
candidates. As a result, we received 30 completed surveys with necessary data. We have 
tried to follow guidelines and to receive feedback form people with different occupations: 
politicians and government employees (N=3), religious leaders (N=4), academia (N=7), civil 
society leaders (N=6), journalists and opinion-makers (N=5) and young leaders (N=5). Of 
the respondents, 21 were male (70%) and nine (30%) were female. The average age of the 
respondents was 35.5 years, with the youngest respondent being 25 years old and the 
oldest one 54 years old. With regard to respondents’ education, six respondents have a 
bachelor’s degree, 15 respondents hold an MA, while nine of them have obtained a PhD 
degree. 
The role of religion in Serbia
The questions were designed to show how religion is perceived in Serbia and to see its role 
in Serbian society, and also in other Western Balkan countries. 
The first question was related to the level of importance of religion today for most of the 
people in Serbia, on the scale, 1–7 where 1 represents ‘not at all’ and 7 stands for ‘very 
important’. The average grade was 4.37. Overall, we could say that religion is moderately 
important for people in our society. Additional data which can show the importance of 
religion for people living in Serbia comes from the census in 2011,148 when it was shown 
that more than 94.4% of the population identified as religious – as a member of a church 
or religious community/organisation. The disparity between these two is quite obvious. 
Specialised surveys show that a high percentage of people are not believers in terms of 
practising religion, but they rather choose their religious affiliation on the basis of their 
traditional belonging to a specific confession. The number of atheists and agnostics is 
growing. This is the reason for the opinion that in large surveys, such as national censuses, 
it is hard to get precise data on religious affiliation. Hence specialised surveys are more 
148 The special study available only in Serbian, written on the basis of Census in 2011. Etnomozaik 
178, retrieved via http://pod2.stat.gov.rs/ObjavljenePublikacije/Popis2011/Etnomozaik.pdf 
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suitable for collecting that type of data.149
Therefore, the data collected on the census is more connected to the personal feelings of 
traditional belonging than on active participation in religion, i.e. the activities of a religious 
organisation or community.  
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However, when it comes to the level of influence of religion on people and their attitudes, 
things change. The influence of religion on societal issues, such as poverty, justice, equality, 
crime, social cohesion tends to drop significantly. It drops down to an average grade of 
4.03. It drops even further down when respondents were asked to scale the influence on 
people’s attitudes when it comes to political issues, such as democratic participation, 
voter behaviour, political parties. Our survey has shown that the average grade is 3.77. 
When we compare the two questions which deal with the influence of religion on people’s 
attitudes on both societal and political issues we can observe that respondents opted for 
an above average grade of 43.29% for societal and only 23.31% for political issues. 
Figure 31: Influence of religion on societal and political issues in Serbia
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When asked about the influence of religious leaders in their respective communities and 
their influence on public opinion in general the results changed a bit. Interestingly enough, 
149 See Etnomozaik 82, (Нада Радушки, Методолошки аспекти и проблеми у истраживању 
етничке структуре становништва), Теме, 31, 4, 2007, pp. 698–699.
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one would expect that the influence in religious communities would be seen as significantly 
higher than in the general public. However, the difference between the average grades of 
the two is almost insignificant. The reason for this could be the fact that the majority of the 
people declared as religious and that there is not much difference between the religious 
communities and society in general. However, the influence is not equally distributed 
throughout the scale, showing that around a third of people in religious communities 
are not highly influenced by their respective religious leaders. Despite that fact, religious 
leaders are still pretty influential. The significant difference is with the average grade of 
the influence of religion and of religious leaders. We can see that the average grade in the 
questions dealing with the role of religion is somewhere between 3.77 for political and 4.03 
for societal issues. However, when it comes to the religious leaders’ influence, it is notably 
higher – somewhere between 4.47 and 4.63.
Figure 32: The influence of religious leaders in Serbia
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The influence of religion on developments in Serbia
The next question is designed to show if religion influences different developments 
in society and to show to what extent it is influential. The respondents were asked to 
say if religion has a positive or negative influence on specific developments or has no 
influence at all. The specific areas of influence of religion they were asked about were 
political developments, democracy, interethnic relations, social cohesion, economic well-
being, tolerance and peaceful coexistence and development of good neighbourly relations 
among countries in the Western Balkans. 
According to this question only, people tend to see religion as a phenomenon which affects 
different areas of society in Serbia. If we combine all of these sections together we have 47 
votes for positive influence, 73 for neutral and 70 opted for negative influence, while 20 did 
choose to respond. These results are similar to those in the previous questions. Religion 
has only relative influence – and it is more perceived as negative than as positive. We will 
now get more details about particular areas of development.
According to the first section of the tenth question, which deals with political development, 
people do not see any kind positive influence of religion. They tend to see religion as 
predominantly negative (N=14), or neutral to a lesser degree (N=13). However, strikingly 
enough, there was not a single respondent that sees religion as having a positive effect on 
political development. 
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When it comes to the development of democracy the situation is pretty much similar, 
although there were few (N=5) who tend to believe that religion has a positive influence 
on the development of democracy. The vast majority once again opted for either neutral 
(N=13) or negative (N=9) impact of religion on the development of democracy. 
The issue of interethnic relations showed us that only a few people (N=4) tend to believe 
that religion does not affect its development. Contrary to the previous questions where 
a high percentage of respondents did not recognise the influence of the religion on 
political developments and on the development of democracy, the role of religion in the 
development of interethnic relations seems to be significant. However, this influence is 
mostly recognised as negative (N=14), with an additional nine respondents who see a 
positive influence for religion on interethnic relations. Therefore, religion is seen as one 
of the reasons causing problems in interethnic relations in Serbia. The underlying reason 
for such a negative impact could be the fact that ethnicity and religion almost completely 
resonate with each other in Serbia.150
Based on this survey people seem to see more of a negative influence for religion on various 
aspects of society – only tolerance and peaceful coexistence and social cohesion were 
recognised as being positively impacted by religion. But even these two developments are 
not univocally seen as such. Both of them are almost equally considered to be negatively 
influenced by religion. When it comes to tolerance and peaceful coexistence we can see that 
there is quite a small difference between the positive (N=11) and negative (N=9) influence. 
Social cohesion was similar, where most people (N=13) tending to see positive aspects of 
religion. However, with a very small difference in number, other respondents said it has 
no impact (N=4), or that it has a negative impact (N=10). In all other developments, the 
negative role of religion seems predominant, or respondents have opted almost equally 
for neutral and negative aspects of religion. 
Figure 33: The influence of religion on politics and society in Serbia
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150 The special study available only in Serbian, written on the basis of Census in 2011. Etnomozaik 
187, retrieved via http://pod2.stat.gov.rs/ObjavljenePublikacije/Popis2011/Etnomozaik.pdf 
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However, when it comes to economic well-being the respondents in the vast majority 
(N=19) stated that religion does not impact it, five opted for negative influence and three 
for positive one. 
The last section of question number ten dealt with religion’s contribution to the 
development of good neighbourly relations among Western Balkan countries. It seems 
that the majority of the respondents recognise a negative (N=11) influence of religion 
on relations between Western Balkan countries, with additional 11 respondents who do 
not recognise the influence of the religion in this matter at all. Only 20% (N=6) of the 
respondents claimed that religion positively influenced this development. 
Religious tolerance
The next part of the survey dealt with interreligious relations in Serbia on the one hand 
and in the wider region of the Western Balkans on the other. We asked our respondents 
to describe the current situation in Serbia and the Western Balkans as a whole. They had 
to choose on scale 1–7, where 1 stands for religious hatred and 7 for religious harmony. 
As we can see from the graph below, people are very critical of the current state of the 
interreligious relations in the country. Regarding the situation in Serbia, the majority (N=16) 
do not see those relations as harmonious and good. The remaining respondents (N=14) 
claimed that religious relations are leaning toward the positive side of the scale. When 
asked about Western Balkan interreligious relations, our respondents seem to be even more 
critical about it. A fairly large number of respondents (N=22) described current religious 
relations as poor at the moment. Only eight respondents think that relations are good at the 
moment, and only one claimed that they can be described as religious harmony. 























The respondents were then asked to estimate the future development interreligious 
relations in the next five years in Serbia and in the Western Balkans (see graph below) and 
to further explain their selection. Once again, they had to choose from the scale 1–7, where 
1 stood for ‘will significantly deteriorate’, 7 for ‘will significantly improve’, and 4 for ‘it will 
remain the same’. 
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Our respondents showed doubt in high percentages that things will change significantly 
in any direction. The majority of 56.67% (N=17) do not see any incoming change in terms 
of interreligious relations in Serbia, four respondents see the relations deteriorating 
a bit, and five see those relations slightly improving. When asked about the future of 
interreligious relations in Western Balkan countries, respondents seem to be a bit more 
optimistic. Namely, only six of them think that relations will deteriorate, while the majority 
sees relations as staying the same (N=13) or improving at some level (N=11). However, the 
small differences are only in the distribution of the respondents. Overall, the vast majority 
of respondents feel that relations will remain the same or slightly improve or deteriorate 
(N=26 for Serbia and N=24 for Western Balkan countries). 
When asked about the rationale behind their selection, a few responses stood out by their 
frequency: influence of political factors (in the context of the Western Balkans in the first 
place) and lack of initiative for interreligious cooperation. 
The main reason for relations staying more less the same is because of the influence of 
regional politics, or politics in general, on the religious institutions at some level. Political 
influence was recognised either as a rise of the right across the Western Balkans or as an 
entanglement of nationalism with religion, or at the highest frequency as an influence 
of daily politics on religion, i.e. religious institutions and representatives, or as one 
member of academia phrased it: ‘The inter-religious factors are determined by political 
relations in WB. They will continue to develop along those lines’. On the other hand, one 
of the representatives of an NGO claimed that ‘the 5-year time period is too short for any 
significant change - there can be only small changes toward religious harmony or otherwise. 
The reason for this is the historical burden which lies on the top of our interethnic and 
inter-religious relations in region’. Another respondent pointed to the gap between the 
formal interreligious meetings between leaders of distinctive religious communities and 
other believers. In his opinion: ‘...those meetings do not have any significant influence on 
believers’. 
82 ROLE OF RELIGION  
IN THE WESTERN BALKANS’ SOCIETIES
Threats and opportunities for religious tolerance in Serbia
The last part of the survey deals with the threats and opportunities for interreligious 
relations in the country and in the whole region. An absolute majority (N=23) repeated 
their concerns from the previous questions. The religious relations in the Western Balkans 
and in Serbia will continue to be determined by political factors in Serbia and in other 
Western Balkan countries. Some of those political factors are the rise of the right and 
nationalism, interests of political elites etc. 
People were also worried by the low level of knowledge about religion in general (due to 
the long heritage of communism), but by a low level of education in general, which affect 
one’s critical approach.
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Some of the respondents (N=8) were worried by the fact that people who were involved in 
the war in Syria have returned to their homes in the Western Balkans and that they present 
an imminent threat, not only to the religious relations, but to general security. 
One of the recognised potential threats (N=7) is the fact that there are not many initiatives 
which work on improving religious relations or on improving of mutual respect and 
knowledge about other religious communities. 
Despite the low level of influence of religion as a whole and predominantly negative 
influence of religion on different areas in society people also seem to be rather positive 
and open about the potential role of religion in Serbia and wider. For example, its benefits 
could be seen in the areas of economic well-being, especially when it comes to helping the 
poor and those who need help by organising special programmes of assistance.151
151 Current study quote. This kind of interreligious initiative has been seen by three respondents as 
a way of improving not only economic well-being of the poor but also interreligious relations.
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Cross country comparison 
By Viktorija Borovska
Political, economic and cultural elites in the Western Balkans share common views on 
the role of religion in society, but different perspectives on the challenges and concerns 
related to interreligious relations. Sharper differences in relation to challenges and threats 
to religious diversity and interreligious dialogue are observed in the region’s multi-ethnic 
societies. 
Albania and Kosovo are more homogenous societies in terms of ethnicity. Although 
Albania and Kosovo have a heterogeneous religious structure, the structure of ethnicity is 
fairly homogenous. In Albania 97% are Albanians, and in Kosovo 92.9% of the population is 
Albanian. North Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina are ethnically very heterogeneous. 
In North Macedonia, according to the last census from 2002, 64.2% are Macedonian, 25.2% 
Albanians. Macedonians are generally Orthodox Christians and Albanians are generally 
Muslims. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, according to the last census from 2013, the case is 
even more diverse, 50.11% are Bosniaks, 30.78% are Serbs, and 15.43% Croats. Bosniaks are 
generally Muslims, Serbians are Orthodox Christians and Croats are generally Catholics. 
Also, when we talk about ethnically heterogeneous structure it is important to bear in 
mind that it makes a difference if there is religious heterogeneity as well. For example, 
Montenegro has also ethnically heterogeneous structure with 45% Montenegrins, 28.7% 
Serbs, and 8.6% Bosnians, but Montenegrins and Serbs (which comprise the majority) 
are both Orthodox Christians. The ethnic diversity in combination with religious diversity 
seems to have been more prone to political manipulation and tensions even in the post-
1990s conflict period in some of Western Balkan countries.
Regarding the importance of religion for most of the surveyed elites in each of the countries, 
it is obvious that religion plays an important role in society and it is an important aspect 
for citizens that live in the Western Balkan region. This is most noticeable in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (with a mean of 5.63) and least noticeable in Albania (mean 4.1). 
Religion has a moderate influence on the attitudes of the majority of people regarding social 
issues (the highest influence on social issues was observed in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
with a mean 5.24, and the lowest influence in North Macedonia with a mean of 4 and in 
Serbia, 4.03).
Sharp differences between ethnically homogenous and multi-ethnic societies are observed 
in relation to the influence of religion on the attitudes of people regarding political matters. 
Namely, in Macedonia the mean is 4.18, and in Bosnia and Herzegovina it is 5.24, which 
shows that religion in these two countries has a significant influence on political matters. 
Unlike these results, in Albania and Kosovo the value of the mean is lower (3.26 in Albania 
and 3.7 in Kosovo) which indicates that religion is perceived as not having a significant 
influence on political matters.
There are also differences regarding the influence of religious leaders among their 
respective communities of believers. If we compare the means of these six countries, it is 
noticeable that Bosnian religious leaders (mean 5.2) and those in Kosovo (mean 5.47) have 
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a greater influence on their respective communities. This influence is weakest in Serbia 
(mean 4.47) and North Macedonia (mean 4.36).
Generally, the influence of religious leaders on public opinion in general is lower. However, 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina alone (mean 5.2) according to surveyed members of elites there, 
religious leaders have a significant influence on public opinion. This influence is lowest in 
Albania (mean 3.43) and North Macedonia (mean 3.84).
The next set of questions from the survey were about the opinions of the respondents 
as to whether religion, as dominantly interpreted and presented in the public discourse, 
positively or negatively influences the development of political processes, democracy, 
interethnic relations, social cohesion, economic well-being, tolerance and peaceful co-
existence, and good neighbourly relations among Western Balkans countries. The cross-
country analysis of surveyed elite members’ opinions suggest that in more heterogeneous 
countries (such as North Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina) generally the influence 
of religion on the social aspects mentioned is negative. In Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
North Macedonia the influence of religion is mostly negative upon political developments, 
democracy and interethnic relations. Serbia has similar results on this matter, but leaning 
more toward neutral influence. Montenegro’s results are similar with the tendency to 
see religion as dominantly interpreted and presented in the public discourse as more 
of a negative influence especially on tolerance and peaceful coexistence and interethnic 
relations. Unlike these countries, the situation in Albania and Kosovo is quite different. 
Generally, elite members from these two countries perceive religion’s influence in 
society more positively. The most positive influence religion in Kosovo has is on peaceful 
coexistence, social cohesion and interethnic relations. In Albania this influence is most 
positive on peaceful coexistence, social cohesion, democracy, and interethnic relations.
In all of the countries the respondents have assessed the influence of religion on economic 
well-being as neutral, which can lead us to the conclusion that religion has the lowest 
influence on economy.
The biggest differences between the countries that emerged from the elite survey are 
those regarding the interreligious relations in Western Balkan countries. Respondents were 
choosing on the scale with seven degrees, between religious hatred and religious harmony. 
In countries with a greater ethnic homogeneity, the mean is closer to religious harmony 
(Albania mean 6, Kosovo mean 5.57). But we have a completely opposite image in the 
countries with multi-ethnic structure which have experienced the severe consequences of 
interethnic conflicts. In North Macedonia the mean is 3.82, and in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
is 3.67. As we can see there is a great discrepancy in the results. One should bear in mind 
that the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina from 1992 to 1995, and the armed conflict in North 
Macedonia in 2001 have affected greatly the interethnic relations in these two countries. 
But when we speak about the perceptions of the respondents of the interreligious relations 
in the Western Balkan region we see a different picture. Surveyed respondents in most of 
the Western Balkan countries perceive the interreligious relations in the region as leaning 
towards religious intolerance (North Macedonia mean 3.05, Kosovo mean 4.1, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 3.5, Albania 3.74). Results from the Serbian survey show that they are more 
critical about the interreligious relations in Western Balkan countries. Montenegro is the 
exception in this matter. Respondents from Montenegro see the interreligious relations in 
their country in the worst condition (mean 3.02) than interreligious relations in the whole 
region (mean 4.31). 
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Respondents from the six countries generally expect that interreligious relations in their 
respective countries and in the region in general will remain the same, mostly because the 
period of five years is short and there is no evidence for any major change in the matter.
The elite’s perceptions of what the biggest threats of interreligious relations are in these 
six countries overlap to some extent. Generally, in all Western Balkan countries the 
biggest threat for religion is politics. They view that relationship or the abuse of religion 
for political gain, or in other words the shaping of religious relations by political factors 
as representing one of the greatest challenges for religion today in the region. Even more 
worrying is that the respondents don’t expect this situation to change in the future. For the 
respondents from Kosovo and Albania one of the biggest threats is religious extremism 
and Islamophobia. In Serbia one of the perceived threats is returnees from the Syria War, 
not only as a religious but also a security problem. In Montenegro, surveyed elite members 
see media reports on religious matters as an additional problem. Namely, they argue that 
with media focuses mostly on incidents of religious tension while examples of mutual 
respect and harmonious multi-religious and multiethnic life are less visible in the media. 
Participants from all six countries complain that there is an absence of interreligious 
dialogue, as well as lack of religious knowledge and understanding among declared 
believers from all confessions.  
Finally, regarding the positive opportunities or participants’ opinion on how religion can 
help improve certain aspects of society, the majority of the respondents from these six 
countries agree that religion can actually help in most of the areas mentioned. What 
respondents suggest is that religion or religious leaders should do more to promote 
universal and ethical values and strengthen interfaith dialogue. Religious institutions and 
religious representatives should lead by example especially in terms of acceptance, respect 
and tolerance towards other religious communities. Also, avoidance of any relationship 
between religion and politics was mentioned in each country report as one of the steps to 
improve the state of and opinion about religion.
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Concluding remarks
The opinion that religion in Western Balkan countries plays a crucial role in different 
aspects and spheres of society prevails not only in the answers of the respondents, but 
also in the previous work and research of academics and international organisations. While 
it plays an important role, the impact religion has on the economy, politics, democracy and 
society in general is not necessarily tangible or positive. Religious leaders need to act 
more vigorously to promote religious values which would assist Western Balkan societies 
in reconciliation and overcoming the challenges of past conflicts. Moreover, institutionally, 
religion is perceived to have strong ties to political elites in some of the Western Balkan 
countries. Overall, religion and its institutions should assume a more proactive role in society 
in terms of perpetuating universal ethical principles and condemning populist rhetoric 
that is in breach of democratic values. However, the prospect for such a development is 
surrounded by scepticism because religion in some Western Balkan countries is abused 
for political goals and sustaining the divide among ethno-religious groups. 
Although religion may be important to people it seems that it has failed to show its positive 
effects on different social aspects. The general opinion is that religion seen through 
the practice and the rhetoric of its religious representatives in some of Western Balkan 
countries it has not actively encouraged tolerance or peaceful coexistence. 
Another very important conclusion that emerged from this survey is that religion (through 
its religious representatives) must show initiatives and genuine practices of interreligious 
cooperation, understanding, respect and acceptance. Religious leaders in Western Balkan 
countries should engage more actively in establishing interreligious cooperation both at 
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The Interfaith Council for Social Cohesion in the 
Western Balkans
Ylli H. Doci, PhD152
Abstract
With the demise of the communist governments in the Balkan region in the early 1990s, 
we have entered a phase in which serious religiously related issues challenging the social 
cohesion of our societies need serious analysis and action at different levels. Interfaith 
councils as a way of engaging the different religious communities in one society are not new 
and not the same. Nor are they unquestionably accepted or easily dismissed as ineffective 
in addressing challenges of peacebuilding and social cohesion in a religiously pluralistic 
society. There are political, cultural, ethnic and national considerations beside religious 
and educational ones which figure large in the role of an interfaith council and influence 
its character and effectiveness, but their contribution to peacebuilding and the social 
cohesion of our pluralistic societies cannot be ignored. As such this paper will explore, 
from different perspectives, the role of an interfaith council as a helpful instrument for the 
wellbeing of our societies. 
The virtues of an interfaith council discussed in this paper should give us hope for fruitfully 
addressing the challenge of different traditions in the same social space, but it remains 
to be seen if it can win the support of the majority culture’s stakeholders with their 
concerns in providing for a peaceful and harmonious society. The Albanian context with 
its similarities and differences from the religious pluralistic context of the other countries 
in the region provides a good case study to evaluate the merits of an interfaith council as 
an instrument to facilitate tolerance and social cohesion.
Keywords: interfaith council, religious pluralism, peacebuilding, tolerance, social cohesion.
Introduction
The world we live in now in the third millennium is different from the one our parents lived 
in until 2001, especially with regard to the resurgence of religion in Eastern Europe and the 
Balkan region (Johnson, 2013), with predictions of secular modernity in need of adjustment 
152 Ylli H. Doci, PhD in Social Anthropology, is the Albanian director of International Leadership 
Foundation and gave the Kent Matthews Lectures at Denver Seminary in 2018 about 
globalisation, nationalism and national identity. His area of expertise is philosophy of 
religion and interreligious dynamics while serving in Christian organisational leadership since 
1998 at the local and national level.
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(Appleby, 1994; Eggemeier, 2012). Our Balkan region has suffered long and even recently 
from conflicts between different ethnic groups, but the relationship of religion, ethnicity 
and nationalism deserves much more serious thought (Ruane & Todd, 2010; Poulton & 
Taji-Farouki, 1997). 
Perhaps due to the lasting influence of communist ideology in our region, alongside 
other factors, it seems as if religion is not taken seriously by Balkan intellectuals and 
those in positions of leadership. The observation of John Micklethwait in another context 
sounds like an accurate description of our intellectuals as well: ‘If you gather together 
a group of self-professed foreign-policy experts—whether they be neoconservatives, 
realpolitickers or urbane European diplomats—you can count on a sneer if you mention 
“inter-faith dialogue”. At best, they say, it is liberal waffle; at worst it is naive appeasement,’ 
(Micklethwait, 2007, p. 22). 
Religious pluralism as a social reality is now here to stay, but tolerance as a necessary 
ingredient of social cohesion in this context is not a given because tolerance is a cultural 
achievement (Netland, 2001). We cannot afford not to pay attention to the religious 
dimension of life in our region. This does not mean we only need to empower the state 
again to deal with it – we perhaps know better than most what happens when the state is 
overbearing and oversteps its boundaries with regard to freedom of religion, yet the state 
needs to be involved. 
In this paper I discuss the merits of the interfaith council as one important mechanism 
to engage religious dynamics to strengthen the social cohesion in the Western Balkan 
states. Methodologically, by virtue of analytic induction the argument of this paper is: 
(1) Balkan countries need to address their interreligious dynamics by more consciously 
including the different religious representative bodies within their societies; (2) an 
explanation for the general lack of enthusiasm for utilising the interfaith council in our 
region could be due to the dominance of one religion in the national identity and culture 
of each country; (3) the Albanian Interreligious Council, as an expression of acceptance 
by all religious communities in Albania of other religious communities as equals, is the 
dependent variable of the difference in the nature of the role of religion in the make-up of 
the national identity and culture. 
This paper starts by highlighting the religious dimension of the tensions between different 
groups in our societies that need social cohesion, then describe the form, purpose and 
function of the interfaith council as a cooperation platform for different religious groups 
followed by probing its relevance to address the issues of peacebuilding and social 
cohesion from theological, political and peacebuilding perspectives, to conclude with one 
illustrative case in Albania observing some potential challenges in other countries of the 
region.
Profile of an interfaith council in fostering social cohesion
The interfaith council is not a new idea. The interfaith council is a reflection of the 
significance of belonging together to the same social entity, some form of a democratic 
sovereign state or a common society, in which we need to live together respectfully and 
harmoniously. This implies the prior commitment to a common vision of society defined 
by tolerance in pluralism, recognising and respectfully engaging religious others who are 
our next-door neighbours while they also are embodiments of ‘the universe next door’ 
(Sire, 1997). 
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The world’s largest and most representative multi-religious coalition is called Religions for 
Peace (Religions for Peace, 2019). Their motto, ‘different faiths, common action,’ captures 
well the attitude of respect for people of different faiths seeking to advance the common 
goal of peace and wellbeing for all. Here we see the concern with ensuring the necessary 
basis for a cohesive society which is peaceful coexistence.
The vision, mission, principles, structure and method of the Religions for Peace coalition 
give a good picture of the kind of interfaith council this paper puts forward as a helpful 
instrument for our societies. The interfaith council or interreligious council (IRC) is the 
primary mechanism  for interreligious cooperation envisioned by Religions for Peace 
network. I will try to briefly describe aspects of the interfaith council – what it is and what 
it does – but this is necessarily general, and I will illustrate this with the Albanian Interfaith 
Council as one concrete example in our region. 
The vision or the desired reality for an interfaith council includes ‘the vision of a world in 
which religious communities cooperate effectively for peace, by taking concrete common 
action’ (Religions for Peace, 2019). The mission or the work such a council does which 
‘bears fruit in common concrete action’ includes organising interfaith dialogue, but we 
should clarify that ‘cooperation includes but also goes  beyond dialogue’ (Religions for 
Peace, 2019). 
Every group that cooperates together needs to be clear on the undergirding principles 
of their cooperation and it is helpful when they are written down, so Religions for Peace 
holds up five such principles of interfaith cooperation: ‘[1] Respect religious differences; 
[2] Act on deeply held and widely shared values; [3] Preserve the identity of each religious 
community; [4] Honor the different ways religious communities are organised; [5] Support 
locally led multi-religious structures’ (Religions for Peace, 2019). 
With regard to structure, Religions for Peace is a network of self-led interreligious bodies, 
comprising representatives of the various religions who decide together on the specifics 
of their organisation with equal deciding power. The function that the council should 
perform necessitates that its structure is such that helps build trust in the members of 
diverse communities and thus those elected (or those the respective communities have 
already chosen as representatives) have the credibility needed to serve in the council 
as bridges between communities to reduce hostility and create new positive perceptions 
between them. 
Before we look at the specific example of the Albanian Interreligious Council and its 
relevance for the wider Balkan region, it seems important to anticipate some questions 
and evaluate the usefulness of an interfaith council from three perspectives; theological, 
political and peacebuilding perspective. 
The interfaith council evaluated from three perspectives
Because of a view of religion influenced by the previous period of communist indoctrination 
for over a generation, it may be difficult to convince people in the Balkans that religion is 
very important for the cohesiveness of our societies or that it has already played a much 
larger role than we thought possible in the conflicts that dismantled Yugoslavia. Part of the 
difficulty may also be, as Arthur Schneier (Schneier, 2002) indicates, that religion is never 
alone as a cause of conflict. Other scholars have explored in some depth the relationship 
of religion, ethnicity and nationalism (Gorski & Türkmen-Dervişoğlu, 2013; Flora, Szilagyi, & 
Roudometof, 2005; Duijzings, 2002) revealing the importance of religion in the mix.
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The theological perspective
One of the most important aspects of any religion is its theology and the system of 
doctrines that governs the understanding of the world according to the specific revelation 
a particular religious group cherishes. When approached from this perspective, the 
function of the interfaith council is helpful in providing the safe space to explore different 
theological perspectives in order to better understand each other better. This perspective 
emphasises the importance of ideas and the power of ideologies to motivate action. It 
is not necessary to hold, and here I appear to disagree with Neufeldt, that those who 
approach the issue of peace and conflict resolution from the theological angle are blind to 
religion being a cause of conflict (Neufeldt, 2011, p. 348). Furthermore, they are more aware 
of the religious thought of the different traditions that contribute to peace and harmony, 
and that is why their perspective is invaluable in peacebuilding as the necessary basis for 
social cohesion and fostering cooperative action. 
Some conscientious believers and religious leaders may be wary of interfaith councils 
because there is, in the minds of some, another goal for interfaith dialogue, namely 
‘active theology’ (Panikkar, 1978;  Kellenberger, 1993; Singh & Schich, 2001). The theological 
dimension of engagement in the context of the interfaith council, within the accepted 
boundaries where all feel protected in their specific religious identity, finds much room 
in the council interactions to develop friendships and appreciation for each other going 
much farther than just general respect. This effective dimension of the dialogue is very 
valuable and goes a long way toward finding solutions for problems that might arise in the 
future (Hanson, 1993). 
In such a context of respect, the interfaith dialogue, which may ensue under the auspices 
of such an interfaith council, may arrive at a common language about shared values that 
can then be disseminated to the broader base of adherents with the credibility of the 
leadership that is represented at this level. Such is the value of joint statements that a 
council may produce in the course of time and events. Thus, from the theological point of 
view, the interfaith council is an important reference point for the respective communities 
of faith and helps build trust in being free to live and propagate one’s faith, in conversation 
with the other views and with respect for others in spite of theological disagreements that 
will remain.
The political perspective
Politics had to deal with religion after 2001, and many international political peace efforts 
started then in different places, including our region, which considered the interfaith 
dialogue important (Mojzes, 2006). Looking at the usefulness of the interfaith council from 
the political perspective means that the evaluation keeps in mind the goal of peaceful 
coexistence of different religious communities in the same space. The politicians who have 
this goal are more pragmatically interested in the interfaith council as a means to an end, 
but in spite of those motivations and the danger of being used by politicians, the truth 
is that there is commonality with the political goal of social peace and harmony, and the 
council is well placed to mediate in the achievement of those goals. 
Again, the interfaith council in this context would be very valuable because the 
representatives are officially recognised by their communities to uphold their exclusive 
view of reality (Omar, 2005). When such respected and trusted representatives take 
a moderating stance on a certain issue, they are best placed to communicate in the 
appropriate language, including through powerful symbolism and ritual, and to be much 
more effective in convincing members of their community than a political declaration 
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would be. They would also be better positioned to know how to interact with radicals 
inside their own communities and bring them along to a better path to live in peace with 
all by following their religion in an adjusted way.
The peacebuilding perspective
It bears repeating that our concern with social cohesion starts with the first step, 
peacebuilding. The conflict resolution typology framed by John Paul Lederach presents four 
levels where change can occur to create the necessary synergy for conflict transformation 
(Ledarach, 2003). These four levels include personal, relational, structural and cultural 
levels, and in each of these levels the interfaith council has a significant role to play. From 
the theological angle we can see how the focus is on both the personal and relational 
levels but much less on the structural and cultural levels. The political perspective 
naturally addresses the personal level less than the relational level, which means the 
adherents of one religion are motivated to relate more appropriately to the other. The 
political perspective also is concerned with the structural level, which means that it is 
possible that policies and processes may be influenced by religious leaders. 
The third perspective, the peacebuilding perspective, seems to encompass all four of the 
levels of change because it seeks to develop or cultivate a culture of peace and tolerance 
in a sustainable way which can be seen as the basis for a cohesive society. Relating to 
the levels we discussed above, peacebuilding efforts imply a dynamic process including 
influence for change in perceptions, attitudes, behaviours and interests of persons and 
communities – thus addressing both the personal level and the relational level. But beside 
this level of change, the complex process of peacebuilding also seeks to address the 
underlying structures where causes of conflict are also found to perpetuate the problems. 
Religion is naturally seen as integral in this search for peace because there are also 
reasons to see it implicated in the problem of conflict, and therefore, either way, it cannot 
be ignored (Appleby, 2003). 
The interfaith council provides a platform for joint action to address issues of concern 
and get to the causes of problems together as well as ways to move forward by mobilising 
different communities and actors in common action. The interfaith council, simply by virtue 
of bringing representatives of different religious communities together, is an important 
step toward the reality of living together in peace. The example set by representatives 
coming together is a signal of the furthering of the cause to address the perceptions of the 
religious other and to inform understanding about them. 
Probably the most significant contribution of the interfaith council to social cohesion 
and peacebuilding efforts is its ongoing nature – continuous collaboration not just for 
occasional crises but as a way of life together, thus helping in different ways and at 
different levels to cultivate that culture of peace and tolerance that is needed for the 
social cohesion in our pluralistic societies. 
Albania as a good case study of the interfaith council’s role in social cohesion
From the discussion so far it may seem that there are no further concerns to hinder 
supporting whole-heartedly the creation and proliferation of interfaith councils in our 
region, but there is much more to deal with in the specific context of each of our countries 
which goes far beyond the scope of this paper. Overcoming these and other challenges 
accumulated throughout the uneasy history in the Balkans is not a matter of simple 
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acknowledgment of what is true and right, therefore we should seek to move forward 
consistently but with modest expectations from our efforts. It is in this spirit that the 
upshot of this paper – based on analysing the nature and usefulness of the interfaith 
council in the context of our need for interfaith dynamics in the region – is to suggest that 
the interfaith council can be an important factor for the cause of peace and tolerance by 
fostering social cohesion in our societies of the Balkan region. 
As mentioned earlier, more analysis is required of the specific make-up of the situation 
in each country. Taking Albania as one example might be helpful to illustrate not only the 
value of the interfaith council in addressing the challenge of religious divisions within one 
country but also the importance of national dynamics in each case. In Albania there are five 
religious communities recognised officially by the government accompanied by a formal 
memorandum of understanding regarding the dynamics of cooperation and relationship. 
The Albanian Interreligious Council (KNFSh) was established on 22 October 2007 with 
representatives of four of the major religions in Albania – Sunni Muslim, Orthodox, Roman 
Catholic and Bektashi. Since October 2018, the council’s presidential board has also 
included Protestant Evangelical representatives on an equal footing with the other four 
(knfsh.al, 2019). 
There have been several occasions when the leaders of the Interreligious Council of 
Albania have drafted important press releases related to different situations in the political 
climate of Albania as well as presenting common concerns to foreign heads of state at 
important junctures in our country’s road toward EU integration. On such occasions, it has 
been important to recognise the way each community approaches the issue of belonging 
to Europe and what are understood to be European values. 
Another occasion that highlights the importance of the council in coming to use a common 
language was in its expression of sympathy for victims of religiously based terrorism. The 
form of wording included some discussion of the differences in perspectives about the 
kinds and the portrayal of this kind of terrorism. Our religious backgrounds inform our 
perspectives, and it takes hearing how the other perceives the same event to modify and 
agree on common language in our joint declarations, which has a significant impact on the 
building of good will between our religious communities. 
More important, it seems, is the message that is communicated to Albanians in seeing 
religious leaders together, visiting each other’s centres in formal expressions of good 
will on occasions of specific celebrations for their communities. It sends a clear message 
to the broader population that we can live together in social harmony while we remain 
established in our individual religious commitments. These frequent contacts provide 
ample opportunity for friendship among the representatives and privately addressing 
sensitive issues of common concern. 
On at least one occasion when the leaders of Albania’s three main Christian denominations 
(Catholic, Orthodox and Evangelical) expressed their concern with the unbalanced 
government support of events at certain religious celebrations, both the prime minister 
and the president of the republic responded positively and adjusted their policy to 
include the Christian request in their program of official events. As is also apparent from 
the website of the Albanian Interreligious Council, there are other activities and exchanges 
that are invaluable in fostering positive interreligious dialogue and understanding across 
the theological divides of the different communities in an atmosphere of respect and 
appreciation of the other’s point of view.
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Challenges for the interfaith council in the Western Balkans
Albania is a Balkan country, and we may assume many similarities with others in the 
region, but Albania is also somewhat different from most of our neighbours, and this may 
account for the existence of the interreligious council in Albania. Albanian national identity 
is understood by Albanians as less connected with any specific religion, while almost all 
of our Balkan neighbours would seem to have a hard time identifying an individual of 
their country as a member of the specific nation without the typical religious designation 
associated with belonging to their nation. An Albanian is not necessarily a Muslim, an 
Orthodox Christian, a Catholic, a Bektashi or even an Evangelical, and no one in Albania 
would doubt the Albanian identity of any Albanian-speaking citizen of any of these religious 
persuasions. This is very important, and it is both a blessing and a handicap. It also may 
help in understanding some aspects of the attitudes with regard to the interfaith council.
On the other side, in any other Balkan country the typical national of that country is 
generally considered to be of the majority religion of that country, most likely of a national 
Orthodox church (Anscombe, 2014, p. 237). Although the communist rule of the last half-
century did much to blur the distinctions between nationalities based on religion, it was 
not difficult for the old distinctions to re-emerge with the resurgence of religion after 
1990. This dominance of one religion in one country is also very much a blessing but also a 
handicap with regard to the cohesiveness of the society (Anscombe, 2014, p. 253).
The blessing of the Albanian plurality of religions is in the country’s experience with 
accommodating the other that is different in the secondary aspect of religion, while being 
fully one and the same in another more significant or the primary aspect of nationality. 
The handicap is that, compared to the depths that religious sentiment can plumb in 
uniting people, there will always be a shallower level of cultural unity between Albanians 
of different religions. This means that it appears easier to accept the different religious 
people represented as equals around the Albanian table in the form of an interfaith council 
and at the same time also more important to facilitate good interaction between different 
religious communities to preserve a functional national society.
On the other hand, generally speaking for the rest of the Balkan countries, the blessing of 
a Balkan national is in having the opportunity of a much deeper union with the dominant 
majority of one’s compatriots who also are of the same religion. But here as well, while 
the blessing is significant, the challenge for the social cohesion of the whole society that 
includes others of other religious minorities is also significant. In many Balkan countries, 
the typical perception of a citizen of the majority religion is that a minority-faith citizen of 
the same country, is twice as far removed from the standing of a typical national of that 
country; compared to the perception of belonging to the same nation that Albanian citizens 
of different religions consider as equal between themselves and any other Albanian of any 
religion. This may mean that it is more difficult to accept religious minorities as equals 
at the national table and less important in the eyes of the majority to risk giving more 
credibility to the religious minorities by including them as equals in an interfaith council, 
all the while imagining it easier to preserve a functional national society without much 
cooperation between majority and minority.
I insist on these oversimplified generalisations because of the strange juxtaposition between 
a social life that is deeply defined by religion at the culturally significant level of national 
identity in our Balkan region, and the apparent lack of urgency for serious interreligious 
engagement in the form of a helpful common platform such as the interreligious council 
(Mojzes, 2006, pp. 30–31). 
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The purpose of this paper was to indicate that the interreligious dynamic in the Western 
Balkans is significant for the social cohesion of our societies, and that the interfaith 
council is a valuable platform to include all relevant religious bodies for cooperation. The 
existence of the Albanian interreligious council, as yet a rare case in the Western Balkans, 
suggests that more light needs to be shed on the influence and interplay of the dominant 
religion and the national identity and culture of our societies to explain more fully the 
attitudes toward sharing a common interreligious platform in our pluralistic context.
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In pursuit of ‘twin toleration’: democracy and 
church–state relations in Serbia and Montenegro153 
By Marko Veković, PhD154, University of Belgrade
Abstract
This paper explores the relationship between church and state in Serbia and Montenegro 
by examining the development of ‘twin toleration’. In particular, it aims to explain why 
there is still no ‘twin toleration’ in these states, and why it is important to impose 
such institutional arrangement in church–state relations. The ‘Twin toleration’ concept 
suggests that institutional arrangements between the state and religious communities 
in a democratic society should be based on mutual autonomy, in which the state should 
not interfere in the matters of religious communities, and vice versa. However, since the 
fall of communism and resurgence of religion, both the Serbian and Montenegrin states 
have tended to have close relations with the dominant religious communities in order 
to achieve their narrow political interests. On the other side, religious communities 
often interfere in political issues. Such a situation does not contribute to the further 
development of democracy in these countries. In this paper I employ content analysis 
in order to investigate constitutions and specific laws on religious communities, if any, 
in the states mentioned above. Besides its theoretical perspective, aim of this paper is 
to offer practical suggestions on how to rearrange church–state relations in Serbia and 
Montenegro in order to make these countries more democratic. 
Keywords: religion, democracy, ‘twin toleration’, Church-state relations, Serbia, Montenegro
Introduction
The collapse of communism all over Eastern Europe, and Western Balkans, triggered two 
equally important social and political processes. First was democratisation, a ‘transition 
153 This research has been supported by the project “Civil Society and Religion”, Grant no. 179008, 
funded by the Ministry of Education, Science, and Technological Development of Republic of 
Serbia.
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Belgrade, Faculty of Political Science. He was appointed as Visiting Scholar at Columbia 
University (2016) and Temple University (2014). His area of expertise is religion and 
democracy, role of religious actors in democratization processes, and political behavior of 
Orthodox Christian Churches. His work has been published in Journal of Church and State, 
Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, Democratization, Religion, Politics & Ideology 
Journal, and Serbian Political Thought. Contact Email: marko.vekovic@fpn.bg.ac.rs 
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from authoritarian towards more democratic regimes’.155 On the other hand, societies 
of Eastern Europe, including the Western Balkan states, experienced the resurgence of 
religion.156 I believe it is logical to presume that these two processes have been interrelated, 
as religious communities are important historical, cultural and above all political actors in 
Western Balkan societies. Did religious communities help or hinder the democratisation 
process across the Western Balkans?157 Although this is a very important research 
question, in this paper I will argue that Western Balkan societies are now in the stage of 
consolidation of democracy. Therefore, in this paper I will tackle the issue of the role of 
religion and religious communities in this process, by examining church-state relations 
in Serbia and Montenegro and their consequences for the consolidation of democracy in 
these two countries.
Of course, this paper does not argue that the role of religion and religious communities is 
the single most important aspect of democratic consolidation in Serbia and Montenegro. 
However, it strongly argues that the imposition of a specific form of church–state relations, 
namely ‘twin toleration’, has a strong tendency to help democracy work by providing an 
institutional environment in which religious communities can use all of their democratic 
potential to contribute to the society.
Research design
Rather than focusing on Orthodox Christian political theology, this paper offers an 
institutional argument for explaining why there is no ‘twin toleration’ in Serbia and 
Montenegro, and why the possible implementation of such a church-state arrangement is 
good for democracy. Such an approach situates this research in the area of institutional 
comparative politics, which argues that institutions matter when it comes to religion and 
democracy, and particularly to the question of the consolidation of democracy. 
In terms of theoretical rationale, I offer answers on two main research questions. First – 
why does ‘twin toleration’ matter for democratic consolidation? And, more importantly, 
I focus on the question – Îs Orthodox Christianity an obstacle to democracy in the first 
place? Based on content analysis of the most recent and relevant literature in the field, I 
highlight major contestation points and disputes in this field. 
In the second part of this paper, I analyse church–state relations in post-Milošević Serbia, 
as well as in post-2006 Montenegro. I decided to narrow my analysis to this time frame 
155 S.Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (University of 
Oklahoma Press, 1991).
156 See more about this in: P. Norris and R. Inglehart, Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics 
Worldwide, 2nd Edition, Cambridge University Press, 2011, particularly ‘A Religious Revival 
in Post-Communist Europe’, pp. 111–132; G. Evans and K. Northmore-Ball, ‘The Limits 
of Secularization? The Resurgence of Orthodoxy in Post-Soviet Russia’, Journal for the 
Scientific Study of Religion, Vol. 51, No. 4, 2012, pp. 795–808; and A. Sarkissian, ‘Religious 
Reestablishment in Post-Communist Polities’, Journal of Church and State, Vol. 51, No.3, 2010, 
472–501.
157 I have dealt with this issue in my dissertation, “The Role of Orthodox Christian Churches in 
the Democratization processes in Greece, Serbia and Russia“, doctoral dissertation, University 
of Belgrade – Faculty of Political Sciences, Serbia, 2018. 
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for several reasons. First of all, post-Milošević Serbia represented a relatively stable 
democratic society in which one religious actor, namely the Serbian Orthodox Church 
(SOC), dominated the religious sphere. On the other hand, since 21 May 2006, Montenegro 
has been an independent state working on its democratic capacities. However, I argue 
that the incapability of the state to successfully manage its complex and specific religious 
structure is one of the major deficiencies of its political system. In order to map specific 
church–state relations in Serbia and Montenegro I will use qualitative descriptive methods, 
mostly content analysis, by offering insights on how each country institutionally manages 
its church–state relations. Therefore, I focus on constitutional provisions and other 
legislation which deal with religion and religious issues. 
In the final section of this paper, I will try to explain why there is no ‘twin toleration’ in 
Serbia and Montenegro, and more importantly, what we can do about it. 
Institutions matter: theoretical rationale
One of the fundamental debates in the field of religion and politics is the relationship 
between religion and democracy. According to Alfred Stepan, this debate can be 
encapsulated by the following question: ‘Are all, or only some, of the world’s religious 
systems politically compatible with democracy?’158 The vast body literature in the field 
tries to provide answers on this question. However, it seems that the answer is more 
complicated than it was expected to be. When it comes to Christianity and its three major 
branches, Peter Berger argued that, ‘In the cases of Catholicism and Protestantism, the 
answer is pretty definitely yes. In the case of Orthodoxy, it is maybe. On the whole, this is 
a far from depressive picture’.159 On the other hand, religious traditions such as Islam or 
Confucianism have been seen as major obstacles for democracy.
The relationship between Orthodox Christianity (Orthodoxy hereafter) and democracy 
is rather complex. For a long time, scholars have claimed that there is a clear link 
between Orthodoxy and authoritarianism. For example, Arnold Toynbee argued that, ‘Like 
communism, Eastern Orthodox Christianity is authoritarian’.160 Mostly based on Toynbee’s 
work, as well as on Max Weber’s 1922 work Economy and Society, Samuel P. Huntington 
wrote in his seminal, and notorious, work on the ‘clash of civilizations’ that Orthodoxy is 
‘much less likely to develop stable democratic political systems’.161 Therefore, it is logical 
to ask the following question: is Orthodox Christianity an obstacle for democracy in the 
first place? There is no straight and simple answer to this question. I would say that 
Orthodoxy, just like any other religious tradition, is politically ambivalent, or multi-vocal. 
158 A. Stepan, ‘Religion, Democracy, and the ‘Twin Toleration’, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 11, No. 4, 
2000, p. 37. 
159 P. Berger, ‘The Global Picture’, Journal of Democracy, Vol.  15, No. 2, 2004, p. 80.
160 R.L. Gage (ed.), Choose Life, A Dialogue: Arnold Toynbee and Daisaku Ikeda, (I.B. Tauris, New 
York, 2007), p. 117. 
161 S. Huntington, Clash of Civilizations and Remaking of the World Order (Simon & Shuster, 1996); 
Here quoted from, C. March, ‘Orthodox Christianity, Civil Society, and Russian Democracy’, 
Demokratizatsiya, Vol. 13, No. 3, 2005, p. 450; On incompatibility between Orthodoxy and 
democracy, as well as modernity, see for example: V. Clark, Why Angels Fall: A Journey Through 
Orthodox Europe from Byzantium to Kosovo (St. Martin’s Press, New York, 2000); D. Clendenin, 
Eastern Orthodox Christianity: A Western Perspective (Grand Rapids, Michigan, 1994).
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This answer is based on research by Daniel Philpott and Alfred Stepan, among others, 
who say that all religions have a significant political potential. The real question then is 
not if Orthodoxy is compatible with democracy, but rather how we can use such religious 
political ambivalence? In his influential work, Philpott argues that any religious actor can 
be involved in different acts, such as political violence or democratisation. According to 
him, there are two major mechanisms which can help us explain the political actions of 
religious actors: political theology (ideas) and differentiation (the institutional relationship 
between a religious actor and the state).162 A similar argument has been put forward by 
Alfred Stepan, who argues that a person dealing with the issue of religion and democracy 
should take care of several misinterpretations, including ‘doctrinal misinterpretation’.163 
This misinterpretation lies in assumptions of ‘univocality’, claiming that ‘any religion’s 
doctrine is univocally pro-democratic or anti-democratic’.164 This is simply wrong due to 
the fact that all religions are actually multi-vocal, which means that all have the potential 
to support both democratic and anti-democratic systems (or in other words, religions 
are politically ambivalent, as Philpott suggested). This particular framework applies 
to Orthodoxy too, as Elizabeth Prodromou has argued. She claims that, ‘there is ample 
empirical evidence to suggest that Orthodox Christianity and democracy are generally 
compatible, in theory as well as in practice. Yet there is no denying that Orthodox churches 
often display a certain ambivalence about key elements of the pluralism that characterises 
democratic regimes’165.
Now on to the next question: why does ‘twin toleration’ matter for democracy, and 
particularly for democratic consolidation? Stepan explains twin toleration as ‘the minimal 
boundaries of freedom of action that must somehow be crafted for political institutions 
vis-a-vis religious authorities, and for religious individuals and groups vis-a-vis political 
institutions’.166 It is of crucial importance for democracy to impose such institutional 
arrangements due to the fact that, according to Stepan: 
‘Democratic institutions must be free, within the bounds of the constitution and human rights, to generate policies. Religious institutions should not have constitutionally privileged prerogatives that allow them to mandate public policy to democratically elected governments. At the same time, 
individuals and religious communities, consistent with our institutional 
definition of democracy, must have complete freedom to worship privately. 
In addition, as individuals and groups, they must be able to advance their 
values publicly in civil society and to sponsor organizations and movements 
in political society, as long as their actions do not impinge negatively on the 
liberties of other citizens or violate democracy and the law’.167
162 See more: D. Philpott, ‘Explaining the Political Ambivalence of Religion’, American Political 
Science Review, Vol. 101, No. 3, 2007, pp. 505–525.
163 See more: A. Stepan, Religion, Democracy, and the ‘Twin Toleration’, pp. 40–46.
164 Ibid, p. 44.
165 E.Prodromou, ‘The Ambivalent Orthodox’, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 15, No. 2, 2004, p. 62. 
166 A. Stepan, Religion, Democracy, and the ‘Twin Toleration’, p. 37. 
167 Ibid, pp. 39–40.
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Moreover, he argues that all the world’s major religions are involved in a ‘struggle over twin 
toleration’.168 In his further studies he developed this concept, particularly focusing on the 
cases of Senegal and Tunisia. When it comes to Senegal, Stepan argued that the secular 
fundamentalist vs. religious fundamentalist conflict in this country has lessened, due to 
the fact that ‘twin toleration emerged as the dominant discourse and practice’.169 When it 
comes to the particular case of Tunisia and its democratisation in 2011, Stepan argued that 
its successful democratisation has been related to the ‘adhering to a relationship between 
religion and politics that follows the pattern of what I have called in these pages and 
elsewhere the twin tolerations’.170
Church–state relations in Serbia and Montenegro: a descriptive approach
This part of my study provides a brief descriptive look into church-state relations in both 
post-Milošević Serbia and post-2006 Montenegro. Although one can argue about it, in this 
paper I refer to both post-Milošević Serbia and post-2006 Montenegro as societies which 
are still in the process of democratic consolidation.
After the breakup of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s, Serbia was been ruled by the authoritarian 
regime of Slobodan Milošević. The subsequent democratisation process in Serbia, in which 
the dominant religious community (SOC) had an important role, ended successfully in 
2000.171 However, in the immediate aftermath of 2000 Serbian political elites missed the 
opportunity to impose a twin toleration concept. Even though Serbia has been declared 
as a secular country where all religions are treated equally and where no religion will 
be declared as state’s religion (Article 11, 2006),172 it is obvious that a dominant religious 
actor in Serbia, namely the SOC, has been a significant political actor too, influencing 
different aspects of social and political life of post-Milošević Serbia. While the current 
Serbian constitution provided a general framework for religion and religious communities 
– including the above-mentioned secular nature of the state, granting that all churches 
and religious communities are equal and separated from the state (Article 44), freedom of 
religion (Article 43), and the ban on religious discrimination (Article 21)173 – Veković argued 
that this specific area needed a deeper and more insightful legal regulation, due to several 
reasons, including but not limited to ‘complexity of religious mosaic in Serbia, issue of 
returning of the expropriated property by the former communist regime, State’s support 
for clergy’s pension insurance, and the introduction of the religious education in Serbian 
168 Ibid, p. 54.
169 A. Stepan, ‘Rituals of Respect: Sufis and Secularists in Senegal in Comparative Perspective’, 
Comparative Politics, Vol. 44, No. 4, 2012, p. 380.
170 A. Stepan, ‘Tunisia’s Transition and the Twin Toleration’, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 23, No. 2, 
2012, p. 89. 
171 The role of SOC in the democratisation process in Serbia was a chapter of my dissertation, 
titled ‘The Role of Orthodox Christian Churches in the Democratization processes in Greece, 
Serbia and Russia’, doctoral dissertation, University of Belgrade – Faculty of Political Sciences, 
Serbia, 2018. 
172 Ustav Republike Srbije, Article 11, Službeni glasnik Republike Srbije, br. 98, 2006.
173 Ibid.
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school system’.174 That is why the new ‘Law of Churches and Religious Communities’ (2006) 
has been introduced.175 Although there is a strong argument for regulating the religious life 
of a country with a specific law, in this case several shortcomings have emerged.176 In short, 
another great opportunity has been missed for implementing ‘twin toleration’ in Serbian 
legislation. 
In the case of Montenegro, the situation is similar and yet different. After the 21 May 2006 
referendum, Montenegro has become an independent state. From that moment, all the 
former Yugoslav republics had become independent states. Just like Serbia, Montenegro 
is also a secular country. This fact has been confirmed in the Constitution of Montenegro 
of 2007, Article 14 of which states, ‘Religious communities shall be separated from the 
state. Religious communities shall be equal and free in the exercise of religious rites and 
religious affairs’.177 Freedom of religion is guaranteed under Article 46 of the Constitution. 
In the case of Montenegro, it is particularly important to mention the draft law on religious 
communities, which is supported by the political elite. The most important critiques of 
this law are based in how it regulates the property of religious communities. Moreover, 
according to Article 52 of the draft, all religious buildings built before 1 December 1918 
which it can be confirmed were built using state funding or support, becomes state 
property. This fact will, of course, directly influence the major religious communities 
in Montenegro, and particularly the SOC which is one of the wealthiest institutions in 
Montenegro. Support amongst religious communities for the draft law, has only come from 
the Jewish community and the Montenegrin Orthodox Church.178
Towards an explanation:  
why there is no ‘twin toleration’ in Serbia or Montenegro?
There are, at least, six approaches for explaining why there is no twin toleration in Serbia 
or Montenegro. These are: history, stateness, religious structure, identity, (geo)politics and 
symphonia. We will briefly discuss each of them in the following section. 
When it comes to history, it is important to note the long-term historical role played by 
Orthodox Christianity in both Serbia and Montenegro. Shortly after the foundation of the 
medieval Kingdom of Serbia in the thirteenth century Serbian Orthodox Church achieved 
autocephaly. Since then the religious life of many Serbs has been regulated by the SOC, 
174 M. Veković, Uloga pravoslavnih crkava u procesima demokratizacije u Grčkoj, Srbiji i Rusiji, 
doktorska disertacija, Fakultet političkih nauka Univerziteta u Beogradu (Beograd, 2018), p. 
215.
175 Detailed analysis can be found in: M. Radulović, Zakon o crkvama i verskim zajednicama, 
Službeni glasnik (Beograd, 2006).
176 It is important to mention that several organisations asked for delay in accepting this law, 
including the Council of Europe, as well as several Serbian NGOs and political parties. More 
detailed analysis of this process can be found in: M. Vukomanović, ‘The Serbian Orthodox 
Church as a Political Actor in the Aftermath of October 5, 2000’, Politics and Religion, Vol. 1, 
No. 2, 2008, pp. 237–269.
177 “Ustav Crne Gore”, Službeni list Crne Gore, Br. 1/2007, and 38/2013.
178 M. Vekovic and M. Jevtic, ‘Render unto Caesar: explaining the political dimension of the 
autocephaly demands in Ukraine and Montenegro’, Journal of Church and State, published 
online 29 April 2019, https://doi.org/10.1093/jcs/csz025  
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and as a consequence the SOC has become more than a religious actor, and an important 
historical, cultural and above all political actor in both Serbia and Montenegro. The political 
potential of the SOC, along with its specific form of church-state relations in the 21st century 
draws from way back in history. In addition to the historical argument is the ‘stateness’ 
problem. Stateness refers to a situation when ‘a significant proportion of the population 
does not accept the boundaries of the state (whether constituted democratically or not) as 
a legitimate political unit to which they owe obedience’.179 I use to this term to explain the 
significant political role of SOC today in both Serbia and Montenegro. When the Serbian 
state ceased to exist during after the Ottoman conquest, the idea of the restoration of 
the state survived in the institution of the Serbian Orthodox Church. Some authors even 
emphasise the fact that the SOC represented the state itself during the long period of 
Ottoman rule. Once the Serbian state had been restored, the relationship between the 
state and the church was very close, and historically, the SOC has held various privileges 
as a result. 
On the other hand, the religious structure of both Serbia and Montenegro seem to represent 
a problem for twin tolerations. Orthodoxy is the dominant religion in both Serbia and 
Montenegro (Serbia – 85%; Montenegro – 72,1%).180 Due to that fact, the SOC does not 
regard its political interests as equal with those of other religious communities, but rather 
it seeks from the state to recognise its dominant role via state regulation. However, in the 
case of Montenegro things are quite different, as the state supports the non-canonical 
Montenegrin Orthodox Church.181 Although this religious community has a smaller number 
of believers, it is important to mention in terms of state’s relationship with the SOC. 
Besides this, the identity of people in Serbia and Montenegro has been deeply rooted in 
religion, and particularly Orthodoxy. According to various sources and research, there is a 
strong correlation between national identity and religious affiliation. This fact has been 
highlighted in Serbia. The consequences of such a situation makes the SOC an important 
political actor, which has its own political interests and motivations, while individuals tend 
to shape their political view and values according to their religious affiliation. Therefore, 
the state tends to have closer and friendly relationship with the SOC, particularly in Serbia, 
in order to achieve its political goals and objectives.
The Western Balkans region has always been subject to geopolitics, and the political 
interests of world’s powers. In the case of Serbia and Montenegro, one of the key foreign 
actors is Russia. It is well known that the Orthodox Church is used as one of the ‘soft 
powers’ of Russian foreign policy. Therefore, there are reasons to believe that the SOC is 
regarded as the ‘extended arm’ of Russian influence in both Serbia and Montenegro. On the 
other hand, political elites, particularly in Serbia, tend to have close relations with Russia 
179 D. McKay, ’Stateness’, Federalism, and Institutional Adaptation, in: Designing Europe: 
Comparative Lessons from the Federal Experience, David McKay (ed), Oxford Scholarship 
online, 2001, pp. 1–7.
180 Republic of Serbia, 'Census of population, households and dwellings in 2011. Ethno-
confessional and linguistic mosaic of Serbia’; and Montenegro Statistical Office, ‘Census of 
Population, Households and Dwellings in Montenegro 2011 – Population of Montenegro by 
sex, type of settlement, ethnicity, religion and mother tongue per municipalities’, pp. 14–15
181 See more: M. Vekovic and M. Jevtic, ‘Render unto Caesar: explaining the political dimension 
of the autocephaly demands in Ukraine and Montenegro’, Journal of Church and State, 2019, 
forthcoming. 
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and the Russian Orthodox Church. This is why it is not simple for the state to introduce a 
institutional arrangement with the church on the base of twin toleration. 
And last but not least, there is an ideal type of church–state relations nurtured in the 
Orthodox Christian political theology, namely symphonia. This represents a specific 
institutional arrangement, which dates back to the Byzantine era, in which neither church 
or state is held to e dominant but complimentary.182 Is symphonia in contradiction with the 
twin toleration concept? This is a very interesting question, which calls for deeper analysis. 
In short, the answer would be ‘yes, it is but…’.
What can we do about it?
I strongly believe that both Serbia and Montenegro need to use the democratic potential, 
which Orthodoxy possesses. In order to achieve this goal, it is my firm opinion that the 
twin toleration concept should be introduced in both states. It would benefit the state, 
with the flourishing of democratic societies, and it would benefit to the religious actors 
as well. Although it would not be easy to achieve this goal, it is doable. I offer a very brief 
description of this process. 
One of the first steps is to open a public debate on the role of religion in public life, in 
which academics, clergyman and political elites are included. This debate should consider 
major issues arising around this question, but limited by the secular character of the state. 
The main goal of the debate should be a deeper explanation of the twin toleration concept, 
its comparative advantages and consequences, based on recent experiences around the 
globe. Orthodoxy should be given equal treatment with all other religious communities. 
The registration of religious communities should be regulated by the autonomous state 
body, and should not discriminate against any religious community. On the other hand, the 
state should regulate its own policy independent of the influence of religious institutions. 
However, when specific regulations referring to religious communities are going to be 
imposed, the voice of religious communities should be taken into account. 
182 A. Papanikolaou, ‘Byzantium, Orthodoxy, and Democracy’, Journal of the American Academy of 
Religion, Vol. 71, No. 1, 2003, pp. 75–98.
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The struggle of Kosovo policymakers to upgrade 
the law on religious affairs
By Jeton Mehmeti183, University of Graz 
Abstract
Apart from guarantees over freedom of religion, in the last two decades, authorities in 
Kosovo have made little progress in advancing its legal framework to accommodate the 
emerging needs of religious communities. The only law that regulates religious affairs in 
Kosovo is the 2006 Law on Freedom of Religion. The law is framed in very broad terms, 
and has received a lot of criticism for failing to properly regulate the status of religious 
communities. Representatives of these communities have consistently asked for changes 
to legislation that would grant them the status of legal entities. Without legal entity status, 
religious communities can only function at the most basic level. The government has tried 
to introduce a new law almost every year since 2011, but every attempt to change the 
law has failed so far. Why? Part of the answer is to be found in the legal complexities of 
Kosovo’s dealing with religion.      
Keywords: Kosovo, religious identity, secularism, laicism, freedom of religion
Introduction
The Muslim presence in Kosovo goes back to the time of the Ottoman’s when Islam 
spread gradually among Albanians. Although the majority of Kosovo Muslims are 
Albanian, other ethnic groups like Turks and Bosniaks also constitute a large number 
of the Muslim population. In addition to the Sunni majority, there are small Sufi orders 
active in Kosovo. According to the latest national population census organised in Kosovo 
in 2011, the overwhelming majority of the population declared themselves as Muslims. 
Out of a population of nearly 1.8 million people, over 95% identified as Muslims, 2.2% as 
Roman Catholics, and 1.5% as Serbian Orthodox.184 There are other communities too, like 
Protestants, Jews, and those who did not declare their religious affiliation. 
183 Jeton Mehmeti is a PhD candidate at University of Graz in Austria. He finished his 
undergraduate studies in Malaysia and post-graduate studies in Hungary. He is the recipient 
of three outstanding fellowships, Marshall Memorial Fellowship for study visit to the 
United States, OeAD Fellowship for research at University of Vienna and BIRN Fellowship 
for Journalistic Excellence. His work has been published by Palgrave, Nomos, Peter Lang, 
Brill and Springer. His area of expertise include freedom of religion, freedom of media and 
democratization. Email: mehmetijeton@gmail.com 
184 Kosovo Serbs are predominantly affiliated with the Orthodox Church. Since the 2011 census 
was boycotted by most Kosovo Serbs, the exact number of Orthodox Christians living in 
Kosovo is unknown.  
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The interreligious harmony that was cultivated for a long time in Kosovo was disrupted 
during the war of 1998–1999. Religious sites and monuments became a target of war and 
retaliation. To avoid any religious favouritism, the international community introduced a 
model of strict separation between state and religion. Kosovo was declared a secular state, 
with no official religion and with a neutral stance on religious affairs. The Constitution 
of the Republic of Kosovo incorporates three models of state-religion relations – the 
American concept of the secular state, the French concept of laïcité, and state neutrality 
towards religious affairs. 
Apart from guarantees over freedom of religion, in the last two decades Kosovo’s authorities 
have made little progress in advancing the country’s legal framework to accommodate 
the emerging needs of religious communities. The only law that regulates the status of 
religious communities in Kosovo is the 2006 Law on Freedom of Religion. This law, in 
general, speaks about the freedom to express one’s religion and freedom of religious 
association, and while it emphasises that there is no official religion in Kosovo, the law 
recognises five religious groups in the country, namely the Islamic Community, the Serbian 
Orthodox Church, the Roman Catholic Church, the Jewish Religious Community and the 
Protestant Evangelical Church. The law is framed in very broad terms, and has received 
a lot of criticism for failing to properly regulate the status of religious communities. The 
law does not address, for example, a critical aspect for the normal operation of religious 
communities, namely the right of religious communities to acquire legal form and to gain 
status as legal entities. This is of paramount importance if they are to carry out the full 
range of their legitimate activities. Without legal entity status, religious communities can 
only function at the most basic level. 
An initiative to modify the law was taken for the first time in 2011, when a new Bill on 
freedom of religion was approved by the government. However, the government withdrew 
the Bill on the day that was supposed to be discussed in parliament. The same scenario 
has been repeated almost every year since then as three different cabinets have tried to 
modify the religious freedom law. But why do religious communities want a new law, and 
most importantly why is the government failing to deliver? Part of the answer is to be 
found in the legal complexities of Kosovo’s dealing with religion.  
This paper proceeds in three parts. The first part elaborates the principles of the secular 
state in a liberal democratic tradition. The second part provides an overview of the legal 
framework on freedom of religion in Kosovo. And the last part consists of an analysis of 
the struggle of policymakers to accommodate the demands of religious communities in 
any prospective new law.  
Secular states within the liberal democratic system 
According to a study by the Pew Research Center, Kosovan Muslims, along with their 
Bosnian and Albanian neighbours are among the most liberal Muslims in the world.185 
Such studies have shown that Balkan Muslims have been able to embrace modernity 
without abandoning their religious identity, seeing themselves as fully Muslim and fully 
185 Pew Research Centre, The World’s Muslims: Religion, Politics and Society, 30 April 2013, 
https://www.pewforum.org/2013/04/30/the-worlds-muslims-religion-politics-society-beliefs-
about-sharia/ 
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European.186 This explains why the secular model was never contested in the region. In 
Kosovo, the idea of a secular state was not introduced in 1999 when the country entered 
a new political era. The origins of the process date back to the early days of communist 
Yugoslavia, when major integration and modernisation policies were implemented in 
some Muslim-populated areas, which led to rapid secularisation. This process gave birth 
to an atheistic political and intellectual elite, as well as to a radical marginalisation of 
the Islamic clergy. Islam was thus restricted to the private sphere: worshiping practices, 
annual religious feasts, and traditional ceremonies for weddings and deaths.187
However, a secular state within a liberal democratic system is largely different from that 
in the socialist system. Unlike the socialist regime, which was characterised by enforced 
separation and an ideological hostility towards religion, in a liberal democratic system 
the emphasis is more often on the cooperation between the state and religion. To 
demonstrate this point, we may take the definition of a secular state given by Donald 
Eugene Smith. According to Smith, the secular state (in a liberal democratic system) is ‘a 
state that guarantees individual and collective freedom of religion, treats individuals as 
citizens, regardless of their religion, is not constitutionally linked to any religion, and does 
not attempt to promote or interfere in religion’.188 From this definition, Smith derives three 
types of relationships: religion vis-à-vis the individual, the state vis-à-vis the individual, 
and the state vis-à-vis religion. 
The first relationship concerns only religion and the individual, where the principle of 
freedom of religion is in effect; the individual is free to believe or not to believe in any 
religion; and where individuals are free to associate in religious groups. The role of the 
state in this relationship is minimal, only in the sense that it provides legal grounds to 
guarantee such freedoms. The second concerns the state and the individual, where the 
principle of citizenship is in effect. In other words, in a secular state, religion becomes 
completely irrelevant to the definition of civic status and the rights and obligations of 
citizens are equal. Here citizens are part of the sovereign body, regardless of their beliefs, 
and together they give legitimacy to the law. The third relationship concerns the state and 
religion, where the principle of separation is in effect. All religions are separated from the 
state. Religious groups are autonomous entities; this means they are responsible for their 
own organisation, they formulate their own beliefs and discipline, establish their own 
institutions, and finance their own activities.189 It is this third relationship – ‘the separation 
of state and religion’ – which is usually mentioned when defining the secular state, however, 
Smith argues that the other two are equally important in liberal democratic traditions.  
All three relationships can be found in Kosovo’s legal framework, as we will see in the 
next part of this paper. However, one can find ambiguity, if not controversy, as to what 
constitutional model of state–religion relationship is promoted in Kosovo. Article 8 of the 
English version of the Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo states that ‘the Republic of 
186 R. Asimovic Akyol, ‘Want to Cultivate a Liberal European Islam? Look to Bosnia’, The Atlantic, 
13 January 2019, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2019/01/bosnia-offers-
model-liberal-european-islam/579529/ 
187 J. Mehmeti, ‘Faith and Politics in Kosovo: The Status of Religious Communities in a Secular 
Country’, in A. Elbasani and O. Roy (eds.), The Revival of Islam in the Balkans, (London, 2015), 
pp. 62–80
188 D. Smith, India as a Secular State, (Princeton, 1963) 
189 Ibid. 
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Kosovo is a secular state and is neutral in matters of religious beliefs’. While the English 
version uses the term ‘secular state’, the Albanian version of the same article uses the 
term ‘shtet laik’ (laik is the Albanian for laïcité). So, is it possible for a state to embrace 
both the secular and the laicist model? Are they the same thing? Despite similarities, some 
scholars argue that the two models are different. The laicist model is seen as anti-religious 
– a model that seeks freedom from religion (as illustrated by revolutionary France and 
Kemalist Turkey after the demise of the Ottoman Empire), whereas the secular state seeks 
to protect religions from state intervention (such as in the United States).190
The legal foundations of freedom of religion in Kosovo    
In June 1999, the Security Council of the United Nations adopted Resolution 1244, which 
became the juridical foundation for the international administration in Kosovo. According 
to Resolution 1244, the Secretary-General was requested to appoint an international 
representative who became known as the Special Representative of the Secretary General 
(SRSG) to Kosovo. He was in charge of a new civil administration in Kosovo, known as 
United Nation Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), which became the 
main international civil authority. The SRSG was given full legislative, executive and legal 
authority.191 In the following years, the SRSG would sign UNMIK Regulations, which were 
legislative provisions; would make executive decisions and would appoint and remove 
prosecutors, as well as decide when to arrest and take into custody anyone suspected of 
violating the law.
One of the most important documents enacted by the head of UNMIK was the Constitutional 
Framework for Provisional Self-Government in Kosovo, which was signed by Hans Haekkerup, 
the SRSG, on 15 May 2001. This document guarantees all the basic human rights, including 
the right to exercise one’s religion. Article 3.1 of the Constitutional Framework states that ‘all 
persons in Kosovo shall enjoy, without discrimination on any ground and in full equality, 
human rights and fundamental freedoms’. Furthermore, Article 4.1 states that ‘communities 
of inhabitants belonging to the same ethnic or religious or linguistic group (Communities) 
shall have the rights set forth in this Chapter in order to preserve, protect and express 
their ethnic, cultural, religious, and linguistic identities’. In addition, communities and their 
members were guaranteed the right to preserve sites of religious importance (Art. 4.4.f) and 
to operate religious institutions (4.4.n).192
From 2001 to 2008 there was a gradual and smooth transition of competences from 
UNMIK to Kosovo’s new domestic institutions and, on 17 February 2008, Kosovo declared 
its independence. The Constitution, which was adopted two months later, was based on 
the Ahtisaari proposal – designed to make Kosovo a multi-ethnic and secular state in 
which no ethnic or religious group would have supremacy. Therefore, to avoid any religious 
favouritism, first and foremost, the Ahtisaari proposal demanded that the Constitution 
190 R. Hirschl, ‘Comparative Constitutional Law and Religion’, in T. Ginsburg and R. Dixon (eds.), 
The Research Handbook in Comparative Constitutional Law (2011) 
191 UNMIK REG/1999/1, On The Authority Of The Interim Administration In Kosovo (July 25 1999), 
s.1, http://www.unmikonline.org/regulations/1999/re99_01.pdf. 
192 UNMIK REG/2001/9, On Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government in Kosovo 
(15 May 2001) http://www.unmikonline.org/regulations/2001/reg09-01.htm 
112 ROLE OF RELIGION  
IN THE WESTERN BALKANS’ SOCIETIES
of Kosovo must affirm that Kosovo has no official religion and that it shall be neutral on 
questions of religious belief. The Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo, which was ratified 
on 9 April 2008, prescribes that ‘the Republic of Kosovo is a secular state and is neutral in 
matters of religious beliefs’ (Art. 8). Article 38 speaks about the freedom of conscience for 
individuals, while Article 39 concerns the rights of religious communities to organise their 
activities:
‘Freedom of belief, conscience and religion is guaranteed. Freedom of belief, conscience and religion includes the right to accept and manifest religion, the right to express personal beliefs and the right to accept or refuse membership in a religious community or group. No one shall 
be required to practice or be prevented from practicing religion nor shall 
anyone be required to make his/her opinions and beliefs public. Freedom 
of manifesting religion, beliefs and conscience may be limited by law if it is 
necessary to protect public safety and order or the health or rights of other 
persons. (Article 38)193 
‘The Republic of Kosovo ensures and protects religious autonomy and religious monuments within its territory. Religious denominations are free to independently regulate their internal organization, religious activities and religious ceremonies. Religious denominations have the right to 
establish religious schools and charity institutions in accordance with this 
Constitution and the law. (Article 39)194 
Unlike the Constitution, which does not mention any religions by name, the only law that 
speaks about religious communities in Kosovo is Law 02/L-31 on Religious Freedom in 
Kosovo that was prepared by UNMIK administration in 2006.195 Article 1 concerns freedom 
of religion:  
‘Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This right includes the freedom to have, not to have, to retain or to change one’s religion or belief and the freedom, either alone or in community with others, in public or private, to manifest one’s religion or belief, in worship, 
teaching, practice and observance.196
The law reemphasises that there is no official religion in Kosovo, however the law recognises 
five religious groups in Kosovo. Article 5 states that: 
193 The Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo, 15 June 2008, Art. 38, available at: http://www.
kryeministri-ks.net/repository/docs/Constitution1Kosovo.pdf 
194 Ibid. Art. 39.
195 Republic of Kosovo Official Gazeta, Law No. 02/L-31 on Religious Freedom in Kosovo, 24 
August 2006, available at: http://www.gazetazyrtare.com/e-gov/index.php?option=com_
content&task=view&id=64&Itemid=28&lang=en
196 Ibid. Art. 1
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‘To all religions and their communes in Kosovo including Islamic Community of Kosovo, Serbian Orthodox Church, Catholic Church, Hebrew Belief Community, and Evangelist Church, shall be offered any kind of protection and opportunity in order to have rights and freedom foreseen 
by this law.197 
Furthermore, the law stipulates that religious communities shall independently regulate 
and administer their internal organisation (Art. 7.2). 
Looking at the content of the Law on Freedom of Religion, one can come to the conclusion 
that the primary goal of the UNMIK administration was to acknowledge the existence of 
various religions in Kosovo rather than to accommodate their needs and interests. It fails 
to regulate even the most basic need of religious communities – the status of a legal 
person. A religious community without the status of a legal entity may not exercise its 
rights, such as owning or leasing property, maintaining bank accounts, employing workers, 
or providing legal protection to the community, its members and its assets.198 
Three different governments have tried to upgrade the law so far. The first attempt was in 
November 2011, when the government of Kosovo approved a new draft law on freedom of 
religion. On the day that the Bill was expected to be discussed in parliament, the government, 
as sponsor of this law, requested that it be withdrawn for further consultations. A new 
version was again approved by the government in 2012. When it was eventually brought to 
parliament, it failed to receive the necessary votes.199 In 2016, the government approved yet 
another draft Bill,200 which was never submitted to parliament for discussion and voting. 
A more serious attempt was made by the current government, which submitted another 
draft to parliament in late 2017. Eventually, in November 2018, the Kosovan parliament 
approved in principle the draft law. However, the process has stagnated since, and to the 
day this paper was written, the draft law has not been brought for final approval. 
But this is no ordinary law. Under the Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo this law falls 
under the category of ‘legislation of vital interest’.201 Firstly, laws of vital interest cannot be 
submitted to a referendum, according to the Constitution. And secondly, the Constitution 
states that such laws shall require for their adoption, amendment or repeal both a majority 
197 Ibid. Art. 5.
198 OSCE Institute on Religion and Public Policy, ‘Analysis of the Law on Freedom of Religion in 
Kosovo’, 10 October 2006, available at: http://www.osce.org/odihr/21529 
199 ‘Projektligji për Liritë Fetare Kritikohet dhe nuk Kalon’, Kallxo, 30 November 2015, http://
kallxo.com/projektligji-per-lirite-fetare-kritikohet-dhe-nuk-kalon/ 
200 Republic of Kosovo Assembly, ‘Draft Law On Amendment And Supplementation Of Law 
No.02/L-31 On Freedom Of Religion In Kosovo’, http://ligjet.kuvendikosoves.org/Uploads/
Data/Documents/06-L-001_pCErUBna5B.pdf 
201 According to Article 81 of the Constitution, legislation of vital interest includes: Laws changing 
municipal boundaries, establishing or abolishing municipalities, defining the scope of powers 
of municipalities and their participation in intermunicipal and cross-border relations; Laws 
implementing the rights of Communities and their members, other than those set forth in 
the Constitution; Laws on the use of language; Laws on local elections; Laws on protection of 
cultural heritage; Laws on religious freedom or on agreements with religious communities; 
Laws on education; Laws on the use of symbols, including Community symbols and on public 
holidays. 
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of the Assembly deputies present and voting and a majority of the Assembly deputies who 
hold seats which are reserved or guaranteed for representatives of Communities that are 
not in the majority. In other words, any changes require a majority of votes from both 
the Albanian majority and the non-Albanian minorities represented in parliament. The 
Kosovo Assembly has 120 seats, of which 20 are guaranteed for representatives of minority 
communities. Of these guaranteed seats, 10 are guaranteed for the Kosovo Serbs, and 10 
for the rest of the minorities. Practically speaking therefore, the minorities can block the 
amendment of this law.    
How have religious communities reacted to the current draft law? 
The repeated government attempts to modify the law demonstrates that the law, as 
contained in the 2006 UNMIK regulation, is at best vague and at worst ineffective and as 
such it needs to be changed. Although different drafts have been prepared since 2011, here 
we will only focus in the content of the current draft law that is awaiting a final approval by 
parliament. This draft law aims to regulate, first and foremost, the legal status of religious 
communities. According to the current draft, a new state agency will be established for the 
registration of religious communities as legal persons. It also regulates the manner and 
conditions for the registration of a new religious community in Kosovo. The condition is 
that the religious community has to have at least 50 members on the date of its registration 
who are adult citizens of the Republic of Kosovo.202  
The new draft law recognizes one more religious community in addition to the five religious 
communities that are recognised under the UNMIK version – the Tarikat Community of 
Kosovo. According to the explanatory memorandum of the law, the Tarikat Community has 
about 60,000 people and has existed for 350 years in Kosovo.203 
The draft law also regulates the issue of cemeteries and rites of burial. Cemetery places 
shall be assigned on a neutral and non-discriminatory basis by public authorities without 
the intervention of other religious communities and religious rites are to be performed 
in accordance with the wish of the deceased or, in the case of a lack of his/her desire, 
to be made in accordance with the desire of families/relatives of the deceased unless 
it is not contrary to public order. Burials and burial rites in cemeteries are also to be 
organised in a neutral way, and persons belonging to a religious or confessional minority 
should not depend on persons belonging to a majority religious community for matters 
related to aspects of their burial. For which the government foresees the need to issue 
supplementary legislation.204 
With regard to funding, the draft law says that the government shall not finance any of these 
202 Republic of Kosovo Assembly, ‘Draft law on amendment and supplementation of Law 
no.02/L-31 on Freedom of Religion in Kosovo’, Art. 7, 10 October 2016 http://ligjet.
kuvendikosoves.org/Uploads/Data/Documents/06-L-001_pCErUBna5B.pdf 
203 Government of the Republic of Kosovo, ‘Explanatory Memorandum on Amendment And 
Supplementation of Law No.02/L-31 on Freedom Of Religion In Kosovo’, http://ligjet.
kuvendikosoves.org/Uploads/Data/Documents/06-L-001Memorandumishpjegues_
meSxXgzWyG.pdf 
204 Ibid. p. 3
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religious communities.205 However, various tax exemptions for religious communities are 
also regulated by other laws. For instance, the law on the taxation of immovable property 
contains an exemption for the properties of religious institutions that are maintained and 
used for religious purposes. Moreover, the draft law provides that the government may 
invite religious communities to apply for funds related to the maintenance of cultural/
religious monuments which they own. The draft law also obliges religious communities 
to ensure that all revenue, including via foreign donations, is processed according to the 
financial legal system. 
Despite its innovative approach, religious communities responded to the draft Bill in 
different ways. The Islamic Community of Kosovo, for example, which is the largest 
religious community and has often criticised the government for failing to change the law, 
eventually objected some of the new provisions. To begin with, the Islamic Community was 
against the new provision which recognises the Tarikat Community of Kosovo as a separate 
religious community.206 Traditionally all Sufi orders in Kosovo have operated under the 
authority of the Islamic Community, meaning that the proposed change will affect the 
demographics of the Islamic Community, since Sufi Muslims would in the future register as 
a separate religious community. The Islamic Community also suggested that the number 
of adherents required for registration as a religious community should be raised to 500 
instead of 50. This suggestion was rejected. They also proposed a new article which would 
prohibit the activities of non-governmental organisations that deal with religious issues 
without prior permission from the relevant religious community.207 This suggestion was 
also rejected as it conflicts with the law on freedom of association.   
With regard to funding, the Islamic Community suggested that the government should 
allocate funds from the state budget to pay the monthly income of the community’s 
employees and that the government should finance religious communities on a proportional 
basis according to the number of believers.208 This request was not taken into account 
either. Furthermore, the Islamic Community also requested that secondary education 
include religious education in the form of elective courses. This was also rejected by the 
government. 
The Catholic Church and the Serbian Orthodox Church proposed that the article that 
obliges religious communities to submit an annual financial statement to the Kosovo 
Tax Administration be removed from the draft law. This proposal was accepted and the 
article has since been deleted. The Serbian Orthodox Church proposed an article which 
maintains that ‘religious communities freely manage their immovable property, dealing 
to, but not limited to acts of ownership, construction, building additions, repair, and all 
other work necessary for free religious life to the preservation of religious and existing 
205 Republic of Kosovo Assembly, ‘Draft law on amendment and supplementation of Law 
no.02/L-31 on Freedom of Religion in Kosovo’, 10 October 2016, Art. 12, http://ligjet.
kuvendikosoves.org/Uploads/Data/Documents/06-L-001_pCErUBna5B.pdf 
206 B. Bislimi, ‘Drejt ligjësimit të bashkësive fetare, BIK-u i pakënaqur’, Radio Free Europe/Radio 
Liberty, 1 October 2016, http://www.evropaelire.org/a/28026050.html 
207 Government of the Republic of Kosovo, ‘Explanatory Memorandum on Amendment And 
Supplementation of Law No.02/L-31 on Freedom Of Religion In Kosovo’, p. 11 http://
ligjet.kuvendikosoves.org/Uploads/Data/Documents/06-L-001Memorandumishpjegues_
meSxXgzWyG.pdf 
208 Ibid. p. 13  
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buildings owned by religious communities. For such actions religious communities do not 
need special permission or approval by the competent body’.209 This proposal was not 
taken into account.210 
Conclusions  
The secular state is not a new concept for Kosovan society, given that Kosovo operated 
within the secular system of socialist Yugoslavia for more than five decades. However, as this 
article has shown, there are differences between a secular state under a socialist system, 
and a secular state under a liberal democratic system. While the former is characterised 
by separation – with an ideological hostility towards religion, which relegates religious 
authorities to the background and protects the state from any religious influence – the 
secular state in a liberal democratic tradition, while also characterised by the separation 
of church and state, is also about the cooperation between the two. But the cooperation 
between the state and religion in Kosovo has not developed beyond formal recognitions. 
Religious communities are regulated by a law is very broadly defined and therefore 
ineffective. The law currently fails even to grant communities legal personhood. Operating 
without the status of a legal entity means facing difficulties in property ownership; in 
maintaining bank accounts; employing workers; and providing legal protection to the 
community, its members and its assets. The repeated failures of policymakers to upgrade 
the law shows the complexities involved in regulating religion in Kosovo. The system 
introduced by the international community may have been appropriate for protecting the 
rights of religious minorities in a post-conflict era. Today it raises the question of state 
pragmatism in delivering the needs of its communities, including religious communities.    
209 Ibid. p.  35
210 Ibid. p. 34. No justification was given in the explanatory memorandum for refusing this 
proposal other than ‘the proposal was not taken into account’. 
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Religions as loci of conflict prevention: local 
capacities of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s religious 
communities
By Julianne Funk, PhD 211
Introduction
Conflict and coexistence remain in a tense balance in the Western Balkans. Latent conflict, 
in which one’s ethno-religious community denotes which side you are on, persist after 
the violent breakup of Yugoslavia. These frozen and potential lines of conflict were laid 
decades and centuries ago, when religious affiliation diversified. At the same time, these 
religious, ethnic and national communities have a history of suživot: everyday relations 
with one another, or coexistence. The close geographic proximity of communities makes 
functional relational systems, which determine when, where and how people tend to 
interact, a practical necessity.212 As a result of this necessity to coexist, religions in the 
Western Balkans usually perceive ‘decent’, neighbourly behaviour and friendly relations 
with ethno-religious others as a sign of faith (Funk Deckard 2012, Funk 2013). 
Both conflict and coexistence signal relationship; as the peace scholar-practitioner John 
Paul Lederach puts it, ‘relationship is the basis of both the conflict and its long-term 
solution’ (1997, 26). In the post-war setting of Bosnia and Herzegovina, however, relationship 
with one’s former opponents is generally unwanted and even avoided. Ethnic cleansing in 
wartime successfully segregated Bosnia and Herzegovina’s ethno-religious communities 
in terms of geography and the violent methods produced emotional segregation. Social 
segregation, however, fails to engage the basic fact of relatedness within the state structure, 
not to mention a shared history and future. This choice to not relate may seek to avoid 
conflict, but it can also limit opportunities for change. Notably, the country is currently 
stuck in polarised, nationally oriented politics, hindering necessary reforms. Citizens and 
external observers commonly see these stalled reforms and oppositional politics as a 
major obstacle to the country’s development and the well-being of all its people.
211 Julianne Funk, PhD, is a researcher-practitioner, specialised in peacebuilding in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, currently working as a Research Fellow at the South-East Europe Programme of 
the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy and as the Managing Editor of the 
journal Southeast European and Black Sea Studies. She has taught at the University of Zurich 
and has published on political, diaspora and religious identities, public religiosity, trauma 
and healing, Bosnian Islam, socially engaged Buddhism, Mennonite conflict transformation, 
reconciliation, peace and conflict studies, coexistence and women’s spirituality.
212 A well-known example is the practice of visiting neighbours and friends from other ethnic 
groups on their religious holidays. However, this practice requires particular care: Christians 
would make halal cakes for their Muslim visitors on Christian holidays or Muslims would 
attend the Christmas mass, but only after all their Christians neighbours had found space 
within the church.
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Trusted religions in a distrustful society
On the one hand, relationship-blocking behaviours are often interest-based: a protectionist 
agenda pitting ‘us’ against ‘them’ is a proven strategy for maintaining positions of political 
and religious power. On the other hand, these behaviours are also based upon and 
supported by feelings and attitudes remaining from war experiences. A key one of these is 
a fundamental distrust that pervades the relations that do exist across communities, but 
also between people from the same ethnic group (UNDP 2009). As such, the social fabric 
is worn thin. The average local resists considering an ‘opposing’ perspective as viable and 
the context is polarised such that one often feels compelled to position oneself against the 
other or risk losing one’s own communal belonging (Volkan 1997). Individual and collective 
trauma from the war left its imprint of fear and helplessness; some residents would rather 
cope with the indirect, structural violence of the current political and economic situation 
rather than risk a return to direct violence by protesting the status quo. Meanwhile, each 
community has developed and adopted a story of suffering and victimhood at the hands 
of the other(s), which further distances groups from engaging (Moll 2013).
This distrust extends to public institutions as well. In 2015, around half of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina’s citizens continued to distrust government institutions, while 77.2% distrust 
political parties. On the contrary, religious institutions have the highest level of trust 
(65.2% of citizens surveyed), with NGOs following close behind (63.4%) (Analitika 2015). 
The salience of religious institutions, therefore, raises the potential for them to have 
impact and influence upon the post-war social context. The collectivist and protective 
characteristics of the three main religions in the Balkans, pointed out by religious scholar 
Paul Mojzes (2003), may explain this social trust. The collectivist characteristic, in which 
‘the main relationship is not of the individual with God but the collective with God’ (ibid, 5), 
binds the believer to the community. The protective role of religious leaders being ‘pastor 
or shepherd … responsible for the flock’s survival’ (ibid) is likely to inspire profound trust. 
Lederach’s call for relational reconciliation as conflict prevention
This paper draws attention to the capacity of trusted and morally authoritative religions 
to support the necessary transformation of destroyed relationships in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. It highlights local religious actors and initiatives working to transform these 
social dynamics by non-violently and constructively ‘engaging’ communities rather than 
‘disentangling’ or ‘minimizing’ contact between groups (Lederach 1997, 26). Lederach’s 
widely accepted assertion in peace and conflict studies/praxis, is that encounter is crucial 
for truth and reconciliation. An opportunity to not only express one’s trauma, loss and 
grief, the pain of the memories and the anger at the injustice to the other, but also to be 
heard by the other can provide validation of one’s story and emotions. Acknowledgement 
of the other’s suffering ‘represents the first step toward restoration of the person and 
the relationship’ (ibid) and is usually missing after armed conflict. Too often such 
activities of personal expression and listening are limited to high-stakes court cases or 
public commemorations. Religious actors, on the other hand, are able to host low-stakes 
encounters without legal repercussions. The focus of sharing is on personal experience 
rather than collective narratives and positions, however, to avoid the danger of exclusive 
narratives about the past. Lederach therefore rejects the influential idea that separating 
parties prevents violence. While separation can provide crucial initial security from direct 
violence, it is not a sustainable, long-term method for positive peace. 
Besides expressing and acknowledging the past, Lederach points further to the need to 
envision a shared future, since ‘[i]n all contemporary internal conflicts, the futures of 
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those who are fighting are ultimately and intimately linked and interdependent’ (ibid, 27). 
Imagining a shared future is next to impossible without an acceptance of relationship 
and a willingness to relate, both of which require dealing with deep fears and vulnerable 
hopes. Lederach’s ‘reconciliation-as-encounter’ claims that acknowledging the past (truth) 
and envisioning the future are ‘the necessary ingredient[s] for reframing the present’ (ibid). 
Religious actors and communities can provide a safe and trustworthy environment plus 
trauma-sensitive methods to foster a meaningful and hopefully transformative encounter. 
Transforming how residents of Bosnia and Herzegovina relate with each other should help 
break the cycle of violence, therefore preventing future violent conflict.
Bosnia and Herzegovina’s challenge to religious peacebuilding
While religions are well placed and socially empowered to encourage relational 
reconciliation, they are also known to have endorsed wartime violence and some continue 
to shore up divisions and indirect violence through supporting national positions and 
agendas. Religious institutions rarely oppose national platforms and policies that 
structurally and culturally discriminate against ethnic others/minorities, even though all 
three groups’ teachings prioritise treating one’s neighbour with equal if not greater care 
and respect than one’s own group members. For many secular actors working for peace, 
religious institutions and actors have therefore been highly suspect in their attempts at 
multi-ethnic, civic initiatives. Only recently has ‘religious peacebuilding’ been recognised 
by secular organisations and governments as a valuable contribution, primarily, again, 
due to the significant role religions play in people’s lives and the trust they inspire.213 
What follows are a small study from Bosnia & Herzegovina of such relationship-building 
religious peacebuilding (see Funk Deckard 2012 for these and other examples). 
Religious peacebuilding for conflict prevention in Bosnia and Herzegovina
This section focuses on four cases of faith-based civil-society initiatives for peace located 
in an ethnically divided setting, where religions lie at the fault lines of conflict. The author 
focuses on these ‘track three’ or grassroots initiatives rather than elite level, track one 
phenomena primarily due to the all-too-frequent complicity of religious actors in national 
agendas that do not prioritise rebuilding inter-ethnic relations.214 As Spahić Šiljak and 
Funk have noted (2018, 112), there seems to be an overall ‘lack of interest among religious 
communities themselves’ to develop religious peacebuilding. For example, the Islamic 
Community has no office of peacemaking nor does it educate its teachers or imams in 
conflict transformation, while the Serbian Orthodox Church requires a special blessing 
213 Other characteristics of religions are increasingly being explored for their positive 
contributions. One example is the benefit of religiosity or faith for resilience, or is the ability 
to bounce back emotionally and psychologically from extreme stress, which is key for mental 
health and recovering or healing from trauma. Another is the role of meditation or prayer 
(e.g. especially in Islamic prayers which include movement) for de-stressing. Yet another is 
the social connectedness and support that religious traditions and communities can provide. 
(see Hayward 2018; Taylor 2019)
214 Even at the civil-society level, faith-based actors in Bosnia and Herzegovina have nearly 
always chosen to situate themselves within secular organisations because of the stigma 
linking religions with conservative agendas and/or nationalism (and therefore, contrary to 
social cohesion, dialogue and human rights objectives).
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(blagoslov) for any official link of the faith tradition with peace projects (ibid). ‘Practically 
speaking, therefore, religious peacebuilders must be in line with the church’s position, a 
position that does not promote peacebuilding and reconciliation’ (ibid.). Nevertheless, two 
institutional-level initiatives should be noted before moving to the four civil-society cases: 
one old, with questionable results, and one newer, exhibiting early signs of effectiveness. 
The Interreligious Council of Bosnia and Herzegovina arose soon after the war on the 
initiative of international actors,215 (Merdjanova and Brodeur 2009) with the idea that the 
heads of four of the country’s religions (Muslim, Catholic, Orthodox and Jewish) would 
represent their communities in interreligious dialogue and negotiations as well as 
oversee local projects (ibid., 64). For many years, the Council has been known primarily 
to issue statements against violent acts and to appear together in the media. While not 
underestimating the significant symbolic power of these acts, the Council is not known for 
proactive efforts at rebuilding relations in the country. Additionally, as this article goes to 
print, the author has learned that top religious representatives (the Riyaset of the Islamic 
Community and the Metropolitan of Orthodox Dobar-Bosnia) have obstructed a USAID-
funded local project to train religious teachers and priests/imams from the three main 
religious communities in peace education. Surprisingly, the Interreligious Council did not 
assist, intervene, or in any way facilitate the project, whose aims the Council shares, but 
instead declined to get involved due to the ‘sensitive’ nature of the situation.216
A new and promising initiative is a new master’s program on Interreligious Studies and 
Peacebuilding implemented jointly by three university theology faculties: the Faculty of 
Islamic Studies; the Catholic Theological Faculty at the University of Sarajevo and the 
Serbian Orthodox Faculty St Basil of Ostrog of the University of East Sarajevo. This project 
arose from a query made by the international head of Catholic Relief Services for how 
best to support interfaith peace in the country. Drawing MA students from a variety of 
disciplines, the classes are held at the three locations with theology and other professors 
of relevant fields (especially conflict and peace studies). The programme seeks to provide 
a ‘unique opportunity for a clear positioning of religions as sources and catalysts of peace 
and for religious institutions to profile themselves as advocates of a more just and better 
society’ (ESITIS 2019). One generation has graduated to date. 
The rest of this article is dedicated to religious actors who, while not always speaking 
officially for their religious communities, have a clear influence at the local level and also 
through their international engagements and with their global religious communities. 
Given the lacuna at the institutional level, they provide the most notable faith-based 
activity with the aim of preventing conflict.
A Serbian Orthodox Abbot builds trust in Herzegovina
Father Danilo was sent by the Serbian Orthodox Church to the Herzegovinian village of 
Žitomislić to reconstruct the 16th century monastery destroyed during the war and facilitate 
the ‘return of Orthodox priests to the Neretva Valley’ (Ramadanović 2011). However, he saw 
215 The World Conference of Religions for Peace was the initiator with the support of the Mercy 
Corps, the United States Institute of Peace, etc.
216 Another reason given was the level of ‘time and energy’ required with ‘a very questionable 
outcome’, despite the Council’s acknowledgement that ‘the idea is generally good and bearing 
in mind USAID's support to our work’ (as per communication of the Executive Board to the 
local Country Director of the project). 
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this not only as a material task, but also recognised the key aspect of simultaneously 
building relationships within the local community, which carries a history of violence 
against its resident Orthodox Serbs during the 1990s and the Second World War. Contact 
between the majority Croats and minority Serbs of the village was consequently minimal 
to none when he arrived. 
Fra Danilo pleasantly surprised locals by attending Roman Catholic Christmas and Mass, 
inviting Catholic priests to his Orthodox Mass, having Croats and Muslims at Orthodox 
Christmas and Easter celebrations, visiting the mosque for Bajram and even welcoming 
the Muslim muftija to speak at his church. These actions broke the status quo of distanced 
relations and non-interaction and have been generally welcomed. In Fra Danilo’s words:
‘From the first day we were open to everyone and we tried to make contact with all the people from the surrounding area, considering it the best way for the Church to be a witness. Today Žitomislić is recognizable precisely by the fact that people are glad to come to here no matter to what religion 
they belong. … I am most delighted with the fact that we are fully integrated 
… and that people experience us as their own (Pavlović 2012).
Fra Danilo’s accessible Easter messages in Bosnian newspapers, explaining Orthodox 
traditions and the meaning of the holiday also encourage ‘the previously common 
experience of knowing one’s neighbor’s religion and traditions and celebrating with 
him/her on holidays’ (Funk 2019, 153). Such actions characterise the local flavour of 
coexistence called suživot, demonstrating engagement with rather than withdrawal from 
strained relationships. Fra Danilo recognises his influential role, saying religious leaders 
must be wise and responsible in their political engagement. ‘[T]he Church is faced with 
a great temptation, but also the challenge to use its only trump card, which is to be … 
the declaration of the kingdom of heaven on earth. More than anywhere else, the Church 
in Bosnia should preach the gospel truths about the equality of all nations and people’ 
(Pavlović 2012).
Krajina imams engaging interreligious leadership and youth in transformation
After their personal experience of wartime violence in Sanski Most, Vahidin Omanović 
and Mevludin Rahmanović have sought to turn it into a city of peace. The two imams’ 
own stories of transformation from the pain, trauma, anger, and desire for revenge to 
openness, trust, hope and courageous activism are the backbone of their work at the Center 
for Peacebuilding (Centar za Izgradnju Mira, or CIM). For both individually, their Muslim 
faith was not only key to their individual transformations, but ‘Islam and the revelation’ 
continues to be the ‘main source’ and ‘motivation’ for their peace work. Mevludin claims 
he personally ‘cannot see a difference between being an imam and doing peace work - 
except that this peace work is much more important’. 217 Both cite the Prophet Mohammed 
as an inspiration for non-violent social change and openness to others and the two aim to 
demonstrate Islam as a path of peace. 
After years of effort, CIM initiated an Interreligious Council (with Catholic and Orthodox 
217 These quotes come from an interview with Vahidin and Mevludin over skype, 12 November 
2015.
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priests and the head imam) in Sanski Most. On the one hand, Vahidin notes that many 
people do not believe faith and peacebuilding are compatible, and yet when it happens, 
they are deeply impressed. ‘Our example shows that it is not only possible, but [it] is even 
adding value to the peace work,’ he reflects. Mevludin voiced the challenge of drawing 
non-Muslims into their work in a Bosniak/Muslim-majority town in the Federation. People 
outside are suspicious and resist. They find it ‘hard to accept that we can fight equally for 
Serb, Croat and Bosniak rights…. [since the dominant] narrative is pro-Bosniak’. Distrust 
also seems to stand in the way of the Interreligious Council’s current attempts to engage 
with religious leaders in the neighbouring Serb-majority town, Prijedor.
CIM’s Peace Camps also stand out as events that are changing the post-war landscape of 
the country. These annual camps for youths from all ethnic backgrounds provide a safe 
space to interact across segregated nationalities, the opportunity to consider their own 
groups’ stories, stereotypes and prejudices and also envision a new future of positive 
relationship. Of particular note is the explicit consideration of religious identity, which 
tends to function as an ethnic marker more often than as a sign of personal faith. The 
two imams explain their own, opposite relationships with religion as: a critical stance 
to ethnic belonging alongside a wholehearted and clear religious vocation for peace. As 
Vahidin expressed it to me in 2008, ‘I believe this [peacebuilding] is one of the reasons why 
God gave me this breath of life’. CIM’s Peace Camps are sustainable in that they not only 
engage the next generation, making them into leaders, but these young people are often 
transformed by their encounter with each other and the challenging topics they work 
through together. Every year, multiple peace activists emerge dedicated to their country 
and a life together and CIM follows up with them after they go home to continue to have 
an impact there.
A Bosnian Franciscan priest uses music as a ‘bridge of souls’ (Pontanima)
Central Bosnian Franciscans have been recognised as the front-runners and ‘most vocal 
faith-based peace activists’ (Spahić Šiljak and Funk 2018, 112) in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
both during and after the war of the 1990s and Friar Ivo Marković is perhaps the most known 
religious peace activist. Fra Ivo understands the ‘experience of conversion and the grace of 
God’ as ‘forgotten potentials for peace’ within religions, because one can change direction 
to follow God’s ‘way of love, peace, forgiveness, goodness and good deeds’ (Tanenbaum 
2007, 116). Fra Ivo claims his own actions are ‘a sign of the experience of grace’.
The ‘core’ of Fra Ivo’s work is cooperating with faith-motivated people from different 
religious traditions ‘to collectively promote peace and spiritual healing’ (ibid., 115). This is 
fundamentally about engaging similarly peace-oriented people, providing a bridge through 
believers themselves into the ethnic communities.218 For himself and these believers: 
‘Faith is a personal experience, and not the passion that comes from belonging to a group … In my opinion, the tragedy of the Balkans stemmed from replacement of personal faith with the passions of belonging to the group. That is the fundamental question for the traditional Balkan 
religions of Catholicism, Orthodoxy and Islam’ (ibid., 116).
218 The author has noted another such bridge formed through the regional network Vjernici za 
mir (Believers for Peace): http://www.vjernicizamir.org/  
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Fra Ivo initiated the Pontanima Interreligious Choir during the war to bring together singers 
from all religious (and non-religious) backgrounds to sing religious music from various 
traditions. The choir has sung for audiences all over the world. Pontanima’s concerts 
provide opportunities to hear and be touched by ‘enemy songs’. According to trauma 
healing and peacebuilding experts Randy and Amela Puljek-Shank (2008, 147): 
‘In listening to the choir the healing enters in the space that is most sacred, i.e. religious identity. These songs create space for listening to the other that otherwise would not happen. The choir brings an especially strong message of healing when it performs in the towns and cities that have 
experienced massacres on a large scale’. 
Fra Ivo claims that audiences are positively shocked when the feared unknown becomes 
intimate and prompts reflection (Conrad 2009, 5). The music provides a gentle but firm 
insistence upon the need to change attitudes that are inconsistent with the beauty of this 
‘mosaic of fine art’ (ibid). 
A Sarajevo Muslim peace educator pushes believer activism into civil society
Amra Pandžo became a peace activist during the siege of Sarajevo and her life’s work is 
changing the common characterisation of Islam as violent to Islam as a religion of peace 
(Funk Deckard 2012). She points to the Arabic letters for Islam – s, l and m – as the same as 
those for the word peace, selam. ‘Islam then means peacebuilding (as a verb), selam (as 
a greeting) means peace be with you, [and] to be a Muslim – means to be a peacebuilder’ 
(Pandžo 2010, 4).
Amra’s sees her faith as not only a ‘deep motivation and strength,’ but she also believes 
her work for peace is ‘the path to be saved’ (Spahić Šiljak and Funk 2018, 114). However, 
like others working from a faith-basis, Amra has struggled against being marginalised in 
the civic sphere. ‘Everything related to nationalism or, God forbid, religiosity was removed 
from civil society’ she reports (Spahić Šiljak 2014, 290). Like others, her NGO ‘Small Steps’ 
is officially secular even though she and most of her staff are believers (Christians and 
Muslims). Like the two imams, Amra sees the mixing of faith and peace activism not only 
as complementary but something greater in combination, and she explores this in her 
practice and research.
Amra published a Manual for the Teachers of Islamic Religion on the Peaceful Dimensions 
of Islam (2008) in Bosnia and Herzegovina containing stories of non-violent action from 
the Islamic tradition, which she has distributed to more than 900 public school teachers of 
Muslim religious education along with training them in its classroom use. Her intention with 
this religious peace education tool is to expose young people to a ‘peaceful interpretation 
of the sacred text of Islam’ and encourage an understanding of ‘faith as a bridge to others’ 
(Pandžo 2010, 5). While this notable initiative seeks to deal with the controversial issue of 
confessional religion taught in public schools from within the Muslim community itself, 
the manual has unfortunately received no official support from the Islamic Community of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (Funk Deckard 2012). 
Amra is also regularly engaged in interreligious projects outside the country. For example, 
the author discussed her own experience of being welcomed as a Christian to regularly 
attend prayers at a Sarajevo mosque with Amra’s group of Albanian and Serb women from 
a divided town in Kosovo. We then visited a mosque and a church to learn about and feel 
comfortable in those spaces together. As such, Amra’s work is primarily about relating and 
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bridging divides between people, in line with Lederach’s theory that engagement is more 
effective at transforming current and preventing future conflict than minimising contact 
or segregation.
Conclusion
Highlighted here are the sustained efforts to develop relationships of trust by a Serbian 
Orthodox Abbot in Herzegovina, two imams from Krajina, a central Bosnian Catholic priest 
and a Sarajevan Muslim peace educator. Each of these cases demonstrates a method for 
turning conflict-avoiding behaviour into engagement; they facilitate safe, even healing 
spaces for encountering the ‘feared other’, through religious traditions, rituals, music 
and identities, and providing practices that empower the conflict-averse with non-violent 
strategies of relating. At the same time, they explain their actions according to their 
own religious frameworks, which support attitudes and behaviours of trust, forgiveness, 
and love. Consequently, we can see ways in which religious communities in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and the region as a whole possess a capacity for preventing violent conflict as 
well as the ability to drive conflict towards violence. As a wise story about two inner wolves 
reveals at its end, the one who wins this struggle is the one you feed.
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“Islamic tradition”: questioning the Bosnian model
Zora Hesová219, Charles University, Prague
Introduction
Debates over whether there can be a ‘European Islam’ have not ceased since 1990s when the 
term was coined by Bassam Tibi. Decried as an assimilationist imposition on Muslims for 
whom Islam does not bear adjectives, it still lives on in other forms, such as in Emmanuel 
Macron’s ‘Islam of France’. Since the mid-2000s the case of the ‘other European Muslims’ in 
the Balkans has attracted attention and questioning: are there not already autochthonous 
European Muslim communities with an experience of existing within secular state?220 
Indeed, the oldest of these communities and its form of the religion, ‘Bosnian Islam’, has 
since been held up as a potential model for other European Muslims and their relation to 
modern secular states.221 
When Riada Asimović Akyol recently wrote in the Atlantic that ‘the history and practice 
of Bosnian Islam yields a number of noteworthy lessons for those seeking to cultivate a 
liberal Islam in Europe’, she identified such a liberal version of Islam with the Bosniak’s 
acceptance of the modern state during Austro-Hungarian rule, in the administrative 
centralisation of its institutions, in the prominence of Islamic modernism in Bosnia and 
in history of secularisation – in short, the Bosniak’s adaptability to modernity and secular 
contexts is a model to be imitated.
This paper aims to question the idea of a ‘progress towards a liberal Islam’ as being 
too straightforward by providing historical, political and also intellectual context to the 
practice of Islam in Bosnia and, above all, by analysing the present logic of looking for a 
particular Islamic identity. I will propose a reflection on what the ‘Bosnian model’ might 
mean in three steps – defining the Bosnian model; placing it in historical context; and 
reconstructing the context of the contemporary Islamic community’s efforts to define the 
Bosnian Islamic tradition and assessing its results. 
219 Zora Hesová, PhD, is an Assistant Professor at the Institute for Political Science at Faculty 
of Arts, Charles University, Prague and fellow ať the Institute of Philosophy of the Czech 
Academy of sciences.  She has worked in the areas of Islamic philosophy, religion and politics 
in Central Europe and the Balkans. She currently coordinates a project on culture conflicts in 
populist politics in Eastern Europe.  Contact email: zora.hesova@ff.cuni.cz 
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A Bosnian model for Europe?
The attractiveness of the Bosnian model is based on two main factors: first, it represents 
a modernised sort of Islamic practice while being autochthonous and legitimate, and 
second, it has the potential to become a template for other Muslim communities. Asimović 
Akyol points to Bosnian’s capacity for ‘embracing modernity without abandoning religious 
identity’ and highlights that an ‘institutionalized, centralized form of Islam can be highly 
successful, as seen in the case of the Islamic Community’ of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
Acknowledging the impossibility of replicating concrete institutions elsewhere, she is 
nonetheless confident that Bosnia can indeed function as a positive example of how Islam 
and Europe, are ‘far from incompatible – in fact, they have been intertwined for centuries’.222
French historian Xavier Bougarel agrees that ‘all of these debates can be boiled down to 
a central issue: that of the relationship between Islam and Western modernity’.223 In his 
view, Bosnia clearly presents tendencies towards a kind of European Islamic modernity. 
Its major proponent, Fikret Karčić, is also the author of the influential definition of the 
‘Bosnian Islamic tradition’, which in his view comprises five key elements: 1) Hanafi–
Maturidi doctrinal belonging; 2) Ottoman–Islamic cultural heritage; 3) the Islamisation 
of pre-Ottoman practices; 4) the tradition of Islamic reformism in the interpretation of 
Islam; 5) the institutionalisation of Islam in the form of the Islamic Community; and 6) the 
practice of expression of Islam in a secular state.224 
In Bougarel’s view from the mid-2000s, Karčić’s vision of ‘individualised Islam in a secular 
state’, represented one possible trajectory among others including, identifying Islam as a 
‘common culture’, and a politicised vision of Islam as a nationalist ideology. These were, 
implicitly, in competition. In Bougarel’s analysis, the first position would not necessarily win 
out. Karčić’s vision was influenced by the former Yugoslav secular and reformist framework, 
whereas the other visions were motivated by the necessities of the new political context: 
a need for national identity and for national mobilisation. 
Increasingly, Bosnians themselves have presented their Muslim practice as an explicit 
model for Europe. In Zagreb in 2006, Mustafa Cerić – Reis ul-ulema (the elected leader of 
Bosnian Muslims) from 1993 to 2012 – presented his vision in his Declaration of European 
Muslims,225 in which he called for mutual tolerance and respect and a development of 
European Islamic institutions. The declaration was noticed in Europe: Bosnian Islam was 
portrayed in Germany as ‘a model for Muslims in Europe’.226
222 R. Asimovic Akyol, ‘Want to Cultivate a Liberal European Islam? Look to Bosnia’, The Atlantic, 
13 January 2019, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2019/01/bosnia-offers-
model-liberal-european-islam/579529/ (Accessed on 22 March 2019)
223 X. Bougarel, ‘Bosnian Islam as ‘European Islam’: Limits and Shifts of a Concept’, in A. Al-Azmeh, 
and E. Fokas (eds.), Islam in Europe. Diversity, Identity and Influence, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 2007.
224 F. Karčić, ‘What is the Islamic tradition of the Bosniaks’, Preporod, 7 December 2006.
225 ‘Islam: Bosnian Cleric Sees Unique Role For Europe's Muslims’, Radio Free Europe/Radio 
Liberty, 15 March 2006, https://www.rferl.org/a/1066720.html
226 Z. Arbutina, ‘Bosnischer Islam als Vorbild für Muslime in Europa?‘, Deutsche Welle, 7 
November 2007, https://www.dw.com/de/bosnischer-islam-als-vorbild-f%C3%BCr-muslime-
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Reis Hussein Kavazović, his successor, systematically speaks of Bosniaks, as the 
autochthonous European Muslims. In his lecture at the University of Pecs in 2016,227 he 
gave elaborate exposition as to what makes Bosniaks European and Muslim at the same 
time. Firstly, their Islamic tradition in terms of law, since the Ottomans bestowed ‘the 
most flexible’ of the four schools of Islam on the Balkans. Secondly, the fact that Bosniaks 
did not ‘become Turks’ but retained local customs such as outdoor prayers and never 
took to polygamy. Thirdly, the occupation by Austria-Hungary in 1878 meant the end of 
a ‘traditional form of religious and ethnic self-isolation’ and the necessity of religious 
and intellectual dialogue with another civilisation. It meant ‘confrontation’ with, and 
‘reflection’ upon various styles of thinking, governing and social conduct. It finally resulted 
into a process of ‘securing an autonomy’ within this new modern world by building a self-
governing religious institution. Finally, since Bosniaks ceased to be subjects of universal 
empires and became a part of a periphery, European identity has come to represent a 
‘universal’ anchorage for them. Reis Kavazović refers to Bosnian religious intellectuals who 
highlight the need for the ‘meeting between religion and science’ (H. Neimarlija), and the 
necessity of a secular state (F. Karčić) and of a ‘dialogical consciousness’ (E. Karić).
Another prominent Bosnian Islamic figure, the former director of the Institute of the 
Islamic Tradition of the Bosniaks Dr. Dževada Šuško, presents a similar self-understanding 
of Bosnian Islam as European in her German text, ‘A model for Europe? History and Practice 
of Islam in Bosnia and Herzegovina’, from 2017. While echoing the historical background 
outlined by Dr. Kavazović, she elaborates on two other aspects: the tradition of Bosnian 
Islamic reformist thought and the nature of the Islamic institutions. Bosnian traditional 
clerics and modernist intellectuals helped namely to absorb ‘the civilizational shock’ of 
losing the status of subjects of a universal religious leader (the caliph) and becoming a 
religious minority under a Catholic emperor. In 1882 the Grand Mufti permitted Muslims 
to serve in the Austrian army, and in 1884 the Tuzla mufti declared that it was permitted 
under lslamic law to live in the Christian state. The social consequences of modernisation, 
such as the presence of women in public places, the schooling of girls etc. became 
controversial. Often, a strong Islamic case was made for modernisation and a leading 
reformist, Džemaludin Čaušević, was elected as reis. The Islamic reformist tradition became 
the basis of the Islamic revival from 1970s.
The Islamic Community (IC) became a ‘substantial part of the religious identity of the 
Bosniaks’ (Šuško 2017). It offers itself as a model: it is self-financed, self-administered 
and ‘half-democratic’. All important positions are filled through elections – direct at the 
level of the džemat (local community) and indirect at higher levels, including the reis. The 
IC in Bosnia and Herzegovina is ruled by a modernised constitution. Dževada Šuško also 
highlights the centralised nature of the IC: all imams are nominated at the local level and 
appointed directly by the reis. Imams and religious teachers are educated in six secondary 
lslamic schools and three university faculties. As a result of the representative and 
centralised nature of the IC, the institution is stable, adaptable and most importantly, she 
notes, was able to withstand the danger of radicalisation. Indeed, due to its complex and 
adaptable structure, the IC was largely able to impose its central authority on all mosques 
and most informal fundamentalist groups, and continues to enjoy concrete legitimacy 
among the faithful it serves and represents.
227 Debate in Hungary with Reis ul-ulema: ‘Bosniaks have no complex because they are 
Muslims and Europeans‘,‘Mađarska besjeda reisu-l-uleme: Bošnjaci nemaju kompleks zato 
što su muslimani i Evropljani‘, lecture at the University of Pécs, 29 April 2016, via http://bit.
ly/2zvzR2D  (Accessed on 22 March 2019)
131papErs dElivErEd to thE ConfErEnCE
Bosnian Islamic institutions in historical context 
When Reis Kavazović says that the main heritage of the Bosniaks is their ‘religious 
foundation and institutionalisation within the IC’, he may be supporting the optimistic 
assessments of those who think that Bosnian Islam may be a direct model for Europe. 
Yet traditions and institutions are organically grown social phenomena. When looking 
at the ‘Bosnian model’ in its historical context, it becomes evident that modernisation, 
institutionalisation, self-governance etc. are results of mostly non-linear, complex and 
agonistic historical processes that could well have had very different outcomes. 
One example is the above-mentioned proposal of former reis Mustafa Cerić. Alongside his 
declaration of 2006, he engaged in many-faceted public diplomacy and spoke on behalf 
on European Muslims in the aftermath of dramatic situations, in a moment when the 
European Muslim diaspora had no recognisable representatives. He made a strong case 
for the mutual recognition of Islam and secularism, for the institutionalisation of Muslim 
communities in Europe and even for a single Muslim authority in Europe.228 The project was 
unrealistic at the time, which Reis Cerić has since acknowledged. While European states 
awkwardly work towards institutionalisation, or rather, a ‘churchification’ of Islam, there is 
no clear end in sight for this process.229 
Institutions, as well as theological consensus and identities, develop in conflicts with 
unknown outcomes. It was not otherwise in Bosnia. Institutional autonomy, reformism 
and the acceptance of secularism were as much products of circumstance as results of 
intentional action. 
Bosnian Muslims accepted their new existence as a minority within a Christian Empire 
with reluctance. Even after accepting the Habsburg legacy and modernisation as a part of 
their identity, Bosniaks continue to speak about the period as an occupation. After 1878, 
Bosnian Muslim lived through what has come to be known expressively as ‘a civilizational 
shock’. The ceding of administrative control of Bosnia and Herzegovina to Austria-Hungary 
by the Ottomans at the Congress of Berlin in 1878 was mitigated by promises of religious 
autonomy and continued attachment to the formal sovereignty of the Ottoman caliph. 
However, in 1882 the Austrian emperor created the office of reis ul-ulema, in order to 
detach Bosnians from the control of the Ottoman Sultan-caliph in Istanbul and elevating 
the pro-Austrian mufti of Sarajevo to the office. 
Later, when Bosnian Muslims mobilised for religious and administrative autonomy (1899–
1909) alongside Balkan nationalist movements, they wanted to return under the jurisdiction 
of the caliph. Their demand for autonomy was primarily defensive – spurred on by the 
Austrian state’s exploitation of Islamic endowments, forceful modernisation and by a fear 
of Catholic proselytising. This mobilisation for autonomy was eventually vindicated after 
the official incorporation annexation of Bosnia by the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1908, 
and then after the abolition of the caliphate in Turkey by Atatürk in 1924.
Similarly complex was the destiny of modernist theology in the Bosnian identity. The fatwas 
228 M. Cerić, ‘The challenge of a single Muslim authority in Europe’, European View 6, 2007, pp. 
41–48.
229 N. Vinding, ‘Churchification of Islam in Europe’, in N. Vinding, E. Racius and J. Thielmann (eds), 
Exploring the Multitude of Muslims in Europe, (Leiden: Brill, 2018).
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in favour of continued life under a Christian emperor and serving in his army were responses 
to almost existential crises – a large exodus of up to a fifth of the Muslim population, and 
an uprising against a military draft. The ability of Muslim law to pragmatically interpret 
precedents in Islamic history helped to save Bosniaks as a nation. Even more telling is 
the later fate of modernist thought. In the effervescent interwar period, young Muslim 
intellectuals were bringing in modernist ideas from Cairo and Istanbul and campaigned 
for social reforms. A series of intellectual battles were fought between modernists and 
traditionalists in their respective spheres. While many outspoken modernists could count 
among themselves prominent personalities, such as the first Bosnian-chosen reis Čaušević, 
they by no means were winning the culture war. In fact, Bosnia proved difficult for the 
Austrian rulers to modernise. While benefiting from Austrian sponsorship of higher Islamic 
education, Bosnian Muslim institutions managed to resist and stall many modernising 
policies from traditionalist positions, such as women’s schooling (at a time when universal 
schooling was law in the rest of the Austrian Empire). On the matter of female full veiling, 
the modernising reis also lost the battle and was criticised for being too impressed by the 
reforms of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk.230 In Bosnia, the fear of losing their identity through 
changes in social norms was at least as great as the ideals of social development.
The identification of Bosinaks with Islamic reformism in fact comes from a much later 
period – the last decade of Yugoslavia. In the 1940s, the fascist occupation and the 
subsequent communist regime repressed or eliminated many Bosnian intellectuals, 
especially the traditionalists like M. Handžić and M. Busuladžić. Between the 1970s and 
mid-1980s, the communist regime relaxed its control of religious activities and a limited 
Islamic revival ensued. Since then, the IC has focussed its limited resources on salvaging 
Islam as a practice, culture and institution. It has succeeded in renewing educational 
institutions, such as the faculty of theology in 1977 and a women’s madrassa in Sarajevo. 
Secondly, its leaders, especially Husein Džozo, made rational inquiry, reformist thought 
and practical legal questions key parts of the faculty’s curriculum.231 Modernised teaching 
included recognition of the secular framework of Islamic law and practice. Finally, the IC as 
institution has cemented its role as the umbrella organisation of Bosnian Muslims through 
new media outlets, through incorporating Sufi lodges and through claiming a monopoly 
on the wealth tax (zakat) in order to finance Islamic schools to preserve Muslim identity.
Hence, there was no straightforward process towards what makes Islam unique in Bosnia 
today. Many of those remarkable characteristics of Bosnian Islam hailed today as liberal or 
progressive were not based on a modernist consensus, but rather crystallised in complex 
processes and often resulted from necessity. Centralisation, reformism and Islamic 
education instead became defining elements of Bosnian self-understanding relatively 
recently – in a moment when Islam became a question of identity.
230 X. Bougarel, ‘Farewell to the Ottoman Legacy? Islamic Reformism and Revivalism in Inter-War 
Bosnia-Herzegovina‘, in N. Clayer and E. Germain, Islam in Inter-War Europe, (London: Hurst 
2008), pp. 6.
231 A. Alibašić, ‘Traditional and Reformist Islam in Bosnia and Herzegovina’, Cambridge 
Programme for Security in International Society (C-SIS), (Cambridge 2003), pp. 6.
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Defending the tradition 
A second characteristic of the Bosnian model is the fact that Bosnians themselves have 
started reflecting the specificity of the ‘Bosnian Islamic tradition’ recently and in the 
context of a new religious pluralism. This has driven institutions to make active efforts to 
define, strengthen and preserve the Bosniak tradition.
It is notable that what seems to be the basis of the official self-understanding of Bosnian 
Muslims as defined above is that it is not treated as identity but is usually as ‘tradition’, 
specifically, ‘the Islamic tradition of the Bosniaks’. This tradition, as defined by Karčić 
in 2006, became a quasi-official position of the IC. Links to Karčić’s ‘What is the Islamic 
tradition of the Bosniaks’, which was first published in the fortnightly outlet of the IC 
Preporod, can be found on the official IC website, on the websites of regional organisations 
of the IC in Bosnia and Germany and on official think-tanks of the IC.232 The five elements 
are consistently echoed by Bosnian Muslim representatives. The reason is that the Bosnian 
tradition is not only a practical self-definition, but an instrument of self-positioning in a 
religious context that has suddenly become dangerously pluralistic. 
Since the end of communism, Islam has faced three sorts of challenges in the region: 
the politicisation of religion in nationalist politics of the 1990s; increased involvement by 
foreign actors from the Muslim world during the war and after independence; and finally, 
the pluralisation of the Islamic scene in Bosnia itself. All have thrown into question the 
autonomy and authority of the IC in Bosnia. The IC has gradually learned to answer those 
challenges. With substantial foreign help, it has rebuilt its infrastructure, opened secondary 
schools and faculties, educated its religion teachers and imams, founded various organs 
and publications, and managed a change in the direction of the IC. 233 In the early 2000s, 
the IC liberated itself form the overwhelming influence of a political party and diversified 
its financial support from various parts of the world – seeking alliances not only in the 
Gulf, but also in Turkey and more recently in the EU.234 But the most demanding challenge 
proved to be the inner pluralism in Bosnia itself.
Since the late 1990s, the penetration of various Islamic trends into Bosnia via the Internet 
led to ‘a change in Islamic discourse in Bosnia’.235 Many hitherto absent ideas and types 
of religious organisation were spreading rapidly: minority sects (Shia, Ahmadiya), Turkish 
neo-Sufis (Hizmet, Suleymancis) and neo-Salafism.236 
The last trend represented the only real challenge. Several neo-Salafi groups openly 
232 Islamska Zajednica u Bosni i Hercegovini, 30 August 2007, http://www.islamskazajednica.ba/
index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1646:cta-je-to-qislamska-tradicija-bocnjaka
q&catid=90&Itemid=222,also available at https://www.cdv.ba/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/
Fikret-Karcic-Sta-je-to-islamska-tradicija-Bosnjaka.pdf
233 See forthcoming publication by Z. Hesová and E. Rašidagić, ‘The Changing Role of the 
Traditional Islamic Organization: three challenges to the restored Bosnian Islamic community‘.
234 K. Öktem, ‘New Islamic actors after the Wahhabi intermezzo: Turkey’s return to the Muslim 
Balkans’, European Studies Centre, Oxford (2010).
235 A. Alibašić, ‘Traditional and Reformist Islam in Bosnia and Herzegovina’, Cambridge 
Programme for Security in International Society (C-SIS), Cambridge (2003), pp. 14.
236 A. Ross Solberg, ‘The Role of Turkish Islamic Networks in the Western Balkans’, Südosteuropa, 
55(4), 2007.
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questioned the monopoly of the IC. Neo-Salafi groups started offering alternative fatwas 
on their websites, separate Islamic education to adults and Qur’an courses to children. 
Neo-Salafi leaders have also openly disputed the legitimacy of certain traditional religious 
practices such as outdoor prayers, receiving ‘pocket money’ for funeral rituals, keeping 
mausolea, the calculation of Ramadan timings, etc. 
A dissident Islamic discourse was disseminated by Saudi-financed translations of religious 
literature and Islamic centres founded by former mujahideen.237 Later, a generation of 
Bosnian preachers took over and initiated an even fiercer attack on the legitimacy of IC’s 
monopoly and its practices. Because dozens were educated in Saudi Arabia, they could 
base their differing vision of Islamic practice on their mastery of Arabic, on the aura of 
conservative authenticity and on a corpus of literalist neo-Salafi quranic references. The 
years 2005–2007 were marked by debates about confessional belonging within Islam (the 
madhabs) and they finally escalated in attempts by neo-Salafi groups to occupy or take 
over mosques.238 In 2012–2013, dozens left for Syria and threatened the IC from there.  
In a belated response, the IC sought to reaffirm its authority and legitimacy. It pursued 
two main strategies: strict and soft. First in 2006, the IC adopted a ‘Resolution on the 
interpretation of Islam’, calling upon imams to ‘be consistent in the interpretation of the 
institutional learning of Islam on the basis of the Qur’an, the Sunnah, and our experience 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina’, as well as reaffirmed its sole authority over religious objects 
and in rules concerning the usage of religious houses.239 As it became obvious, asserting 
authority is not the same as possessing it, and conflict ensued. It became necessary to 
look for other means of legitimising the IC’s authority, and by defending that which the 
challengers attacked – the Bosnian practice of Islam. 
Although the ‘Islamic tradition of the Bosniaks’ was a ‘constitutional category’ of the IC 
since 1997 (pace Dž. Šuško), it remained a vague reference. Attempts to give the Bosnian 
tradition a clear rationale became one of the main strategies for responding to what the IC 
terms ‘exclusive’, ‘radical’ or ‘extra-institutional interpretations of Islam’.240 
Prof. Karčić’s definition proved to a useful basis on which the IC could fully reassert 
its authority. It was able to legitimise the initially empty notion by developing and 
institutionalising the Bosnian tradition. In 2008, the rijaset (the executive office of the IC) 
established the Institute for the Islamic Tradition of the Bosniaks (IITB). Under Dr. Šuško, 
it was tasked with carrying out research into the history of the Bosniaks and engaging in 
public debates about their tradition. It started research into many of the criticised aspects 
of the Bosnian popular practice but also into the neo-Salafi criticism itself.241 The institute 
started publishing works of Bosnian Islamic thinkers to build a corpus of national Islamic 
237 A. Alibašić, ‘Traditional and Reformist Islam in Bosnia and Herzegovina’, pp. 15-16.
238 A. Kadribegović, ‘Vehabije osvajaju Sarajevo!‘, Preporod, Godina XXXVII, broj 5/847, 1. 3. 2007, p. 
9
239 Islamska zajednica, ‘Odluka o džamijskom kućnom redu’, http://islamskazajednica.ba/
images/stories/URADITI/kucni%20red.pdf (Accessed on 22 March 2019)
240 H. Karčić, E. Subašić, ‘Vaninstitucionalna tumačenja islama u Bosni i Hercegovini: djelovanje 
NVO i medija’, Islamska tradicija Bošnjaka na razmeđu stoljeća: izazovi novih tumačenja 
islama, Sarajevo: Institut za islamsku tradiciju Bošnjaka, (2018), pp. 145–166. 
241 E. Duranović, S. Ljevaković-Subašić, (eds.) ‘Izazovi novih tumačenja islama: islamska tradicija 
Bošnjaka na razmeđu stoljeća’, Sarajevo: Institut za islamsku tradiciju Bošnjaka, 2018.
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knowledge production – giving a basis for the claim of a distinct Islamic tradition. 
The IC also began to regularly organise public conferences on the notion of ‘tradition’ 
– considered by some to be ‘the most important academic meeting organised by the IC 
in post-war Bosnia-Herzegovina’.242 The conferences allow to debate over what makes up 
the Bosnian tradition, to bring arguments for its Islamic soundness and to discuss the 
challenges. Their proceedings reflect various trends: the notion of a tradition, the plurality 
of Islamic discourses, Sunni identity and finally empirical studies neo-Salafi groups and 
their challenge the authority of the IC in theological argumentation and media attraction. 
They also reflect a choice of Turkey as a partner in this endeavour. 
Liberal process of constructing a tradition rather than tradition of a liberal Islam
While the meaning of the Islamic tradition of the Bosniaks remains somewhat suspended 
between official and critical discourses that do not always meet, the Bosnian IC succeeded 
in establishing the notion of a Bosnian Islamic practice worth defending, capable of uniting 
the community, and open to some degree of discussion. 
In his definition, Karčić made sure to say that he does not attempt to add any adjective to 
Islam: there is no Bosnian Islam to promote against, say, Saudi Islam. He rather sought to 
theologically locate the Bosnian practice and to list the characteristics that Bosnians care 
about.243 Tradition is different from culture: it is based on adherence to certain principles, 
but it is also a product of a common history and other norms and values (secularity, 
coexistence and organisation). Talking about ‘tradition’ allows one to talk about a universal 
system of religious and ethical norms in a specific, local guise. Only from the perspective 
of tradition can reformism, institutionalisation and secularism become part of what a 
people may be asked to adhere to. Tradition finally allows one to define one’s identity 
without creating divisions – Bosnian tradition is a part of a Sunni tradition, and therefore 
of Islamic tradition.
Even if only IC insiders were included in official events (along with several neo-Salafi 
insiders who recognize the IC), many groups, including Islamic activist websites, neo-Salafi 
websites and secular newspapers, participated in a larger societal debate. The last public 
conference of the IC showed signs of mutual recognition between the official institution 
and certain critical trends: a distinction was made between those Islamic groups who 
criticise certain aspects of the IC position from within, that is, who despite reservations do 
recognize the IC, and those ‘extra-institutional interpretations’ that dispute the IC outright 
(Karčić, Subašić 2018).244
Hence, the process of constructing a tradition has proven flexible enough to slowly 
encompass diversity rather than create division. It also allowed for changing positions and 
242 A. Smajić and M. Fazlović, ‘Bosnia and Herzegovinaů’, Yearbook of Muslims in Europe, Vol. 7, 
(Brill: Leiden, 2015), pp. 118, 205. 
243 The other subject of IITB events were history of Balkan minorities, genocide, diaspora and 
secularism.
244 H. Karčić and E. Subašić, ‘Vaninstitucionalna tumačenja islama u Bosni i Hercegovini: 
djelovanje NVO i medija’, Islamska tradicija Bošnjaka na razmeđu stoljeća: izazovi novih 
tumačenja islama. Sarajevo: Institut za islamsku tradiciju Bošnjaka, (2018), pp. 145-166.
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possibly even for creating a convergence on certain topics, on a moderately conservative 
basis. For example, the IC seems to have reflected upon neo-Salafi successes. It has taken 
account of the problematic status of informal payments for funeral rituals,245 and of the 
absence of youth work. It has since initiated a series of programs for imams and, with 
the help of Norway246 (Perry 2016:32) and the EU,247 for youths to promote moderation, 
the Bosnian tradition and its European orientation. On the other hand, it made use of 
the liberal value of freedom of religion to advance collective religious rights and entered 
the debate about secularism and courts with a fatwa that defined the hijab as a religious 
obligation.248
The success of tradition as a process does indeed confirm what Dž. Šuško has underlined: 
the prevention of strife and extremes. The internal challengers have largely accepted the 
necessity of a common framework for defining common values, identity, tradition, but 
also recognised their agency in that very process. Nowadays, conservative or neo-Salafi 
intellectuals are the most active writers on practical subjects of social relations, family 
issues and religious morality, and they do so within the framework of the IC.249
Hence, the open process of tradition-finding does not make the Bosnian practice liberal 
per se. On the contrary. The need to constantly justify its Islamic legitimacy in the context of 
the ‘defence of a tradition’ may have pulled it towards more self-consciously traditionalist, 
communal or socially conservative positions or at least towards an acceptance of such 
positions. In this new context, the rational vision of an individualist religion that Bougarel 
has ascribed to Fikret Karčić may be losing ground after all to more communal, conservative 
projects of Bosniak Islamic identity.
But the process itself makes the tradition ‘liberal’ in another sense. The institution proved 
capable of navigating the plurality of positions, ideologies and influences. The capacity for 
evolution along a pragmatic set of rules while retaining a link to its foundational norms 
could be a sign of what Charles Taylor defines as secularity.250 Bosnian institutions rarely 
invoke religious authority anymore, but rather seek to gain legitimacy through inclusion 
and persuasion. 
Conclusion
245 Reis Kavazović and the Fatwa Council have respectively declared giving extra money for 
funerals unethical and paying for communal meals untraditional. See: ‘Od sada zabranjeno 
davanje “koverte” hodžama‘, http://www.kozarac-mutnik.com/index.php/obavijestenja/510-
ekskluzivno-od-sada-zabranjeno-davanje-koverte-hodzama (Accessed 20 March 2019)  
246 V. Perry, ‘Initiatives to Prevent/Counter Violent Extremism in South East Europe: A Survey of 
Regional Issues, Initiatives and Opportunities’, Regional Cooperation Council, Sarajevo, 2016.
247 Počela realizacija projekta ‘Moje mjesto u Evropi: izgradnja i promocija dijaloga o EU 
integraciji’, Islamskazajednica.ba, http://www.islamskazajednica.ba/vijesti/mina-
vijesti/27642-pocela-realizacija-projekta-moje-mjesto-u-evropi-izgradnja-i-promocija-
dijaloga-o-eu-integraciji (Accessed on 25 March 2018)
248 Al-Jazeera, ‘Vijeće muftija: Hidžab je vjerska obaveza’, http://balkans.aljazeera.net/vijesti/
vijece-muftija-hidzab-je-vjerska-obaveza (Accessed on 22 March 2019)
249 See a book on Bosnian tradition published by Muharem Štulanović, the Saudi educated 
former dean of the Islamic pedagogical faculty in Bihać: Faith and tradition in the Bosniak 
identity (2017).
250 See C. Taylor, A Secular Age (Harvard University Press, 2007).
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In most Bosnian Muslim self-descriptions, the Bosnian practice of Islam is based on a 
centralised institution, the IC, and the experience of pluralism, reformism and secularism. 
Such a self-perception does not reflect an explicit model – that is, a set of ingredients and 
principles for a liberal, European Islam. Rather it is the sign of successful efforts in finding 
responses to the multiple challenges of globalisation, religious pluralism, and challenges 
to confessional authority through the construction of an ‘Islamic tradition of the Bosniaks’.
Some ten years ago, the Bosnian Islamic Community initiated a path to reaffirm its authority 
and legitimacy through the notion of a Bosnian tradition. Tradition as a process seems to 
have led to a more pragmatic framing of religious and ideological conflicts. It helped to 
channel conflict into discursive controversy and institutionalising dispute into a process 
for open-ended yet controlled identity formation. While the emerging identity cannot be 
expected to be necessarily liberal or individualistic, it has a procedural character that 
evolves within a modern, secular framework. 
Not every Islamic community has its own ‘tradition’. Diasporic Muslims in Europe are very 
plural if not divided in their respective national traditions, ideological trends; indeed 
other Balkan Islamic communities struggle to even define their national traditions in the 
face strong foreign influences. Bosnian Muslims have the advantage of being attached 
to an organisation that is complex and adaptable enough to evolve and engage to some 
extent in self-reflective processes. Rather than a set of principles, its ‘model’ consists in a 
pragmatic and prudent organising of religious life in Bosnia and Herzegovina.251
251 'Zašto je Evropi zanimljiv 'bosanski islam', Al-Jazeera, 3 June 2017, http://balkans.aljazeera.net/
vijesti/zasto-je-evropi-zanimljiv-bosanski-islam
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